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This thesis analyses the political negotiations that shaped pre-electoral coalition-building 
amongst opposition parties in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda, over multiple rounds of 
elections between 2000 and 2017. Existing literature on opposition coalitions in Africa tends 
to draw upon quantitative research, using electoral data and a rational actor framework, and 
argues that access to funding is the key determinant of coalition formation, that electoral 
systems have a predictable effect on the likelihood of cooperation, and that ethnicity is an 
inhibitor of opposition cohesion. In contrast, this thesis adopts a qualitative and historical 
approach to the examination of factors and dynamics that encourage or impede opposition 
coalition formation by focusing on opposition parties in each of the three countries over at 
least three electoral cycles. The thesis draws upon 140 participant interviews with key 
opposition and civil society actors in the three countries, collected over a period of more than 
14 months of fieldwork, including periods spent in-country monitoring the most recent 
elections and attending election rallies. Internal party discussion documents, coalition 
agreements, party literature and media reports of the election campaigns also provide 
important sources. 
Coalition negotiations were held in 15 of the 17 elections under review, suggesting that pre-
electoral coalition negotiations – and subsequent coalition formation – are much more 
prevalent than previously assumed. In turn, the findings challenge our existing understanding 
of the dynamics of coalition-building in Africa. More specifically, the experiences of 
opposition parties in each country highlight a variety of reasons for the limited success of 
coalition-building. In Zimbabwe, foreign governments have played a central role in aiding 
opposition parties, but it is shown that their involvement has reduced the effectiveness of 
cross-party cooperation. Domestic and foreign business interests have provided financial 
incentives to induce party co-ordination in Zambia, yet opposition parties have been unable 
to find common ground, or have aligned their interests with those of the governing party. In 
Uganda, the opposition has consistently attempted to build coalitions at every election, 
building on a long history of cooperative politics, but these efforts have been thwarted as 
smaller parties attempt to protect their narrow electoral constituencies against the 
expansionist aims of larger multi-ethnic opposition parties. Across the three cases, the most 
consistent predictor of coalition collapse is intra-opposition competition for the same 
constituencies, rebutting previous theories that ‘ethnic’ parties are a hindrance to coalition 
formation and challenging the ethnic voting hypothesis. In sum, this thesis provides 
contextualised and historical accounts of coalition negotiation, formation and (frequent) 
collapse and identifies the multiple, complex reasons for the limited success of pre-electoral 
coalition-building. This contributes to a more nuanced and empirically-grounded 
understanding of the shifts in mobilisation strategies of African opposition parties, and brings 
the study of parties back into coalitions research. 
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1. Introduction  
“The struggle for democracy always takes place on two fronts: against the authoritarian regime for democracy 
and against one’s allies for the best place under democracy,” Przeworski (1997, 67) 
 
1.1 The Puzzle 
In December 2014, two Zambian opposition party leaders met at a South African game lodge, 
where prominent businessmen put money on the table to encourage them to form a coalition 
ahead of an imminent unplanned election. This was in a context where Zambia’s ruling 
Patriotic Front (PF) party was suffering a series of financial and political crises, and it 
appeared likely that it would lose. The PF had alienated their ethnic base through failing to 
recognise the popular Bemba paramount chief and seeking to install another, as well as by 
failing to pay farmers for their crops or provide inputs for the new farming season. In urban 
areas, discontent was rising on the back of food price inflation, electricity blackouts, and 
public servant wage freezes. While the opposition were gearing up for an election, the ruling 
party was mired in succession battles that threatened to split it down the middle, and the 
supporters of different party factions held running battles in the streets of the capital. The 
opposition was acutely aware of the consequences of not working together, as the single-
round (first-past-the-post) presidential electoral system had allowed the ruling PF to win the 
2011 election with just 41% of the vote. In every election held since 2001, opposition parties 
had shared more than 50% of the vote. 
In such circumstances, political science literature predicts that the opposition will coalesce 
because of the increased likelihood of winning the election,2 the availability of funds,3 the 
economic downturn,4 and the single-round electoral system,5 which provides greater 
incentives to opposition parties to coalesce. So why did the parties not agree to work 
                                                 
2 Nicolas Van de Walle, ‘Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce?’, in Electoral Authoritarianism: 
The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler, 2006, 77–94. 
3 Leonardo Arriola, Multi-Ethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
4 Michael Wahman, ‘Offices and Policies–Why Do Oppositional Parties Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions in 
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes?’, Electoral Studies 30, no. 4 (2011): 642–657. 
5 Gary W Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems, vol. 7 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ Press, 1997); Denis Kadima, ed., The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa (Johannesburg: EISA, 
2006). 




together? This is also not a one-off. Across the three countries and 17 elections under 
consideration in this thesis, 15 polls (88%) witnessed coalition negotiations between 
opposition leaders – and of those, just seven coalitions (47%) survived to fight the election, 
though many of these excluded key opposition players who defected just before polling day. 
Why do coalitions that are negotiated – as in Zambia in 2011 – so often break down prior to 
the election? Is the full story about trust deficits, inter-ethnic competition and financial 
incentives as Arriola (2013) has argued in his seminal text on coalition politics in Africa, or is 
there more at play? This thesis will seek to explain why, in each country and across multiple 
elections, the opposition seeks to coalesce and why these coalitions so often collapse. This 
thesis will – in comparison to much of the existing literature – use a qualitative and historical 
approach, studying coalition negotiations over successive elections in three African countries 
to highlight the ways in which ethnicity, funding and trust interact to promote or hinder 
coalition formation. 
1.1.1 Research Questions 
This thesis seeks to answer several questions through comparative case study analysis: 
1. What are the factors that drive coalition bargaining and coalition formation in each case? 
a. What is the role of private financing in driving coalition formation? 
b. What role does ‘ethnicity’ play in driving or hindering opposition party coordination? 
2. Why do these coalitions so frequently collapse? 
This thesis will use a small-N, multi-case approach to outline the dynamics of intra-
opposition coalition bargaining and coalition-collapse across three African countries – 
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda – from 2000 to 2017. In doing so, it will situate the 
establishment of coalitions within the political culture and history of the three countries, as 
well as outlining how contemporary political events shaped the dynamics of decision-making 
across electoral cycles. In making the case for why coalitions were created and so often 
collapse, it also documents inter- and intra-opposition dynamics, contributing to the sparse 
and often highly theoretical literature on opposition parties in Africa.6 This thesis challenges 
                                                 
6 Thomas Carothers, ‘Confronting the Weakest Link’, Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies. Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment, 2006; Lise Rakner and Nicolas Van de Walle, ‘Opposition Weakness in Africa’, Journal of 
Democracy 20, no. 3 (2009): 108–121; Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan, ‘The Viability of Political 




existing theory on the role that ethnicity and resources play in hindering or helping intra-
party bargaining and opposition coordination, arguing that existing understandings of the 
importance of both factors are insufficiently nuanced. It uses case studies and electoral heat 
maps to demonstrate changing opposition vote bases across electoral cycles, highlighting the 
propensity for anti-incumbent voters in each country to vote strategically, foregoing support 
for co-ethnic parties and party leaders in favour of a nationally-viable candidate. Among other 
things, this approach challenges the ‘ethnic voting’ assumption that remains prevalent in 
much of the literature on political parties in Africa. Finally, the research provides new 
hypotheses regarding the role of newly-elected party presidents in undermining coalition 
cohesion, suggesting a new variable to be considered in future quantitative studies of 
coalitions in Africa. 
In the next section, this introduction will outline the literature on opposition pre-electoral 
coalitions in Africa, defining the boundaries of established scholarship on the subject, and 
highlighting the limitations of existing research on opposition parties and coalitions. Section 
1.1.3 will then sketch out the argument that will be made over the course of the following 
four chapters. Following from this, Section 1.2 outlines the research design and methodology 
employed by this thesis, after which Chapter 1 concludes by discussing the organisation of 
the thesis and how the argument will be developed over the chapters that follow.  
1.1.2 Opposition Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Africa 
African opposition parties are at a significant disadvantage to incumbents, with the result that 
between 1989 and 2010, just 12 countries had experienced an electoral turnover from an 
incumbent president to the opposition.7 This number has increased quite dramatically since 
then. One factor which appears to have been crucial to many – if not most – of these electoral 
victories is that opposition forces within the country united behind a single leader within an 
electoral coalition, enabling the opposition to gain the votes needed to overcome the 
incumbent’s advantages.8 Thus, in 2000, the candidate of a coalition known colloquially as 
the ‘Sopi’ or ‘Change’ coalition won the Senegalese presidential elections, overthrowing 
                                                 
Opposition in Africa: Popular Views’, Afrobarometer Policy Paper 26 (August 2015), 
http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/ab_r6_policypaperno26.pdf. 
7 Nic Cheeseman, ‘African Elections as Vehicles for Change’, Journal of Democracy 21, no. 4 (2010): 1. 
8 On the incumbency advantage and opposition weakness, see Lise Rakner and Nicolas Van de Walle, 
‘Opposition Weakness in Africa’, Journal of Democracy 20, no. 3 (2009): 108–121. 




Abdou Diouf and 40 years of one-party dominance. That candidate, Abdoulaye Wade, was 
subsequently beaten by another coalition led by Macky Sall in a second-round election in 
2012. However, the coalition that really drove scholarly interest in alliances was that formed 
in Kenya in 2002 when, after two multi-party elections in 1992 and 1997 in which the 
incumbent had won with 37 and 40% of the vote respectively, the previously divided 
opposition formed a mega-coalition, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), which went 
on to win a landslide victory. Since then, coalitions have changed governments in Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, and most recently in Nigeria, Liberia, The 
Gambia and Sierra Leone. 
Given this success, it is perhaps unsurprising that pre-electoral coalitions9 are an increasingly 
popular tactic used by opposition parties across both democratic and hybrid regimes. In 2015, 
an opposition coalition caused the first democratic turnover in Nigerian history, while a 
coalition in Tanzania the same year came closer than ever to overturning the hegemony of 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), in power since independence in 1962.10 Between 2012 and 
2018, of 46 legislative elections11 that were held in Africa, 23 (50%) were contested by an 
opposition coalition. Of those, six countries experienced an electoral turnover, or a change 
in the majority party represented in parliament.12 Of the 47 presidential elections held,13 17 
countries (or 36%) saw the opposition coalesce, of which four countries then experienced an 
electoral turnover where the incumbent party lost to the unified opposition. These countries 
were Liberia (2017), The Gambia (2016), Comoros (2015) and Nigeria (2015). The coalitions 
in The Gambia and Nigeria both successfully (and surprisingly) ousted the entrenched 
                                                 
9 This thesis will look predominantly at opposition coalitions, as ruling party coalitions are fairly common and 
often-opportunistic alliances of an exchange of political support in return for (almost) guaranteed future 
access to positions or resources – whereas with opposition alliances, access to resources is rarely guaranteed 
and the higher risk involved generally requires higher levels of commitment. 
10 CCM was formed in 1977 following the merger of the independence party, TANU, and Zanzibar’s ruling 
Afro-Shirazi Party. 
11 Nine elections were excluded from the sample because they were holding founding elections (Somalia), 
parties were banned from competing (Swaziland), the country was experiencing a civil war, revolution or 
substantial political unrest (Libya, CAR) or some parties were restricted from competing as the country had 
experienced a coup since the previous election (Burkina Faso, Mali, Madagascar, Guinea)  
12 Seychelles (2016), Nigeria (2015), Comoros (2015), Tunisia (2014), Mauritius (2014), Senegal (2012).  
13 Nine elections were excluded from the sample as a turnover could not be coded due to a recent coup which 
led the ruling party to be disqualified from running a candidate (Burkina Faso, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Madagascar), or because the president wasn’t directly elected (Somalia). Kenya (2013) was coded as not being 
a turnover, as former President Mwai Kibaki (PNU) supported the candidacy of Uhuru Kenyatta (TNA) and 
the PNU agreed not to run its own candidates in the election, but to support the TNA campaign.  




incumbent president. There were also several more instances where a second-round runoff 
between the opposition and the incumbent prompted a coalition of opposition forces to 
support the most successful opposition candidate – who ultimately won. Between 2012 and 
2018, this occurred in Senegal (2012), Benin (2016) and Sierra Leone (2018).  
The growing prevalence of opposition coalitions has prompted the rapid growth of academic 
interest in party coalitions in Africa. As far back as 1997, Bratton and van de Walle identified 
the importance of opposition coordination as a precursor to democratisation by elections.14 
But, as already noted, it was NARC’s defeat of the nearly 40-year incumbency of KANU in 
Kenya in 2002 that captured the imagination of political elites and scholars concerned with 
coalitions, regime transitions and democratisation. Then, in a 2006 study of democratisation 
in competitive authoritarian regimes, Howard and Roessler concluded that opposition 
coordination was the most prominent explanatory variable for progress towards a more 
democratic political terrain following an election.15 Their study suggests that opposition 
coordination ahead of an election is one of the most important predictors for electoral 
turnover, which has long been linked to democratisation.16  
As a result, research on coalitions has proliferated, with several key studies dominating the 
field. Generally, the literature on opposition coalitions seeks to answer three key questions. 
One, why do parties go into coalitions? Two, what leads to the success of opposition 
coalitions? And three, what is the outcome of these coalitions – or of electoral turnover by 
coalition – for democratisation? This chapter will outline the key arguments that have been 
put forward in response to each of the first two questions, while the third – on the 
consequences of successful coalitions – lies beyond the scope of this research project. 
Why Coalesce? 
Opposition parties in Africa face significant challenges when competing against entrenched 
ruling parties. Benefits that can and often do accrue to incumbents such as the use of state 
                                                 
14 Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
15 Marc Morjé Howard and Philip G Roessler, ‘Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian 
Regimes’, American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (2006): 365–381. 
16 See Huntington’s turnover test, Samuel P Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Century, vol. 4 (University of Oklahoma press, 1993); Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: 
Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 




resources, patronage, and coercion place ruling parties at an enormous advantage that is 
particularly difficult for opposition parties to overcome.17 When the opposition then expend 
their energy, resources and political capital bickering between themselves and competing 
against each other for elected positions, their capacity to win parliamentary and national 
elections is further eroded. To overcome these challenges, it is argued, opposition parties 
must coalesce, usually in the form of pre-electoral coalitions.18 These are agreements reached 
between opposition parties ahead of an election, where they publicly declare to coordinate 
their campaigns and electoral strategies, either to front a joint presidential candidate and/or 
to run joint parliamentary candidates so that they do not split the vote at presidential or 
parliamentary level and enable the ruling party to win the election with a plurality of the 
vote.19 This is done with the expectation of sharing out the benefits that would accrue to the 
coalition in the event of victory at the polls.20 Pre-electoral coalitions enable parties to pool 
scarce resources and prevent unnecessary competition; cooperation facilitates the sharing of 
information and allows greater coordination with regards to mobilisation efforts, party agent 
deployment and vote protection mechanisms. Coalition formation often also allows 
opposition parties to access funding that may not otherwise be available – in Zambia in 2009, 
frustrated opposition funders demanded the formation of a coalition between the two largest 
opposition parties to maximise the returns on their investment.21  
Although it is rarely mentioned in the literature, opposition coalitions can also have an 
important demonstrative effect. Coalitions are frequently studied through an analysis of 
electoral mathematics – the proportion of the vote received by each coalition partner in the 
previous election is added together to calculate the likely vote-share of the coalition. But 
beyond basic electoral maths, it is important to remember that coalitions also serve as a 
signalling device to voters. Multiple rounds of Afrobarometer surveys have found that for 
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various reasons, opposition parties are the least trusted actors across a variety of political 
institutions in Africa. Research by Logan (2008) found that across 18 African countries, 57% 
of survey respondents reported that they did not trust opposition parties.22 She suggests that 
this is a result of a cultural preference for consensus rather than contentious politics, but 
other explanations are that distrust of the opposition is the result of antagonistic engagement 
because of personal differences between leaders and the popular belief that politicians place 
their own interests and careers ahead of the public good. Bratton and Logan’s (2015) research 
supports this idea – 71% of Afrobarometer respondents reported that they believe that 
opposition “leaders are more interested in advancing their own political ambitions than in 
serving the interests of people.”23 In such a context, multi-party coalitions can act as an 
important signalling mechanism, regenerating faith in the opposition at election-time, 
increasing the perceived competitiveness of the election and potentially increasing turnout. 
As noted by a Zimbabwean opposition leader, when you create a coalition “you re-energise 
the people, you get them to believe once again that [the incumbent] can be defeated and 
when they believe that [they] will lose, you are able to mobilise many more people to vote 
and it will take much more arithmetic manipulation for [the ruling party] to win.”24 What 
coalitions signal to voters is that opposition leaders are displaying political maturity by 
foregoing their own personal ambitions and overcoming internecine squabbles to coalesce 
for the ‘good of the country.’25 
Coalitions Literature in Established Democracies 
Since the 1950s, comparative and European political science considered the study of 
coalition-building as a key component of the broader political party literature. Riker (1962) 
produced one of the first studies on coalitions and hypothesised that parties, as office-seekers, 
try to maximise the value from being in government by maximising their size within a given 
governing coalition. His ‘minimal winning coalition’ theory suggests that parties always try to 
build a coalition with the smallest possible majority in parliament, to minimise the number 
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of ‘extra’ players between whom benefits should be shared.26 Subsequently, two schools of 
thought emerged – the first revolved around Riker’s ‘size’ principle, and the second around 
a ‘policy-seeking’ theoretical approach. This second school was most clearly articulated by 
De Swaan (1973) who argued that coalitions were most likely to form between parties with 
the most similar ideological inclinations.27 Leiserson (1966) theorised the minimal range 
theory, which predicts that (parliamentary) coalitions are most likely to be formed between 
parties with the smallest ideological range.28 The assumption behind this approach is that 
parties who enter into opportunistic coalitions with parties on opposite sides of the political 
spectrum would be punished by voters for betraying their core values.  
However, most of this body of theory proved inadequate to explain the formation of 
coalitions in sub-Saharan Africa. As noted by Wahman (2013), the problem with these early 
theories of coalition-building, is that they were overly simplistic, their predictive power was 
weak and they were unable to explain over-sized coalitions – such as those most often 
established in Africa.29 Where this research focused predominantly on government coalition-
building (the creation of governing coalitions within legislatures), coalitions in Africa tended 
to be formed ahead of elections, rather than after them. These coalitions were also often 
‘oversized’ – involving a proliferation of parties and political groups – rather than the 
‘minimal winning coalition’ as predicted by Riker. Equally, few coalitions in Africa appeared 
to be formed based on ideological distance. As noted by Manning (2005), the role of ideology 
in party formation and electoral competition tends to be weak, not least because of structural 
adjustment policies and the nature of the global economy which leaves limited options 
available to African policy makers.30 Bleck and van de Walle (2013) argue that rather than 
professing a strict ideological commitment, which is likely to garner less traction, African 
parties are most likely to couch their electioneering in terms of valence issues – broad issues 
with which it is hard to disagree, such as ‘development.’31 Together, these issues make it 
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difficult to apply theories of coalition-building in established democracies to the countries of 
democratising Africa.  
An exception to this is the study by Golder (2006) on pre-electoral coalitions in Europe. This 
study begins with the simple, but crucial observation, that “pre-electoral coalitions arise from 
a bargaining process in which party leaders compare the expected utility from running 
independently to the expected utility from forming a coalition.”32 Golder finds that pre-
electoral coalitions are surprisingly common in Western Europe, and that the likelihood of 
coalition formation is conditioned by the relative size of parties and the extent of party 
polarisation. This research places more emphasis on the party system as a factor that 
influences the likelihood of coalition formation, but its focus on coalitions in parliamentary 
systems in consolidated democracies makes it less applicable to African cases. However, it 
remains useful due to its emphasis on the decision-making process amongst political elites 
who are weighing up various strategies to determine the utility of coalition-building relative 
to the expected utility of running independently.  
Coalitions Literature in Africa 
The growing literature on coalitions in Africa is relatively new, emerging as it did on the back 
of the third wave of democratisation and spurred by instances of transition-by-coalition in 
Senegal in 2000 and Kenya in 2002. Only one book edited by Denis Kadima (2006) on 
qualitative comparative coalition studies currently exists, and it compares a wide range of 
diverse electoral alliances including South Africa, Malawi, Mozambique, Kenya and 
Mauritius.33 The wide range of case studies contribute to defining the emerging borders of 
African coalition studies, variously exploring the factors that drive coalition-formation, their 
ethnic underpinnings, their contribution to national cohesion and the stability of party 
systems. While this book was an important first contribution to the field, it was conceptually 
vague and covered a broad range of coordination-type behaviours amongst both ruling and 
opposition parties. Because of its breadth, this edited volume is unable to reach any firm 
conclusions regarding the specificities of opposition coalitions; thus, it is useful more for the 
data it presents for country-specialists rather than theorists. Since the publication of this 
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book, a burgeoning literature has emerged that tends to study coalitions ‘by numbers’, or by 
using quantitative and dataset analyses of coalitional behaviour.  
The most ambitious of these studies is Leonardo Arriola’s (2013) book on multi-ethnic 
opposition coalitions in Africa. Arriola begins from the premise of a collective action 
problem: opposition parties in Africa face many barriers to effective electoral competition, 
and would thus benefit greatly from cooperation – however, they rarely coordinate 
successfully. He seeks to understand why opposition cooperation remains so elusive, and his 
answer is that ethnic cleavages and credibility gaps present formidable barriers to trust 
between opposition parties. He argues that parties can overcome these trust deficits through 
offering financial incentives to other party leaders – ‘pecuniary coalition-building’ – when 
private business is sufficiently free from political interference and fear of political reprisals to 
be able to fund opposition coalitions.34 Arriola finds that in countries that have undergone a 
process of economic liberalisation which has sufficiently de-linked the state from control 
over access to credit, incumbents lose the capacity to command the political allegiance of 
business.35 This business class is thus able to access credit, free of political constraints, and 
use it to fund the opposition’s pecuniary coalition-building strategy without the fear of 
financial reprisals from the ruling party. For Arriola, it is this factor that explains why 
coalitions cohere in some cases but collapse in others. This book’s key contribution is that it 
highlights the importance of party finance to the study of coalitions, which had previously 
not been theorised in any significant depth.  
Arriola’s book is an important contribution to advancing the field, but it nevertheless has 
several shortcomings. Despite the central role accorded to ethnicity in the book, Arriola fails 
to explain how ethnic groups are conceptualised, and assumes that the political salience of 
ethnicity – and its role as a hindrance to cooperation – is uniform across the continent. 
Arriola also appears to suggest that opposition leaders are equally able to deliver the votes of 
their co-ethnics in stackable voting blocs that can be used to manufacture popular 
majorities,36 a proposition that often does not hold as clearly outside Arriola’s two cases of 
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Cameroon and Kenya – and sometimes not even within them.37 As noted by Bogaards (2014), 
Arriola’s analysis, while ambitious in its complexity, offers a mono-causal explanation for 
coalition formation,38 which, while useful for hypothesis testing, fails to recognise the 
importance of other factors such as  the provision of foreign funding for coalitions, personal 
animosity between politicians, and the strategic calculations of smaller parties. It is unable to 
explain within-case variation in outcomes – why coalitions fail to form in later elections – 
following the liberalisation of the banking sector and the incumbent’s loss of control over 
the allegiance of the private sector. Perhaps most importantly, Arriola’s book does not take 
parties seriously as multi-actor institutions constituted as an alliance of interests – frequently 
organised into factions – who jostle to achieve the supremacy of their interests over others. 
This will be dealt with in more depth below. 
Several other studies have also been published on the topic, but despite the proliferation of 
quantitative research on opposition coalitions, there is relatively little consensus on the 
drivers of coalition formation and barriers to their successful consolidation. In part, this is a 
result of differences in the population of cases being measured. Some authors confine their 
cases only to opposition coalitions in democratic, or semi-authoritarian regimes, while others 
include ruling party coalitions and power-sharing governments within a broader group of 
coalition-type phenomena. Given the substantial differences between regime types and 
coalition types, these studies reach very different conclusions regarding what drives coalition 
formation. Even when authors are studying the same phenomenon amongst the same 
population of cases – as with Resnick and Arriola – their coding of various coalitions differs 
so substantially as to significantly alter the conclusions that they come to. This means that 
many of the conclusions in the literature are contradictory. Where Resnick (2014) finds that 
coalition formation has significantly increased post-2000,39 Arriola (2013) finds that ‘there is 
no significant increase or decrease in the incidence of opposition electoral coordination over 
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time.’40 Arriola thus suggests that opposition parties fail to learn from unsuccessful coalitional 
efforts, a conclusion that contradicts the findings of Gandhi and Reuter (2013).   
There are also several key differences that exist in the coalitions literature. The first is over 
the influence of electoral system design in promoting cooperative behaviour. Manning (2005) 
argues that the predominance of presidential systems in Africa discourages the formation of 
coalitions, due to the indivisibility of the position.41 However, as noted above, opposition 
coalitions are frequently formed in presidential systems. When one looks within this general 
category, electoral rules can have a significant bearing on the likelihood of coalitions, but 
there is little consensus on which electoral systems are most effective at encouraging 
cooperative behaviour. Kadima (2006) and Cox (1997) argue that a first-past-the-post (FPTP) 
electoral system promotes the coordination of opposition efforts,42 while Resnick (2014) and 
Rakner and van de Walle (2009) find that a two-round run off system that requires that 
winners must receive 50% of the vote is more conducive to coalition formation.43 The 
conclusion reached by Resnick and Rakner and van de Walle, is likely due to the increased 
incidence of post-electoral coordination following a first round election – where the losers 
from the first round coalesce to support the largest opposition party, as in Senegal in 2000 
and 2012. The logic advanced for Rakner and van de Walle’s position is that opposition 
candidates prefer not to create pre-electoral coalitions in the first round but to use it instead 
to gauge their political support, and then use the results to bargain for a better deal with their 
candidate of choice in the second round.44  By contrast, Gandhi and Reuter (2013) and Arriola 
(2013) find that electoral systems have no statistically significant effect on the incidence of 
coalitions.  
The likely reason for the lack of consensus is that the effect of electoral institutions varies 
depending on political context. More specifically, opposition leaders’ choices are frequently 
mediated by their trust in the fairness of the first-round election, and the perceived likelihood 
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of pushing the incumbent below the electoral threshold. For example, in Zambia in 2016 a 
constitutional amendment changed the presidential election’s plurality system to a two-round 
electoral system, but the opposition still sought to build a pre-electoral coalition due to the 
need to win decisively in the first round. A lack of trust in the electoral system led party 
leaders to believe that if they won with a slim margin and/or with less than 50% of the vote, 
a potential second-round election would be manipulated or a narrow opposition victory 
would be massaged into an incumbent win.45 The perceived risk of a manipulated second-
round election is high when parties do not believe that the electoral commission is 
independent. Zimbabwe’s experience in the 2008 presidential runoff is illustrative of this 
concern.46 As a result, parties who do not trust in the independence of the electoral 
commission would prefer to win decisively in a first-round election with an ‘oversized 
coalition’ rather than risking it all on a second round. In addition, opposition parties are aware 
that ruling parties prefer to win decisively in the first round, as it helps shore up their 
legitimacy, and a second round raises the risk of incumbent defeat as it raises hopes and 
turnout amongst anti-incumbent voters. 
Although Resnick and Rakner and van de Walle suggest that two-round runoff systems are 
most conducive to coalition formation in the second round, this does not preclude the 
formation of coalitions in the first round. Despite the existence of a two-round presidential 
system in Senegal – through which a second-round opposition coalition had defeated the 
incumbent in 2000 – opposition parties in 2012 still sought to create a pre-electoral coalition 
to defeat incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade.47 When this pre-election coalition collapsed, 
opposition parties formed a coalition in the second round around the top opposition 
contender, Macky Sall, who went on to defeat Wade. This illustrates that two-round systems 
do not necessarily preclude pre-electoral coalitions, but instead the second-round provides a 
second opportunity to coalesce if the opposition is collectively strong enough to pull the 
incumbent under the 50% threshold. Second-round coalitions come at a lower cost than pre-
electoral coalitions. As will be outlined below, first-round coalitions require higher levels of 
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trust, coordination, cooperation and sacrifice, and they carry higher costs in terms of party 
profile, branding and internal unity. The opportunity cost of a second-round coalition is 
much lower, as the ‘ranking’ of opposition contenders has been firmly established by the 
results of the first round, and therefore there is less uncertainty in bargaining. The 
negotiations are also less complicated, as parliamentary and local government races are 
normally concluded in the first round, making the complicated process of choosing joint 
parliamentary candidates redundant. Parties are much more willing to ‘bandwagon’ after the 
first-round has been concluded, as the payoffs are substantial but come at a vastly reduced 
cost.  
The second difference is over the importance of ethnicity in driving or hindering coalition 
formation. A standard assumption in the literature – typified by Arriola – is that ethnic 
fragmentation makes coalition formation unlikely, as inter-ethnic rivalry and competition 
promotes ethnic out-bidding. Arriola operates from the assumption that ethnic 
fragmentation (and thus a lack of trust between ethnic groups and the parties that represent 
them) is the most significant barrier to coalition formation. However, Gandhi and Reuter 
(2013) find that ethnic fragmentation has no significant effect on coalition formation in their 
study of coalitions in semi-authoritarian regimes globally. Wahman (2016) builds on this 
conclusion, offering the insight that ethnicity has been overdetermined as a driver of voting 
(and thus coalitional) behaviour in Africa, and that a more contextual turn away from ethnic 
over-determination is needed in order to understand the complexities inherent in the 
relationship between parties and their constituencies and how that feeds into coalition 
formation.48 In fact, some new research suggests that in cases where parties’ support bases 
are geographically concentrated – as in Malaysia – parties may find it easier to negotiate and 
sustain pre-electoral coalitions as they face less resistance from lower echelons of the party.49 
In contrast, in contexts where potential coalition partners compete at the local level, conflict 
frequently emerges over the demands for one party’s parliamentary candidate to concede 
ahead of the race in favour of the candidate from the other party to the coalition to ensure 
joint candidates in all electoral races. In other cases, such as Zimbabwe, prominent party 
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leaders who are also representatives of ethno-regional groups in the largest opposition party 
may scupper coalitions with parties from the same region out of fear that they will lose their 
place as the most prominent political representative of their region.50  
The existing dataset-driven studies of coalitions are often unable to separate the drivers and 
outcomes of coalitions. As these analyses are always undertaken retrospectively and based 
upon an exploration of electoral results, they find it difficult to deal with sequencing and 
endogeneity problems. Gandhi and Reuter (2013) find that the greater the incidence of 
electoral repression, the more likely it is that a coalition will form. This suggests that coalitions 
are more likely in authoritarian states – a conclusion that other scholars appear to doubt.51 
The authors recognise that there may be an endogeneity problem in their conclusion – that 
rather than repression leading to the increased incidence of coalition formation, the creation 
of a coalition (and thus the prospect of more competitive elections) may in fact lead to ruling 
parties increasing their use of repression in order to dampen down the electoral threat.52 
While Howard and Roessler (2006) find that opposition coalitions are the most significant 
determinant of electoral transitions, van de Walle (2006) contests this by arguing that the 
perceived imminence of an electoral transition forces a ‘tipping point’ which makes 
coalitional behaviour more likely as regime insiders jump ship, both weakening the ruling 
party and strengthening the opposition coalition.53 A dataset-driven analysis of the drivers of 
coalition formation is unable to distinguish between these two outcomes.  
Finally, while the basic building blocks of coalitions are political parties, there has been little 
systematic research on coalitions that looks in any depth at the parties that comprise these 
formations, particularly across several electoral cycles. The clear majority of the literature on 
coalitions is based upon large quantitative datasets, using electoral data and a rational actor 
framework to theorise regarding the factors which promote or impede coalition formation. 
Of the studies of coalitions that have been done, few involve case studies. As Morten Jerven 
(2016) argues, there are some questions that lend themselves to large-N analyses, but that 
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“when the distance between researcher and subject gets sufficiently long, the road from fact 
to fiction is short.”54 In dataset-driven analyses, conclusions are derived from a limited set of 
cases, which are weighted in favour of countries in which the turnover-by-coalition model is 
relatively common. For example, in Arriola’s book he counts 15 cases of turnover by 
coalition,55 but nine of the 15 were in just four countries.56 Where case material has been 
used, there appears to be a ‘success bias’ where cases such as Kenya and Senegal are over-
represented due to their status as two of the most successful cases of coalition formation 
which helped to remove long-reigning ruling parties. Resnick (2011) noted that opposition 
coalitions – though frequently formed – rarely defeat ruling parties.57 Coalitions must be 
studied in context to understand the reasons for their formation, coherence and potential 
success. In this regard, more robust case study analysis is necessary to test the assumptions 
of the quantitative literature and resolve some of the unresolved questions over the drivers 
of and barriers to successful opposition coalition-building. This research will look at both 
failed coalitions and those that cohered to election day, both to highlight the reasons why 
some coalitions fail, and to explain how it is that successful coalitions manage to overcome 
fissiparous tendencies.  
As the foregoing discussion introduced some of the broader concerns with the existing 
dataset-driven analyses of coalitions, the next four short sections will identify the four specific 
areas that this research will speak to. Each section will set out the specific critique of the 
literature, define the relevant concepts and outline the approach used in this thesis. These 
four sections relate to parties, ethnicity, funding and party leaders. This will set the stage for 
the next major section, Section 1.1.3, which outlines the core arguments of this research. 
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Bringing Parties Back In 
Discussions of African political activity since the wave of independence swept across the 
continent in the 1960s have fluctuated between pessimistic accounts of ethnic violence, 
patrimonialism, and ineptitude to the unbridled optimism of the ‘Third Wave’ literature of 
the 1990s. Contrary to the emphasis on parties and partisanship in Western democracies, 
political scholarship on Africa has predominantly focused on the role of kinship and informal 
networks in structuring the relationship between governors and governed. Research on 
African political parties is surprisingly sparse and is dominated by what Carothers (2006) 
refers to as the ‘standard lament’ that parties are weak, corrupt, dominated by personal 
networks and ethnic affiliations, active only around elections, and lacking a significant 
ideological or policy focus.58 This narrative has so successfully overshadowed party 
scholarship in Africa that – even with a new wave of literature on political parties by scholars 
such as Elischer (2013) and LeBas (2011) – relatively little research has been carried out on 
the ideology, organisational structure and mobilisation strategies of individual parties or 
specific party types.59 This pessimism has similarly pervaded the study of opposition 
coalitions, which is typified by the assumption made in Arriola’s Multi-Party Coalitions in Africa 
that parties are little more than the personal vehicles of party leaders who are easily “paid to 
leverage their own reputations in mobilising their co-ethnics’ votes.”60 This leaves little room 
for a nuanced discussion of the ways in which lower level political players influence the 
coalition-building process. However, as this thesis will show, lower-level political officials are 
frequently able to shape the coalition behaviour of parties, thwarting coalitions that threaten 
their personal interests. Similarly to European political parties, more institutionalised African 
parties are comprised of “different coalitions of forces [which] are being formed within the 
party, and actors striving for dominance interact with each other in the struggle for relative 
influence within the organisation.”61 The parties studied in this research frequently find 
themselves riven by factionalism during coalition-building processes, as more junior party 
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leaders contest the coalitional strategies of the leaders and frequently stage mutinies. This 
complicates coalition-building processes, while a history of personal interactions between 
these deputies and other opposition leaders may impede future coalitions.  
This tracks the recent shift within European coalition research, which has begun to theorise 
parties as complex, multi-level organisations that are frequently organised into factions who 
jostle to achieve their preferred outcomes. This research has begun to consider intra-party 
politics as being determinative of coalition-building, as it seeks to move beyond the ‘unitary 
actor assumption’ of formal coalition research.62 Pederson (2010) argues that rather than the 
assumption in the coalitions literature that parties are able to negotiate as unconstrained 
unitary actors seeking to maximise policy, votes or seats, parties are constrained by internal 
factors such as the balance of power between the parliamentary caucus and the extra-
parliamentary party structures.63 The balance of power and relationships between these 
structures helps to determine which coalitions form and which are scuppered. Coalition 
negotiations can be particularly damaging for party unity, as “the choice of coalition partners, 
the type of interparty commitment, the content of the coalition agreement and the timing of 
the coalition formation, to mention only few, are often divisive issues within the party.”64 
The party’s leadership is constrained from below by the demands of party members, and their 
actions may serve to undermine party unity if there is a sufficiently strong group of members 
who disagree with the party leader’s actions. As Maor (1998) argues, when parties are 
factionalised, the credibility of party leaders’ threats and proposals during coalition 
negotiations are compromised by their perceived inability to exert control over their own 
political parties.65 This affects the coalition negotiation process as the public critiques and 
defections of disaffected political notables often undermine the bargaining power of party 
leaders within parties that do not have organised structures for managing internal dissent. 
This is the case in the three countries under study, where political notables threaten to 
abandon the party if their needs are not met during multi-party coalition bargaining processes. 
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This serves as a potential constraint on the bargaining behaviour of opposition party leaders, 
who are thus less free (in many cases) to enter coalitions than current coalition theories allow.  
While Pederson’s work theorises about the negotiation of government coalitions in 
parliamentary systems, many of the insights provided are nonetheless relevant to African 
inter-party coalition negotiations. Parties tend to fragment along similar fault-lines depending 
on the power distribution between the parliamentary caucus and the non-parliamentary party 
organisation. For Pederson, the positions of these two groups differ more along policy lines 
– she argues that parliamentary representatives are more likely to recognise that compromise 
is necessary in coalition formation, while extra-parliamentary party factions are more likely 
to take a hard line on policy positions.66 Although the fault-lines in African parties are similar, 
the reasons for conflict are often quite different. In many of the negotiations outlined below, 
the party’s extra-parliamentary leadership face dissent from the parliamentary wing of the 
party over the need to compromise and share out parliamentary seats in coalitions, 
necessitating some parliamentary candidates to step down for others. This often breaks out 
into open factional fighting or party splits which undermine the party leader’s bargaining 
position and compromise their ability to successfully negotiate a coalition. Bäck (2008) finds, 
with reference to Swedish local government coalitions, that factionalised parties and those 
with a more internally democratic dispensation are less likely to successfully negotiate 
coalitions.67 This is because party leaders are more constrained by their parties and the need 
to maintain unity and retain their position, leading them to be less capable of making the 
unilateral decisions that are often necessary during bargaining processes. Similar conclusions 
were reached by Ceron (2016), who found that in Italy, parties with more centralised decision-
making and leaders who were autonomous from the concerns of party factions were more 
able to successfully negotiate coalitions, and stick to coalition agreements.68  
Arriola’s pecuniary coalition-building theory suggests that smaller opposition parties exist 
merely to sell their support to the highest bidder. However, this is often not the case. Not all 
parties are so easily bought or co-opted. While many smaller African parties frequently sell 
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their endorsements and may even shift from the opposition to an alliance with the ruling 
party, this is certainly not the case with all parties. As Kelly (2018) shows for Senegal, while 
some parties yield to co-optation by incumbents relatively regularly, other parties remain 
consistently in opposition.69 The first distinction that Kelly makes is between parties that 
were formed to contest elections – requiring relatively sophisticated organisational structures, 
systems and mobilisation strategies – and those that function primarily as vehicles for 
attracting patronage and raising the public profile of the party leader.70 Many parties begin as 
the second type, and slowly become functional organisations over time, but most remain little 
more than briefcase or “telephone booth” parties (as they are known in Senegal) and they 
never become sufficiently electorally significant.71 Briefcase parties are less likely to be able 
to amass the necessary financial resources to remain consistently in opposition, and are thus 
more likely to opportunistically enter into coalitions with incumbents or larger opposition 
parties in order to attract patronage, or further their aims of raising the party leaders’ profile. 
However, electorally significant parties with a substantial organisation, significant party 
membership and a relatively consistent vote base are less likely to enter into coalitions with 
the incumbent – particularly in more polarised political contexts – for fear of alienating their 
constituents. At the same time, as will be outlined in the three cases below, the costs of 
entering into opposition coalitions can be high for party unity, profile and support. Leaders 
of electorally significant parties try to weigh up the benefits of coalitions with the potential 
risks of coalescing and conceding their party brand, allowing other parties to run candidates 
in their ‘strongholds,’ and opening up their parties to the defection of political notables as 
cross-party links are strengthened.  
Coalitions and the Political Salience of Ethnicity 
From early works that emphasised the ‘static’ and ‘primordial’ nature of ethnicity in Africa, 
recent political science and Africanist research has made the turn to a constructivist and more 
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contextually-grounded approach to ethnicity in Africa. Having overtaken the ‘primordial’72 
and ‘instrumentalist’73 approaches to ethnicity that were dominant in the first half of the 
twentieth century, the constructivist school holds that ethnic groups are socially-constructed 
‘imagined communities,’ that have historical roots and may impose moral constraints on 
group members, but that these relationships are somewhat fluid and subject to constant 
negotiation between group leaders and members.74 In turn, the political salience of ethnicity 
is the subject of an often-heated debate amongst scholars. In 1985, Horowitz argued that in 
democratising Africa, the nature of ethnic cleavages and the fairly static and predictable way 
in which ethnicity impacts on political behaviour would lead elections to become little more 
than an ‘ethnic census’ where ethnic groups become represented by ethno-political 
entrepreneurs, and voters simply line up behind their co-ethnic party leader.75 According to 
this model, the number of votes that each ethnic party leader can muster would be highly 
correlated to the size of their ethnic community. This view has had surprising longevity, 
though it has been increasingly challenged since 2000. While some scholars employ a bottom-
up approach, investigating whether voters make electoral choices solely based upon ethnic 
calculations,76 others have focussed on a top-down approach to discover whether most 
African parties can accurately be characterised as ‘ethnic’ – in that they mobilise electoral 
support almost solely based upon appeals to a single ethnic group.77  
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Arriola’s pecuniary theory rests on the assumption that African opposition parties mobilise 
support only amongst ethnically-defined constituencies, most of which do not approximate 
an electoral plurality. This requires that they enter into multi-ethnic coalitions in order to win 
elections, either by buying the endorsements of other ethnic party leaders, or having their 
support bought. The ethnic constituencies of these parties can then be added and subtracted 
to manufacture popular majorities. Although he does not define ‘ethnic’ parties in his book, 
we can infer that Arriola uses a similar framework to Horowitz (1985) who argues that “An 
ethnically based party derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group 
(or cluster of groups) and serves the interests of that group.”78 Arriola’s argument assumes 
that parties represent ethnic groups, and that party leaders are thus able to leverage their 
positions as ethnic vote-brokers to predictably negotiate coalitions. But he fails to 
operationalise what he means by ‘ethnic-based parties’ and he extends his cases to all 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, irrespective of the degree of ethnic voting. Despite the long-
standing belief that most African parties are ‘ethnic’ in nature, Sebastian Elischer (2013) finds 
little support for this, arguing that ethnic parties are “neither inevitable nor ubiquitous.”79 
The widespread characterisation of parties as ethnic – and the corollary ubiquitous nature of 
co-ethnic voting – has been frequently challenged by scholars in both case studies80 and cross-
national comparisons.81  
As the three case studies below will illustrate, parties in Zimbabwe, Zambia and Uganda rarely 
seek to mobilise only a single ethnic community, and few ethno-regional groups vote solely 
and reliably for co-ethnic leaders.82 This complicates coalition bargaining, as parties seek to 
mobilise adherents amongst several groups, it brings them into direct competition for voters. 
In such contexts, coalitions carry costs for parties in terms of the potential that they have to 
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undermine the profile, membership and vote base of smaller political parties. When ethnic 
groups cannot be counted on to bloc vote for co-ethnics, this introduces greater uncertainty 
in coalition negotiations. This thesis will show that the electoral salience of ethno-regional 
identities varies over time, and that so-called ‘ethnic parties’ in the three cases cannot always 
count on the votes of their co-ethnics. This complicates the coalition negotiations process, 
as it introduces greater uncertainty than in places such as Kenya, where parties tend to draw 
the majority of their support from particular ethnic groups and ethnic bloc-voting (and thus 
ethnically-determined coalition-building) has been a relatively stable component of recent 
elections.83 
Following from Max Weber, this research takes ethnicity to be a subjectively felt sense of 
belonging, which based on a commonly-held belief in a shared culture and common 
ancestry.84 People’s experiences of ethnicity – and its political salience – are conditioned by 
everyday experiences of interactions with the state, perceptions of history, and “remembered 
or interpreted collective histories of victimhood, marginalisation, and entitlement.”85 While 
the physical and historical basis for these shared identities may be contingent or accidental, 
the identities they circumscribe have become infused with meaning over time. In this thesis, 
I will use the categories deployed in each of the three countries under study, variously 
describing ‘ethnic,’ ‘ethno-linguistic’ and ‘ethno-regional’ groups. These are largely 
interchangeable and are the most politically-salient identities. In many cases, smaller ethnic 
groupings have amalgamated into larger linguistic groups (often a result of missionary and 
colonial classification systems), and although they are relatively recent ‘inventions,’ these 
linguistic groups have themselves been invested with meaning and become a politically salient 
category.86 For example, although there are said to be more than 50 ethnic groups in Zambia, 
these groups were amalgamated into four language groups, and it is these ethno-linguistic 
(and also ethno-regional) groupings that have become the key identity markers that are 
deployed to motivate political action.87 In each country, ethnic groups originate from and 
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predominate in particular regions (therefore ‘ethno-regional’). In many cases, despite the 
ethnic heterogeneity of the region, smaller ethnic groups have adopted the identity and 
grievances of the larger group.88 This is frequently a result of the political or economic 
marginalisation of the broader region, which allows for the mobilisation of political action 
along regional lines, in response to perceived persecution. When speaking about the 
coterminous nature of ethnic group boundaries and regional boundaries, this thesis does not 
deny intra-regional ethnic diversity, but rather intends to speak about the larger politicised 
ethnic (or ethno-regional) identities which have become a locus for political action.  
On Funding and Coalitions 
A lack of finance has long been cited as a constraint on opposition parties’ ability to win 
elections in Africa. Opposition parties are notoriously underfunded relative to ruling parties, 
and this affects the opposition’s capacity to maintain organisational integrity between 
elections and to campaign successfully across the country at election-time. A dire lack of 
resources is also often cited as the reason that opposition leaders will sell their support to 
incumbents, joining a ruling party’s coalition in exchange for financial rewards.89 However, 
this has been a difficult area for scholars to study as there is little available, accurate 
information on opposition party funding due to a lack of public declarations by parties, 
inadequate bookkeeping and a desire to protect the identities of funders to insulate them 
from political fallout. Besides Arriola, no other scholars working on African coalition 
formation have highlighted the importance of funding as a driver of successful coalition-
building. However, while Arriola makes a crucial contribution by drawing attention to this 
hitherto ignored factor, he over-determines funding as a driver of successful coalition 
building.  
More specifically, while Arriola’s argument hinges on domestic businessmen providing 
funding to opposition parties to finance coalitions, he misses several important issues. He 
argues that financial liberalisation makes it more difficult for ruling parties to discipline 
capital, allowing local business elites to finance coalition formation. However, in cases such 
as Uganda, financial liberalisation has not sufficiently constrained the NRM’s ability to 
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penalise businesses who associate with their opponents. Kiiza (2008) quotes a member of the 
opposition as saying: 
While multi-partism is allowed under the current legal regime, support for the FDC in 
all its forms is criminalised by the ruling party. Businesses that offer us financial and 
material support strictly demand anonymity as a condition for supporting us. They fear 
that if their support for FDC becomes public, URA [Uganda Revenue Authority] 
officials will be deployed immediately to harass their businesses and/or drive them to 
bankruptcy [through strict implementation of taxation policies].90 
The ruling party is similarly able to discipline errant businessmen in Zambia, despite the 
thorough liberalisation of the country’s economy and banking sector. Following the 2015 
elections, an opposition-supporting newspaper mogul’s business empire was suddenly 
reviewed by the Zambian Revenue Authority (ZRA), despite allegations that the tax bill in 
question had already been settled, the ZRA attached all the newspaper’s assets and shut down 
the business. Thus, while liberalisation frees business elites from political constraints in 
accessing credit, their businesses remain vulnerable to other types of interference from the 
state. 
Moreover, contrary to Arriola’s argument, business financing of opposition parties is not that 
unusual, and many businesses that support the ruling party financially also contribute to 
opposition coffers. For example, Ugandan business tycoon Sudhir Ruparelia and the Sugar 
Corporation of Uganda Limited (SCOUL) were both said to have contributed substantially 
to the election campaigns of both the NRM and opposition FDC in the 2006 polls.91 But 
according to the DP Secretary General, when businesses give 10 million Shillings to the DP, 
they give at least ten times that to the NRM.92 Kiiza (2008) quotes Professor Kagonyera, the 
former Minister of the Presidency, as saying “don’t be surprised. Business companies seek to 
diversify their ‘investments.’”93 This mirrors other common business practices, where 
corporations hedge their bets in order to minimise the potential fallout for their business if 
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there is a change of power at the head of state level. What determines how political donations 
are split is the likelihood of defeat of the ruling party, or the level of investment of the 
business in a new political elite. For example, businesses that are being persecuted by the 
state (perhaps through the revenue authority, or by being excluded from new government 
contracts) may have an added incentive to fund the opposition, to ensure a more favourable 
political dispensation following the elections. This is often the case with external 
businessmen, who seek to land future government contracts or create an enabling business 
environment by donating to the opposition. This was the case with the 2015 and 2016 
elections in Zambia, where the Brenthurst Foundation – funded by Anglo-American 
Corporation – assisted the opposition UPND both in cash and kind to form an opposition 
coalition, and then to run a formidable electoral campaign (see the Zambia chapter).  
At the same time, opposition parties may receive funding from sources other than domestic 
and international businessmen, such as in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s. The Zimbabwean 
opposition MDC was heavily supported – both in cash and kind – by various Western 
embassies and donor agencies, as well as by partisan political foundations. These actors 
sought to shift the balance of power in Zimbabwe towards the opposition, in order to have 
a more amenable political dispensation in Harare. This highlights that opposition sources of 
funding are often more diverse than expected, and that the constraints on businesses 
described by Arriola may remain a concern long after the liberalisation of the country’s 
financial sector. Finally, as will be shown below, at times party leaders have little interest in 
selling their support to the highest bidder and opt to contest elections on their own party 
ticket. This highlights that there is more at play than simply concerns over access to electoral 
financing or patronage. This thesis will present cases that complicate the neat ‘pecuniary 
coalition-building’ theory, arguing that it is an important factor but that party leaders are also 
balancing other considerations during negotiations.  
The Ambiguous role of Party Leaders 
Finally, as a corollary of the section on theorising parties as multi-level actors, it is necessary 
to address the role of party leaders. As noted above, parties and party leaders are normally 
treated as one and the same within a ‘unitary actor’ framework of opposition party behaviour. 
Parties’ interests are believed to be largely indivisible from the interests of the party leader, 




as parties across most of Africa are considered to be little more than “ephemeral vehicles for 
personal ambition.”94 This may be true of briefcase parties which have few structures, limited 
staff and a narrow membership base. However, parties that are more institutionalised – such 
as the MDC-T, FDC and UPND – are comprised by factions which have their own interests 
and supporters, and will advocate to advance their own agendas during coalition negotiations. 
Flattening party types leads to a failure to account for the constraints on the behaviour of the 
party leader that are imposed by more organisationally robust opposition parties. Party 
leaders are concerned with maintaining their own positions, and will act to try to secure those 
positions from both internal and external threats.  
These leaders were also brought to power by a coalition of political forces, and often find 
themselves accountable to the political and financial interests that helped to elect them. Partly 
as a result of this and due to a lack of reliable polling – which makes electoral results 
unpredictable – newly-elected party leaders appear to over-estimate their political support. 
As will be shown below, new party leaders almost always insist on running as a presidential 
candidate in the first election in which they are party president. In subsequent elections, 
following a disappointing result, these leaders are more likely to enter into pre-electoral 
coalitions. This is likely due to the party leader having expended both their political and 
financial capital on their debut polls, and their inability to recoup both because of their 
obvious infeasibility as a national candidate. However, this does not necessarily make later 
coalitions more straightforward to negotiate.  
Each coalition negotiation is one set in what is understood to be an iterative game, where the 
previous behaviour of coalition partners has a bearing on the future behaviour of other party 
leaders.95 Tavits (2008) notes that defection from a coalition makes the subsequent inclusion 
of the same parties in later coalitions less likely. She finds that this is due to defecting parties 
losing credibility in the eyes of their coalition partners, and thus being punished in future 
negotiations.96 Although it was developed to explain the likelihood of inclusion following 
defection from governments, this theory also applies to opposition pre-electoral coalitions. 
                                                 
94 Gandhi and Reuter, ‘The Incentives for Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Non-Democratic Elections’, 146. 
95 Margit Tavits, ‘The Role of Parties’ Past Behavior in Coalition Formation’, American Political Science Review 
102, no. 4 (November 2008): 495–507. 
96 Tavits. 




As will be shown below, parties’ and leaders’ past behaviour in coalitions helps to determine 
whether and how they are included in later coalition negotiations. In sum, party leaders are 
constrained by their attempts to retain their positions, and thus by the interests of party 
members and factions as well as by the political and financial interests that supported their 
ascent. Leaders may use coalition negotiations to further their own interests, and to punish 
former coalition partners for their actions during previous negotiations.  
1.1.3 The Argument 
The first conclusion to note is that coalition negotiations are more common than is usually 
recognised. Following from the cases studies, this dissertation makes a four-part argument. 
The first is that political parties should be treated seriously as multi-level organisations 
comprised of groups with competing interests and ideas on tactics and strategy, and the ability 
to scupper coalitions to protect their own interests. The second is that ethnic diversity may 
be less of a hindrance to coalition formation than is generally thought. The third finding is 
that the offer of funding is not necessarily a guarantor of successful coalition formation, but 
one of several considerations for party leaders. Fourth, newly elected party leaders almost 
always seek to contest elections under their own banner; in subsequent elections they will 
often enter a coalition but use the negotiations to further their own interests. Each of these 
issues will be highlighted briefly below, after which a discussion of all four will be woven 
through the chronological discussion of coalitions in each of the subsequent empirical 
chapters and the threads of the argument drawn together again in Chapter 5. 
Parties 
This thesis will argue that much of the pressure that forces multi-party coalitions to collapse 
is exerted by functionaries and candidates below the level of the party leader, whose interests 
are not necessarily served by cooperation. Key actors such as the Secretary General or Vice 
President may seek to scupper party coalitions as they fear the loss of their own positions 
within the party and prospective government hierarchies. While party coalition agreements 
divvy up Cabinet positions amongst the coalition principals (i.e. party presidents), lower level 
members of party executives (such as vice presidents and secretaries general) often see their 
own positions in a potential government hierarchy threatened by this arrangement.  




Equally, coalitions frequently seek to run joint candidates at parliamentary level (to avoid 
splitting the opposition vote), this entails party leaders trying to persuade aspiring 
parliamentary candidates not to run – in favour of a candidate from another party. 
Parliamentary candidates have often spent the preceding parliamentary term building their 
profiles within their preferred constituency, sinking wells, paying school fees and addressing 
community needs. Requiring a candidate to forego a shot at the parliamentary seat – and thus 
an opportunity to recoup these costs – is often extremely unpopular. This can be devastating 
for local-level party unity and the maintenance of party structures, and it can open rifts 
between the parliamentary caucus and the party’s executive that ultimately threatens the 
political survival of the party leader. When party presidents are facing internal revolts (often 
but not always due to coalitions), they will seek to join or abandon coalitions depending on 
what they think will strengthen their hand within their own parties.  
Ethnicity 
Although it is commonly presumed that the high salience of ethnicity in electoral politics is 
a barrier to coalition formation, this is not always the case. Considering the above discussion 
of how MPs might undermine coalition cohesion, in cases where ethnic groups are 
geographically concentrated, and parties organise almost exclusively around ethnic 
cleavages,97 coalitions comprised of parties that compete less at parliamentary or local 
government level are more likely to remain cohesive. The lack of competition with other 
parties over the same parliamentary seats leads to less pushback from lower levels of the 
party, and thus greater party unity and coalition stability.  
Across the three cases, ethnic bloc-voting is also less predominant than is predicted by 
coalition theories – which makes coalition negotiations less predictable. As in Uganda since 
the early 2000s, ethno-linguistic groups have largely failed to bloc-vote for their co-ethnic 
leader, or the opposition party that historically represented their region. Instead, anti-
incumbent voters frequently voted for an opposition party led by a non-co-ethnic politician 
who looked capable of winning, and often rejected leaders of smaller but co-ethnic 
opposition parties. The same argument can be made for politics in Zimbabwe since 2005, 
when voters in the Ndebele-speaking Matabeleland regions consistently rejected a co-ethnic 
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Matabeleland-based party in favour of a Shona-dominated party that was more likely to win 
the election at the national level. Cross-ethnic voter coordination occurs with surprising 
regularity across the three cases outlined in this thesis, which serves to undermine Arriola’s 
‘ethnic bloc-voting’ assumptions, in which ethnic constituencies can be added or subtracted 
predictably to build an oversized coalition capable of winning a national election. 
Funding 
While Arriola (2013) argues that access to funding is the key determinant of the successful 
formation of opposition coalitions, the historical cases in the following chapters undermine 
this and suggest that there is more at play. Opposition party presidents who are offered a 
financial incentive to cooperate in Zimbabwe and Zambia opted to turn the offer down due 
to personal animosity or strategic calculations regarding where their interests would be best 
served. In Zimbabwe, the provision of funding and support by external donors to just one 
opposition party hindered cooperation, entrenching intra-party animosity and limiting the 
likelihood of coalescing. In Zambia in 2015, despite the offer of private financing for the 
endorsements of two party leaders, both opted to turn it down – one to work with the ruling 
party candidate, and the second to run his own presidential campaign. This suggests that 
party leaders might have other preferences than merely to secure a financial reward to endorse 
another candidate – party leaders in Arriola’s theory have few other interests but to sell their 
endorsements to the highest bidder. This theory does not hold true in the majority of 
coalition negotiations under review in this thesis, which suggests that while funding is 
important, it is just one consideration amongst a range of considerations for party elites 
during negotiations. As argued below, the provision of funding can both build and undermine 
trust. 
The Party Leader 
The argument regarding the main party leader is three-fold. First, across the three cases under 
study, newly-elected opposition party leaders have consistently resisted entering into 
coalitions where their party is the junior partner. In nearly every negotiation process, newly-
elected party leaders opt instead to contest as a presidential candidate if their party is not 
chosen to front the joint candidate. This suggests that new party leaders either have an 
inflated sense of how much support they can muster at the ballot box, or they are accountable 




to the political or financial interests that helped elect or nominate them. Following an 
unsuccessful electoral campaign, party leaders frequently choose to enter into coalitions in 
the polls that follow.  
Secondly, party leaders are often constrained by their assessments of what course of action 
best serves their preservation of their positions within their parties, and what consequences 
party disunity (as a result of coalitions) might have on their ability to maintain their own 
positions. If party leaders are concerned about party unity, maintaining their positions, 
obtaining financing and maximising electoral outcomes, they frequently find themselves 
trying to make complex decisions in an atmosphere of incomplete information.  
Finally, existing studies of negotiations assume that each negotiation is a single-shot event in 
which party leaders have had no previous interactions. But, given the small size of the political 
elite, party leaders have invariably had previous interactions with their prospective coalition 
partners and the nature of this previous relationship helps to condition their behaviour in 
later coalition negotiations. The outcomes of previous interactions including coalition 
negotiations – and perceived slights – are a frequent barrier to forming successful 
partnerships. The actions of party leaders are conditioned both by previous interactions and 
by expectations of future benefits within coalitions. 
Contribution to the Literature 
This research can be seen as an expansion of the problem that Arriola sought to explore, 
which was under what conditions do coalitions cohere? More specifically, this research 
outlines instances in which coalitions cohere but also, significantly, instances in which they 
collapse. It is only through studying instances of coalition collapse more rigorously that the 
reasons for coalition cohesion are made plain. This thesis is the first attempt to undertake a 
multi-country, longitudinal approach to studying the dynamics around coalition formation 
and collapse in Africa. Equally, it is the first attempt to give an account of the multi-party 
opposition coalitions in these three cases, which have been largely ignored within the broader 
field of coalition studies. Beyond this, the detail and depth provided in the three empirical 
chapters (Chapters 2-4) give an account of the dynamics of intra-opposition competition, 
highlighting changes in their support bases across electoral cycles and thus changes in 
coalition strategy.  




While this thesis tests assumptions on the role of ethnicity and funding in driving or hindering 
coalition formation, it also problematizes assumptions regarding ‘ethnic voting’ by using 
electoral heat maps to outline party support bases and the importance of non-co-ethnic anti-
incumbent voting in all three countries. This research makes four original contributions to 
existing knowledge on this topic. First, it is the first study to examine African pre-electoral 
coalitions chronologically, looking at the ways in which previous coalition negotiations shape 
or hinder later cooperation. Secondly, it studies these negotiations in three countries which 
have previously been largely excluded from coalition studies, and argues that the experiences 
of these three countries can help to explain broader constraints on successful negotiations 
elsewhere. Third, this research problematises existing research, and formulates new 
hypotheses for why coalitions fail to form which can then be tested in future studies. And 
finally, this research contributes to the sparse literature on opposition parties in Africa, it 
highlights various mobilisation strategies employed and how these change over time, as well 
as how parties’ electoral constituencies shift across electoral cycles.  
1.2 Design and Methods 
1.2.1 Case Studies and Process Tracing 
This section will discuss the use of case studies, the grounded theory approach that was used 
for data collection and hypothesis generation, as well as the process tracing method that is 
used throughout this research to substantiate the arguments. Section 1.2.2 will discuss case 
selection, while Section 1.2.3 will give a detailed account of the methods of data collection 
and the types of data used to make the argument and derive the conclusions.  
This research takes the form of a comparative study of opposition parties in three countries, 
grounded in the qualitative research tradition. This thesis employs a mixed methods approach 
to three case studies; the project formulation and data collection was conducted using 
grounded theory method, while the argument is developed by employing process tracing and 
historical explanation. Grounded theory method, as elaborated by Glaser and Strauss (1967), 
uses an inductive research design where the researcher enters the field with a broad subject 
area or problem in mind, and allows the research questions to emerge first from data 




collection.98 The data is simultaneously collected, coded and analysed, and observations from 
the field are ultimately used to derive empirically grounded theory. In the early stages of the 
research, “as many different people, situations and documents as possible are selected to 
obtain data covering the complete spectrum of the research question.”99 This was the 
approach used in this research, where the researcher went into the field to study the broad 
area of opposition party mobilisation, and from observations regarding the pervasiveness of 
opposition coalition formation and collapse across the three countries, the research question 
was narrowed down. While in the field conducting research on opposition mobilisation 
strategies, it became clear that all three of the large parties under study were in the process of 
negotiating coalitions for upcoming elections. Upon further reading it became clear that these 
negotiations – and those that had preceded them – had not been covered in the coalitions 
literature, and that the existing literature was insufficiently able to explain the outcomes 
observed.  
The methods that were used include interviews, participant observation, archival research 
and electoral data mapping. This thesis seeks to use these case studies to test the validity of 
existing theory – ‘theory-testing’ – through collecting the insights gained in each case to assess 
whether existing theory (developed largely through statistical analysis) is able to explain the 
observed outcomes. As outlined above, the majority of existing research on pre-electoral 
coalitions in Africa was undertaken using a quantitative design, seeking to map out the 
variables that make coalition formation more or less likely. Despite the proliferation of 
research in this area, there are few rigorous case studies of coalition negotiation processes, 
and even fewer that study negotiations across multiple electoral cycles. Existing quantitative 
research treats each coalition as a single-shot occurrence,100 and is thus unable to track and 
account for continuities and changes over time. In the existing research, each election and 
each coalition is analysed separately, as though the parties had ‘no history and no future.’101 
However, as this thesis will show, parties’ strategies in elections and coalition negotiations 
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are conditioned both by past events and by expectations of future benefits. This is only 
possible with a case study approach, which seeks to illustrate continuities and changes over 
time.  
Coalition negotiations are complex events, characterised by information asymmetries and 
competing interests and strategies. This makes them particularly difficult to predict using 
statistical methods. As noted by Hall (2003), regression analysis is useful when the effects of 
a few variables are very strong, and easily measurable – but when the interaction effects are 
complex, and the data is limited, regression analyses fail to adequately explain social and 
political phenomena.102 Charles Tilly (2006) suggests the use of process tracing as a method 
for social science investigation in situations where theoretical propositions should be based 
not on “large-N statistical analysis” but on “relevant, verifiable causal stories resting in 
differing chains of cause-effect relations whose efficacy can be demonstrated independently 
of those stories.”103 In this case, process tracing and historical method will be used to test the 
assumptions and draw out the causal processes inferred by existing large-N statistical analyses 
of coalition processes.  
The theories developed by statistical analyses of coalitions will be assessed and tested using 
process tracing methods. Process tracing is particularly useful in theory-testing, as George 
and Bennet (2005) note: “In process tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival 
documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a 
theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the 
intervening variables in that case.”104 Small-N comparative studies are well-suited to theory 
testing in comparative politics, “precisely because such research designs cover small numbers 
of cases, the researcher can investigate causal processes in each of them in detail, thereby 
assessing the relevant theories against especially diverse kinds of observations.”105 Small-N 
studies are relevant and useful for the current project as they are a useful method of analysing 
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the underlying causal mechanisms. While statistical methods and large-N studies identify the 
correlations between input and outcome variables, case studies can identify the causal 
mechanisms between the inputs and outcomes. As noted by George and Bennett (2006), 
“The method of process-tracing is relevant for generating and analysing data on the causal 
mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that 
link putative causes to observed effects.”106 With regards to this project, case studies and 
process tracing allow a closer analysis of the ways in which ethnicity, funding, parties and 
party leaders interact within coalition negotiations across multiple electoral cycles.  
To mitigate the potential shortfalls of the types of data used for this research (discussed in 
more depth below) – including interviews, WikiLeaks Cables, party documents, personal 
archives and newspaper sources – this research will triangulate all data where possible. 
Triangulation is necessary and useful as it helps to ensure the validity of the data, and thus of 
the research findings. Good research practice is expected to involve triangulation, which is 
the use of multiple methods and data sources to enhance the validity of research findings.107 
This is a strategy that will “aid in the elimination of bias and allow the dismissal of plausible 
rival explanations such that a truthful proposition about some social phenomenon can be 
made.”108 In this case, I used multiple methods and data sources to confirm information 
provided by a single method. For example, I triangulated information provided in interviews 
by politicians with data gathered from WikiLeaks and newspaper archives, as well as with 
interviews with other actors such as diplomatic staff and civil society leaders. This strategy 
leads to a high level of reliability and validity of the data and conclusions presented below. 
The fieldwork-driven case study approach chosen for this thesis allows for the identification 
of new variables that have not yet been considered, and the formulation of new hypotheses. 
Based on three country case studies, which include multiple rounds of coalition-building, this 
thesis’s conclusions are both theory-testing and hypothesis-generating. However, due to the 
size of the sample, the conclusions reached with regards to coalition formation must be 
considered tentative with regards to their broader theoretical implications. Yet, the study 
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yields original insights with regards to the changing incentives that prompt party leaders to 
seek to build or abandon coalitions in each of the three cases.  
1.2.2 Case Selection 
This research used an inductive research design, using extensive field research to guide the 
development of research questions, test the relevance of existing theories and posit new 
explanations for observed phenomena. When embarking on this study, the intention was to 
study the mobilisation strategies of ‘strong’ opposition parties in Anglophone Africa. It 
became apparent during the 14 months of fieldwork that each opposition party saw pre-
electoral coalitions as a viable mobilisation strategy, and they were in the midst of negotiations 
to form coalitions which prompted the more focused topic of this study. Zimbabwe, Zambia 
and Uganda were initially selected due to the existence of relatively strong opposition parties, 
thus selected on the ‘most similar’ principle. The opposition had either consistently received 
more than 25% of the vote in presidential elections (Uganda), or managed to win an election 
(Zambia and Zimbabwe).109  
The cases were also selected because they are broadly three ‘hybrid’ regimes, which exhibit 
varying degrees of democracy. In 2012, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Democracy 
Index ranked Zambia as a ‘flawed democracy,’ Uganda as a ‘hybrid regime’, and Zimbabwe 
as an authoritarian regime.110 This correlated with the findings of both the 2013 Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance (IIAG) and the Freedom House Index of Freedom in the 
World’s findings.111 By 2017, the EIU’s Democracy index had downgraded Zambia from a 
flawed democracy to a ‘hybrid regime’ (in 2016, the country’s ranking dropped) while 
Zimbabwe shifted towards the upper limits of the ‘authoritarian regime’ category as the 
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country’s politics appeared to experience a positive shift. Meanwhile Uganda’s place remained 
stable as a ‘hybrid regime.’112 The findings of the Ibrahim Index and Freedom House 
continued to track those of the EIU, noting a downward trend for Zambia but relatively 
stable levels of authoritarian and hybrid governance in Zimbabwe and Uganda.113 However, 
while the nature of regimes was initially theorised to be a determining factor on the nature of 
opposition party mobilisation, given that the parties under study in this thesis sought to create 
a coalition in 15 of the 17 elections under study – the exceptions being the 2002 and 2005 
elections in Zimbabwe – it soon became evident that regime type was not a determining 
factor of cooperation. Regime type may have a bearing on the likelihood of a coalition to 
cohere until Election Day, but the sample is too small for this to be definitively argued. 
The three countries also share a broadly similar colonial history (although Uganda was a 
British protectorate rather than a colony), which has resulted in similar political systems 
inherited from the British parliamentary model. The three countries have a presidential 
system with legislative power invested in a house of assembly. Elections for parliamentary 
seats are based on a first-past-the-post system in single-member constituencies. This means 
that the nature of contestation for political power at the local level is kept relatively constant 
across the three cases. In Zimbabwe and Uganda, elections for the presidency are conducted 
under a two-round electoral system where the winning candidate must achieve 50%+1 of the 
vote. Zambia used a simple plurality system between 1996 and 2016 when it changed the 
electoral system to a two-round run-off system. This provides an interesting test to see how 
opposition parties respond to changing electoral rules. 
While the focus of this study quickly shifted from regime type, the three country case studies 
were maintained because they were believed to give particularly good insights into the 
conditions under which coalitions are formed and collapse. First, none of the three cases 
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have been the subject of substantive or comparative previous research into coalitions, and, 
as a result, existing studies underestimate the frequency of coalition negotiations in each case. 
Second, all three cases – due to the initial case selection – have relatively effective and 
institutionalised opposition parties, which is useful for studying the intra-party effects of 
coalitions and how party leaders manage dissent and maintain their positions in the face of 
factionalism. Third, differences in the political salience of ethnicity allows for variance in 
studying the impact of ethnic diversity on coalition negotiations. Zambia is often presented 
as a case where ‘ethnic voting’ and ethnic parties predominate, so it is a useful test case of 
the interaction between ethnicity and coalition formation. Similarly, Uganda is a highly 
ethnically diverse country, but its consistent coalition formation illustrates the limits of the 
‘ethnicity as a barrier to coalitions’ argument, and instead helps to highlight how inter-party 
competition for the same voters helps to undermine cooperation. Fourth, Zimbabwe is a 
good illustrative case of how and why well-funded opposition parties forego coalitions, 
particularly when parties are competing for the same electoral seats. Finally, Zambia is 
perhaps the most interesting case for demonstrating how opposition party mobilisation 
strategies change over time, from forming inter-party coalitions to an individualised system 
of ‘elite inclusion’ which forms the basis for an inclusive multi-ethnic mobilisation strategy.  
Each case provides a variety of instances of successful (the coalition cohered until the 
election) and unsuccessful coalition negotiation, which adds vital empirical data to the 
currently limited case study material on opposition coalitions in Africa. The time period of 
2000 to 2017 (with the inclusion of the 1996 coalition in Uganda) was chosen rather than just 
the selection of several cases. This was done to enable this thesis to explore and explain 
changes over time, to demonstrate the ubiquity of coalition negotiations and to prevent the 
intentional selection of cases that confirm the hypothesis (sampling on the dependent 
variable). In many instances, successful coalitions are formed after a series of unsuccessful 
prior negotiation processes, and this is something that this research has attempted to track.  
The period between 2000 and 2017 is also particularly interesting, as it is when the ruling 
party in each case comes under more sustained pressure from the opposition as the politics 
of each country becomes more competitive. 





I collected the data for this project over 15 months of fieldwork, spending approximately five 
months in each country. My first intensive period of field research commenced on 22 
October 2014 in Harare, Zimbabwe. Following the death of President Michael Sata on 28 
October and the calling of a snap election, I travelled to Lusaka, Zambia. My fieldwork in 
each case was conducted around an election, even if I was not in the country on election-day. 
I was present for both the 2015 and 2016 elections in Zambia, and I was in Uganda five 
months before and two months after the 2016 election. For Zimbabwe, my fieldwork period 
fell 15 months after the 2013 election, though I had been in Zimbabwe conducting research 
for my masters’ degree four months before the 2013 polls. This thesis was submitted one 
month prior to Zimbabwe’s 2018 election. My fieldwork periods were as follows: 
Dates: Location: Data: 
22 Oct – 15 Nov 2014  Harare Interviews 
15 Nov – 28 Feb 2015 Lusaka, Kasama, 
Monze 
Interviews, attending rallies, debates and press 
briefings, internal party documents, newspaper 
archives, election observation 
28 Feb – 27 May Harare, 
Bulawayo 
Interviews, party documents, newspaper 
archives 
2 Jun – 19 Sept  Kampala Interviews, party documents, attending press 
briefings, newspaper archives 
20 Mar – 12 Apr 2016 Kampala Interviews 
25 Jul – 20 Aug 2016 Lusaka, Kitwe, 
Ndola 
Interviews, attending rallies, debates and press 
briefings, inter-party coalition documents 
22 Jul – 1 Aug 2017 Lusaka Interviews 
 
My research was predominantly concentrated in the three countries’ capital cities of Harare, 
Lusaka and Kampala, but I also undertook several short trips to other regions and cities to 
observe rallies and speak to members of parties’ regional branches.  
This research was undertaken using a mix of data, including newspaper articles, NGO reports 
and other grey literature, personal and party archives, manifestoes and campaign speeches; 




semi-structured elite interviews with opposition activists and leaders; and participant 
observation of rallies and party meetings. A final important source of data was the electoral 
results from each poll, which were used to generate electoral heat maps to illustrate the extent 
of opposition and ruling party support across each case and make the case for regional voting 
patterns for both the opposition and incumbent parties. The following three short sections 
offer information on how some of this data was gathered and analysed, its limitations and 
how the thesis overcomes these limitations through triangulation with other data sources. 
Interviews 
In accordance with the research methods outlined above, interviewees were chosen for their 
proximity to the events under study for this research, and as a result, were chosen through a 
non-probability, purposive sampling method. As noted by Tansey (2007), this is a suitable 
method of selecting research participants when employing a process tracing approach.114 
Over the course of 14 months, I conducted 137 formal interviews, which lasted an average 
of 1.5 hours.115 The interviewees were chosen through a mix of purposive and snowball 
sampling methods, as well as through the use of grounded theory method which encourages 
simultaneous data collection and analysis to enable the reflection necessary to inform the 
evolving choice of research participants. These interviews were semi-structured, and involved 
a pre-defined set of questions depending on the interviewee’s position and political history. 
Most of these interviews were recorded using a voice recorder. Due to the high volume of 
interviews and the length of most, it was not possible to transcribe every interview. However, 
the files have been kept carefully and stored safely, in accordance with all national laws and 
regulations as well as the UK Data Protection Act and new General Data Protection 
Regulations (GDPR).116 The interviews were conducted with a range of informants, from 
party elites – party presidents, secretaries-general, chairpersons and vice presidents – to party 
activists and grassroots members. I also interviewed the heads of civic organisations, 
diplomatic staff, former presidents and prime ministers, members of government, MPs and 
civic activists. Each interviewee was selected for their knowledge of the case, and asked 
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questions on the country’s electoral history, party histories, party mobilisation strategies or 
specific instances of coalition formation depending on their proximity to negotiations. This 
breadth of information helped to inform the background for the more specific study, and 
enabled the narrowed focus of this research as per grounded theory method. 
In developing my interview questions, I was guided by the grounded theory approach. Due 
to the wide-ranging positions and interests of research informants, several basic sets of 
questions were created for each interview type, in each country, which were then 
supplemented with follow-up questions during the interviews. As noted by Charmaz and 
Belgrave (2012), developing questions for qualitative interviewing using grounded theory 
method involves identifying the “area of interest and form[ing] preliminary interviewing 
questions to explore it. We learn about research participants' concerns and experiences and 
then successively develop our interview guides from the data and our emerging analysis of 
these data.”117 As a result, I employed a semi-structured or open-ended interview method as 
per the grounded theory method, which allowed for sufficient flexibility to be able to adjust 
to the nature of the informant and the breadth of material covered. 
Elite interviews – such as those conducted for this thesis – can be a problematic data 
source,118 as political elites may exaggerate their roles or seek to portray themselves and their 
actions in a positive light relative to their (opposition) competitors. To offset this potential 
methodological pitfall, I conducted interviews widely, with far greater numbers of informants 
than just the political elites involved in negotiations. These interviewees were from the 
diplomatic, civic and academic sectors, and represented a broad array of views. In addition, 
I triangulated my interview data with contemporaneous sources such as newspaper archives, 
participant observation at party conventions and rallies, the WikiLeaks diplomatic cables, 
generally well-informed subscription-based political analysis such as that provided by Africa 
Confidential,119 and intra-party communications in some cases. This information was then 
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supplemented and cross-referenced with secondary sources – both published and 
unpublished – to ensure the accuracy of information and analysis. Finally, each empirical 
chapter was reviewed by country specialists to validate the data and interpretation. The 
reviewers for each chapter were Dr Marja Hinfelaar (Zambia, Zimbabwe), Dr Sishuwa 
Sishuwa (Zambia), Dr Sam Wilkins (Zimbabwe, Uganda) and Professor Brian Raftopoulos 
(Zimbabwe). As a result of this rigorous cross-referencing of data sources and peer review 
of the analysis, the information presented below can be considered to be of a high level of 
validity and reliability. 
Ethics 
All interviews were conducted within university guidelines, and interviewees were asked to 
provide informed consent. As per Marzano (2012), informed consent involves providing 
participants with detailed information on the purpose, duration, and methods of the research. 
The researcher must then describe the risks and benefits of participation in the study and 
give guarantees as to “absolute confidentiality and the respondent's right to withdraw his or 
her consent at any time.”120 At the beginning and end of each interview conducted for this 
thesis, the interviewee was asked if they would like the information that they provided to be 
anonymised. I received informed consent from all interviewees, and in no cases did the 
interviewee ask to end the interview early. In just a few cases – almost exclusively in 
interviews with diplomatic staff – interviewees requested that their names, positions and 
affiliations be withheld, though they were willing to let me use the information provided. In 
one further case, although the research participant did not request that the interview be 
anonymised, the information that he provided was of such a sensitive nature, and the personal 
consequences for him providing the information are potentially serious enough that I believe 
it warranted anonymization. Otherwise, all interviewees cited are referred to by name, 
position held, date and location of the interview. A full list of interviews conducted is 
included as Appendix I.  
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The advantage of naming the interviewees is that many of them were participants in the 
events under study, and their perspective adds important and pertinent information regarding 
the negotiations that were the subject of this research. Without attribution, the information 
carries less weight. Those who were anonymised have been treated in two ways. The first 
category, is for diplomatic staff who are referred to as “Anonymous Western Diplomat.”  
The second is the source that I decided to anonymise out of concern for the potential 
personal consequences of the research, who I have referred to as “Anonymous Former 
Governance Advisor to USAID.” As there were very few anonymizations, I felt that this 
simple system would suffice to both give enough information on the interviewees to readers 
and simultaneously protect their identities.  
My safety and that of my interviewees was ensured by meeting during the day in public places 
such as cafés and restaurants, where it was unlikely that our conversations would be 
overheard. In some cases, interviews were held at the home of the interviewee, but this was 
only done when a driver was available to wait outside (for safety reasons). The interviews 
were recorded by hand in a series of notebooks, and also – for most of them – with a voice 
recorder. The files from these interviews were kept safely encrypted while on fieldwork, to 
prevent them from falling into the hands of authorities. They remain safely stored as per the 
UK Data Protection Act and 2018 General Data Protection Regulation. The safety of 
research participants – and myself – was ensured though the secure storage of the data arising 
from interviews, the choice of safe, public spaces for interviews and the availability of an 
‘opt-out’ option for all interviewees at any time during the process. There have been no undue 
personal consequences for any of my informants or for myself during the course of (or arising 
from) my fieldwork for this thesis. A section below will deal with the ethics of using online 
sources, and controversial data such as that provided in the WikiLeaks online archive. 
Archives: Newspaper, WikiLeaks and Political/Personal Archives 
For all three cases, newspaper archives were an important source of information on intra-
opposition politics and coalition formation. As the research period is from 2000 to 2017, 
many of the newspapers used have online archives that are easily accessible. The print media 
space in all three countries is highly contested, and there is evident bias in many news sources. 
As a result, this thesis endeavoured to use a mix of government and independent media, and 




to corroborate the information gleaned from newspapers with interview data, party 
documents and secondary sources. To access older newspaper material that was no longer 
archived digitally, I accessed two newspaper archives – those housed at the Media Institute 
for Southern Africa (Lusaka, Zambia) and at the Makerere Institute of Social Research 
(Kampala, Uganda). In Zambia, this thesis relied on the unofficial ‘paper of record’ for the 
period, The Post, an independently-owned publication that was seen to be the most reliable 
Zambian daily between 2000 and 2011. It also used the Lusaka Times, an online publication 
with mixed sources and viewpoints. In Uganda, this thesis drew upon the Daily Monitor and 
The Observer, an independent daily and weekly owned by Nation Media Group, itself owned 
by the Aga Khan Foundation. It also used information published by the donor-supported 
Uganda Radio Network, which is written and recorded by stringers and community-based 
journalists from across Uganda. In Zimbabwe, a mix of newspapers was used including the 
government mouthpiece the Herald, and the independent and opposition-sympathetic 
DailyNews, and Zimbabwe Independent. All online newspaper articles cited have been saved to a 
Zotero archive, and are accessible even if the live page has been taken down by the 
newspaper. Beyond these newspapers, the thesis used a broad selection of media sources to 
corroborate information provided by sources such as interviewees, Africa Confidential, and the 
WikiLeaks online archive.  
Some sections of this thesis use information stored in the WikiLeaks online archive of leaked 
diplomatic cables. This archive was created by the controversial leaking of 251 287 diplomatic 
cables covering the period 1966 to 2010 by a group of whistle-blowers. The cables were 
published between February 2010 and September 2011, and have raised substantial debate 
within the academic community as to whether they can be used as a reliable source of 
information.121 Oxford University’s Timothy Garton Ash described the WikiLeaks trove as 
the ‘Historian’s dream,’122 but concerns over the way that the cables were accessed and the 
potential for manipulation have been cited as reasons why they should not be used by 
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academics. In the wake of the leaks, several American universities warned their students not 
to access, cite or read the files123 – and this scepticism regarding the validity and ethics of 
using the data has continued. The most contentious data revealed in the leaks relates to 
information from active warzones such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where sensitive data 
regarding informants and strategy could have disastrous personal and political consequences. 
However, the WikiLeaks cables relating to Africa were more embarrassing than dangerous 
for the US Government.  
The cables reveal thousands of conversations and assessments of politics in African 
countries, revealing embassy analyses of the prospects of opposition leaders, frank 
discussions of manipulated by-elections and the intrigue that goes with high-level meetings 
with government officials. As with all sources, the data provided must be treated with caution 
– embassy officials were reporting contemporaneously, in the interests of the US State 
Department, and often with limited or incomplete information. The cables represent an 
incomplete and one-sided picture of the circumstances in the affected countries. The US 
Department of State reported that for the 2006 to 2010 period in which the majority of the 
relevant leaks for this project were posted, the leaks in ‘Cablegate’ represent just one tenth of 
total diplomatic traffic, and thus they are an incomplete record.124 The particular 
circumstances of the diplomatic post also affects the accuracy of the information; for 
example, in Zimbabwe in the late 2000s, it was very difficult for US Embassy staff and 
defence attachés to secure high level meetings with most senior (ZANU-PF) government 
officials, due to the frosty relationship between Harare and Washington DC. This meant that 
most information reported by the embassy on the Zimbabwean government came from third 
parties, or other interested groups and it may thus have been less accurate than acknowledged. 
Because of these limitations, the information used from WikiLeaks in this thesis is cross-
referenced where possible. As no other documentary evidence exists on the nature of the 
relationship between the Zimbabwean opposition and Harare-based embassies, the 
WikiLeaks documents provide important insights into US Government support (both 
implicit and overt) for the MDCs. At other points, such as with regards to the Zambian 
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opposition, WikiLeaks reports of electoral campaigns are used as the frank assessments of 
relatively disinterested observers.125 More recently, authors such as Lefebvre (2012) and 
Hoekman (2013) have used the WikiLeaks archive to bolster their arguments.126 This thesis 
uses the WikiLeaks cables cautiously and predominantly for parts of the thesis where it gives 
insight into foreign support and considerations, ensuring reliability by triangulating the data 
where possible. 
Finally, a small selection of personal or political archives were made available for this thesis. 
In Uganda, the Foundation for African Development (FAD) provided access to a selection 
of documents related to the inter-party coalitions negotiated between 2006 and 2011. Deo 
Hasubi Njoki, programme manager at FAD, provided access to the institution’s archive. The 
FAD was established in 1980 as a semi-independent think-tank and policy institute for the 
Democratic Party (DP) of Uganda.127 In Zambia, former Patriotic Front (PF) Secretary 
General, Wynter Kabimba, offered his personal archive of intra-party communications from 
the 2011 Pact coalition, negotiated between the PF and the United Party for National 
Development (UPND). This archive was clearly incomplete, but the communications that it 
held were instructive for illuminating the nature of the relationship between the parties and 
the sticking points within the coalition. The final personal archive accessed was that of former 
Zambian Cabinet Minister, Dipak Patel. Patel was the campaign manager for UPND 
candidate, Hakainde Hichilema, in the 2015 and 2016 elections. The archive was a trove of 
campaign planning documents which included flight planning and resource management 
documents from the 2015 campaign. The information used from all archival sources was 
corroborated with other external sources, such as interviews and newspaper articles. Finally, 
this thesis makes use of several coalition documents which were either available in the public 
domain or received from one of the parties to the coalitions.    
Election Results 
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In most cases, the election results used in this thesis – largely to generate the electoral ‘heat 
maps that illustrate voting patterns – were retrieved from the relevant electoral management 
body’s website archive, or directly from the commission. However, in Zimbabwe, much of 
this information was not available directly from the electoral commission, and instead a list 
of results compiled and archived by civic actors was used instead.128 Several elections 
referenced in this thesis – notably Zimbabwe in 2008 and Zambia in 2001, amongst others – 
were believed to have been so openly manipulated by the party in power that the results 
announced by the relevant electoral commission were not believed to have been an accurate 
representation of the popular will. Others were widely known to have been manipulated,129 
but the results have been used nonetheless as they are indicative of broader patterns of 
political support.  
Taken together, the mix of data used for this thesis gives as complete a picture as possible of 
a series of highly opaque coalition negotiations, and seeks to outline the complex, 
multifaceted nature of inter-party cooperation. The limitations of each source are mitigated 
as far as possible by the triangulation of data with other primary and secondary sources, 
giving the data presented a high degree of reliability.  
1.3 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into five chapters. This first introductory chapter describes the 
research questions, outlines the existing literature and gives an overview of the argument, the 
methods and the data that will be used to make the argument. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are the 
main empirical chapters which outline the opposition coalitions negotiated in each country 
between 2000 and 2017. These chapters have been written as case studies, as they present 
data on the relationships between opposition parties that has not previously been collated. It 
is expected that such case studies are more usefully and coherently presented as cases than if 
they had been presented thematically. In addition, in this format they will be more useful for 
country specialists who are seeking out information on each of the three cases. The length of 
the three chapters vary, due to the amount of material to be presented within each case. It 
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was thought prudent to let the cases speak for themselves, rather than trying to fit each 
chapter into a strict word limit. Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter which gathers the insights 
from the three case studies and makes clear the arguments explored across the thesis’ three 
cases and concludes by briefly drawing the research outwards, highlighting the wider 


















2. Consistent Coalition Formation in 
Uganda 
2.1 Introduction 
Opposition coalitions form in Uganda with surprising regularity – opposition coordination 
has been attempted in every executive election in the country’s post-colonial history, barring 
the 1980 election following the fall of the Idi Amin regime.130 Despite this, opposition parties 
and party coalitions are understudied.131 This is the result of disparaging assumptions by 
observers – frequently borne out by party behaviour – regarding the frailty and fractious 
nature of opposition parties as well as their inability to mount a substantive challenge to the 
ruling party. Since the National Resistance Movement (NRM) took power in 1986, none of 
the opposition coalitions that have been formed have been able to unseat the ruling party. 
The motivations for building coalitions in Uganda are clear – in a context where political 
party activities were restricted for more than two decades, even the oldest and most 
established opposition parties are weak, fragmented and severely under-resourced.132 This 
weakness, alongside frequent government interference and the fusion of the NRM to the 
state architecture at the local level – through the local council system and the deployment of 
resident district commissioners and district intelligence officers133 – prevents opposition 
parties from organising effectively and establishing structures across the country.  
Politics in Uganda is characterised by both party polarisation (driven by ‘liberation’ rhetoric) 
and high levels of elite cooperation. In every executive/presidential election – with the 
notable exception of 1980 – there has been the emergence of an alliance of opposition forces 
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to challenge the status quo.134 These alliances were anti-incumbent in nature, most collapsed 
prior to the election, and all but the first – created in 1962 – have been unsuccessful in 
changing the status quo. However, coalitions have an important place in both the popular 
imagination and in opposition mobilisation strategies. This chapter will demonstrate that 
party coalitions in Uganda are a response to the weakness of the opposition, and the inability 
of smaller parties to run national campaigns against the NRM. Parties seek to cooperate in 
order to run candidates across the country, to maximise the returns on scarce resources and 
to have a national platform from which to approach the electorate. However, despite the 
recognition that coalitions are necessary, they almost invariably collapse when newly-elected 
party leaders withdraw from the alliance to run their own campaigns and test their electoral 
viability. When they perform poorly, these party leaders seek to enter into coalitions in later 
elections but the intra-opposition competition for limited constituencies – due to the NRM’s 
hegemony – pushes party leaders to negotiate cynically within coalitions, ultimately leading 
to the collapse of the broader coalition. This chapter concludes that, contrary to existing 
scholarship, coalitions comprised of geographically-limited ethnic parties may be more 
cohesive, as parties are less likely to compete for the same voters. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2.1 provides crucial background information to the 
Ugandan case, highlighting the key factors that animate politics in Uganda, from 
‘liberationism’ to the role of ethnicity in electoral contests. It also outlines the weakness of 
the Ugandan opposition, and links that to a long history of cooperative behaviour. Section 
2.2 sketches out two coalitions formed under the movement system (prior to the 
reintroduction of multi-party politics in 2005), which were important precursors to the 
coalitions formed from 2006 onwards. In 2.3, three pre-electoral coalitions are traced – from 
the 2006, 2011 and 2016 polls – and the reasons for their cohesion or collapse are highlighted. 
Finally, this chapter will conclude by outlining the reasons for frequent coalition collapse in 
Uganda. These are the competition between parties for the same groups of voters, the 
decision by newly-elected party presidents to stand on their own party tickets, and the impact 
of intra-party factionalism on inter-party coalition negotiations. 
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2.1.1 Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in 
Uganda 
‘Liberationism,’ inclusionary strategies and regime maintenance 
Uganda and Zimbabwe bear several similarities – the first among them is that both are 
‘liberation’ regimes. This connotes that the ruling party came to power via a liberation struggle 
or period of violent conflict. This is important for this study for two reasons – the first is 
that the ruling party seeks to use its liberation history to legitimate its continued hold on 
power, and the second is the persistent involvement of the military or military elites in 
politics. The leaders of liberation parties derive much of their legitimacy from this history, 
and indeed rely on it for continued legitimation of the elite’s increasingly tenuous hold on 
power.135 This history is also important as it has meant – in both Uganda and Zimbabwe – 
that the military and former military leaders have continued to have significant sway over 
politics and a considerable role in successive post-conflict governments.136 Even though it 
has been more than thirty years since Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and his NRM 
took power, the war looms large in symbolic politics, with Museveni still frequently referring 
to himself as ‘freedom fighter number one’ (Sabalwanyi Number One).137 The salience of this 
liberation narrative – and how people remember the protracted conflicts that preceded 1986 
– continues to drive Museveni’s vote-base, and limits what the opposition can achieve. 
For the first 20 years of Museveni’s rule, political parties were banned in Uganda and all 
political activity was organised under the ‘movement system’ – in essence a militaristic 
hegemonic-party state.138 The ostensible reason for this – similar to that proffered by Idi 
Amin’s regime in 1971 – was that the partisan mobilisation of ethnic and regional identities 
had previously been the cause of cycles of ethnic exclusion, political violence and insecurity 
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experienced since independence.139 During the movement system, political parties were 
allowed to exist, and elections were held, but these were under the ‘individual merit’ system, 
where political leaders were elected at the local level based on their personal characteristics 
rather than national political alignment.140 Parties could maintain national headquarters, but 
they were legally barred from membership drives, holding rallies, or officially promoting 
candidates in elections. The movement system made politics highly localised (through a 
complex system of locally-elected councils)141 and personalised (through ‘individual merit’). 
This created an atomised political environment, and one in which both the NRM and 
President Museveni are largely held above the fray of local grievances and governance 
failures. As noted by Wilkins (2018): 
The NRM system relies on ingrained and embedded narratives that elevate the local polity, not 
the national one, as the key forum for the resolution of political grievance. This “shape” of 
accountability politics allows the president to play a transcendent, almost monarchical role, 
somewhat aloof from the substance of local grievance.142 
Long after the movement system was abolished in 2005, the legacy of the ‘no-party’ system 
looms large. In the NRM’s strongholds in the rural south-west, the ruling party is seen less 
as a party within a multi-party system than as the ‘conditions’ within which politics occurs.143 
This is demonstrated by the often-absent opposition candidates, and the extremely high 
numbers of citizens who stand and vote in the NRM primaries. As many or more citizens 
participated in the NRM’s primary elections in 2011 and 2016 than voted in the national 
polls, underlining the importance of intra-NRM contestation within local-level politics.144 In 
2016, 2700 candidates vied to be chosen as the NRM’s candidate for just 400 parliamentary 
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seats.145 For those who lose out in the NRM primaries, few turn to opposition parties. Instead, 
most choose to contest as independent candidates, hoping to win their seats on the basis of 
their ‘individual merit’ and negotiate a new, favourable relationship to the ruling party and 
executive.146 In the 2016 polls, 43% of all parliamentary candidates were independents147 – a 
total of 907 – while 91 seats were not contested by a single opposition candidate.148 Although 
ostensibly independent, most of those parliamentary candidates who competed in the 
election on an ‘independent’ ticket campaigned for President Museveni, helping to maintain 
his ‘monarchic’ presidency.149 
Although the characterisation of the NRM as the forum for political contestation holds for 
the NRM’s heartlands in the rural south-west, there is substantial regional variation in voting 
patterns and political culture across the rest of the country. Beyond the rural south-west, and 
particularly in the anti-NRM regions of the north and east, voters have repeatedly used their 
ballots to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the ruling party – but party labels are still far 
less important than in Zimbabwe’s polarised political space (Chapter 4). Instead, voters will 
vote either for locally popular candidates or for the opposition party with the greatest 
potential to confront the unpopular incumbent, sometimes doing both by splitting their 
parliamentary and presidential votes between parties. The ‘individual merit’ system has helped 
to entrench a culture of intra-opposition fluidity, though in anti-incumbent regions it remains 
a politically risky prospect for prominent opposition elites to align with the ruling party. This 
mix of polarisation and fluidity places Uganda between two extremes – the highly fluid nature 
of Zambian politics, and the highly polarised politics of Zimbabwe (see chapters 3 and 4). 
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In 2005, multi-party politics was reinstated by the Omnibus Bill, which also removed 
presidential term limits.150 The NRM has dealt with the competition of multi-party politics 
by seeking to outmanoeuvre its opponents and minimise dissent through ‘inclusionary’ 
strategies used interchangeably with repression.151 To deal with the demands from below and 
competition from the opposition in anti-incumbent regions, the NRM has also presided over 
an ever-growing patronage machine at all levels of the state, party and society. While the 
number of districts (and their attendant bureaucracies) has jumped from 56 in 2002 to 112 
by 2016, the number of parliamentarians has ballooned from 295 to 427.152 At the same time, 
the president has appointed an ever-expanding cabinet – from 21 ministers in 1996 to 81 in 
2016 – and a bevy of over 140 ‘presidential advisors.’ As Reuss and Titeca (2017) argue, these 
advisors are largely irrelevant but the position serves as an inclusionary mechanism to buy in 
an “ever-increasing number of friends and foes.’153 Many of these advisors are young, 
energetic and educated elites who are bought into the presidential fold to minimise the threat 
that they might otherwise pose from outside of the NRM’s ‘big tent.’ The NRM also deploys 
patronage to minimise the threats posed by other organised social actors who might be a 
locus for political organising such as the kingdoms, chiefs and churches,154 largely keeping 
them sympathetic to the ruling party’s agenda. In addition, the NRM also organises 
disorganised groups who might otherwise present a challenge to its hegemony, such as ‘crime 
preventer’ groups in the 2016 election. Crime preventers were groups of marginalised and 
unemployed ‘youths’ – allegedly numbering as many as 1.6 million – who were organised into 
quasi-military units and given limited training and the amorphous tasks of curbing crime and 
supplementing security during the polls.155 Despite widespread fears of anti-opposition 
violence from these groups – which largely failed to materialise – it became apparent that the 
reason for mobilising them was as yet another extension of state patronage and control to 
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marginalised groups that might otherwise challenge the ruling party.156 The NRM’s patronage 
state has become expensive to oppose, but also lucrative for some and expensive for public 
finances to maintain, prompting ever-greater financialization of elections and governance.157 
As noted by Khisa (2016), Museveni and the NRM deploy a carrot and stick approach to 
governance and regime maintenance – enticing elites with patronage, legitimising its 
continued rule with reference to previous episodes of violence and using coercive strategies 
to raise the costs of defection.158 The ruling party deploys a similar strategy to deal with 
opposition parties and their supporters, offering them positions and financial rewards for 
defection (as will be outlined further below) or limiting their ability to operate, both 
financially and through coercion.159 As former NRM heavyweight turned opposition MP 
Augustine Ruzindana put it, “being in opposition is very costly here. Your children become 
unemployable and you cannot do business. They have made being in opposition a very costly 
venture.”160 The opposition thus face an entrenched and strategic incumbent which makes 
the costs of staying permanently in opposition very high. 
Opposition weakness and a history of cooperative politics 
Opposition coalitions are a frequent feature of elections in Uganda. In each election held 
since the NRM took power in 1986, opposition forces have aimed to forge pre-electoral 
coalitions around a single candidate to challenge Museveni. This was done first from within 
the movement system in 1996 and 2001, and later within the context of a (hegemonic party-
dominated) multi-party dispensation. Several of Uganda’s opposition parties long pre-date 
those found in Zimbabwe and Zambia, giving them a historical rootedness and a somewhat 
loyal following, but they remain generally weakly institutionalised. They also find themselves 
struggling to break out of their narrow historical ethno-regional and religious support bases 
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to develop a national following. Uganda’s newest opposition party – the Forum for 
Democratic Change (FDC), officially registered in 2006 – was the product of a multi-ethnic 
breakaway faction from within the NRM, and has proven to be the most successful at 
challenging the regime. The FDC has been able to run more parliamentary candidates than 
the historical parties since its formation in 2005 and has proven to be more ‘national’ in its 
support at the presidential level. However, this party’s success has come at the expense of 
older opposition parties, and this has limited the potential for inter-party collaboration, as 
outlined below. 
The no-party (movement) system in place between 1986 and 2005, and the suppression of 
parties prior to that, undermined the institutionalisation of Uganda’s opposition.161 Even the 
oldest and most established opposition parties, such as the DP (formed in 1954) and UPC 
(formed in 1960), are weak, fragmented and plagued by severe resource deficits.162 This 
weakness inhibits opposition parties from organising effectively and establishing structures 
across the country. Instead, parties are limited to their traditional strongholds or pockets of 
influence – where a strong opposition leader has succeeded in building a loyal following, 
amassed substantial personal resources and embedded themselves within local politics. At 
the same time, the NRM’s control of large swathes of the country leaves opposition parties 
competing for many of the same constituencies. Even though it is the strongest and most 
nationalised opposition party, in 2016 the FDC contested just 65% (262) of the 402 
parliamentary seats. Meanwhile, 91 constituencies or 22% of the directly elected seats 
available were not contested by an opposition candidate. Instead, the opposition ran multiple 
competing candidates in at least half of the constituencies that they contested – highlighting 
that there is significant overlap in the various parties’ electoral bases. This limited 
geographical reach of parties prevents them from challenging the NRM effectively at the 
national level, while the opposition compete for the same groups of anti-incumbent voters 
across electoral cycles (see below).  
Simultaneously, the weakness of centralised civic associations through which the opposition 
might otherwise be able to mobilise hampers their capacity to do so. Nascent opposition 
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parties with weak grassroots structures in places such as Zambia in 1990 and Zimbabwe in 
the early 2000s capitalised on the existence of strong civic groups such as churches, trade 
unions, NGOs and student movements. In both countries, the opposition co-opted these 
groups to build their structures and sustain a successful mobilisation machine.163 The 
potential for associational mobilisation for the opposition in Uganda is low, as religious 
organisations and kingdoms are legally barred from engaging in partisan politics, while 
salaries and patronage provided by the government limit the desire of individuals to step into 
overtly political territory. Churches are more likely to operate in favour of the ruling party, 
either deliberately or inadvertently.164 The opposition are also largely unable to capitalise 
effectively on local-level civic associations and funding networks that link back to the 
Kampala elite.165 This leaves opposition parties in a weak position. Unable to mobilise 
through other groups and limited by resources and state attrition from establishing strong 
structures, parties are left with few options but to form coalitions to try to attract and pool 
resources, prevent intra-opposition competition and share information. When pressed to 
reveal their reasons for forming coalitions in Uganda, each of the key opposition party leaders 
admitted that in a context where parties are weak and government interference makes it 
difficult to mobilise effectively, the opposition can achieve little individually and must 
collaborate to run a national campaign and pressure the NRM to concede ground.166 As 
President of the Justice Forum Party (JEEMA) Asuman Basalirwa stated:  
In the current political environment characterised by repression, restriction, logistical 
constraints and structural challenges, it is extremely difficult to build functional and strong 
party structures across the country that would enable us to field candidates from the lowest 
position to the highest position. Given these constraints, it can only make sense to collaborate. 
Even the biggest opposition parties cannot front candidates in all positions. So, what can only 
make sense is to say come, let’s sit together, who is going where. So, at the end of it all we can 
be able to occupy space all over the country. It’s about creating a national campaign.167 
Party-based incentives for coordination are buttressed by substantial public support for 
coalitions. An opinion poll undertaken in 2014 by the UGMP civil society alliance found 
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widespread support for opposition coalitions amongst voters.168 Of the 2100 respondents, 
47% answered that they would vote for the opposition if it fielded one candidate – this was 
more clearly the preference of urban citizens and younger voters as 52% of respondents 
between the ages of 19 and 34 were in favour of voting for a coalition candidate, while 58% 
of urban respondents reported the same. 
Ethno-regional grievances and shifting opposition bases 
The Ugandan population can be grouped into two major ethno-linguistic family groups, the 
Bantu-speaking majority who live in the central, southern and western regions, and the non-
Bantu speakers (grouped into people of Nilotic and Central Sudanic origin) who live in the 
north, eastern and north-western parts of the country. These two major language groupings 
are further split into more than 66 recognised ethnic subgroups,169 making Uganda one of 
the most ethnically diverse countries on the continent.170 However, none of these groups 
make up a majority of the population – the largest ethnic group is the Baganda, who make 
up just 16.5% (see Table 1). This means that no party can use a strictly mono-ethnic mode 
of electoral mobilisation and hope to win elections at the national level. Instead, parties must 
seek to draw support from across ethnic cleavages or form multi-ethnic alliances, while the 
ruling party needs to balance ethno-regional interests to maintain legitimacy and stave off 
threats from the opposition. Similarly to Zimbabwe’s ruling party (see Chapter 4), Museveni’s 
‘liberationist’ rhetoric seeks to paper over ethnic cleavages, to use a nationalist-liberation 
discourse to legitimate its continued hold on power. But ethno-regional grievances based on 
a regionalised history of conflict with the central government and marginalisation from the 
levers of political and economic power have, at times, undermined the efficacy of this 
narrative in sustaining the ruling party’s support. 
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Table 1 The size and location of Ugandan ethnic groups 
Ethnic Group Sub-Region Number (Millions) Percentage 
Baganda Buganda (Central) 5.56 16.5 
Banyankore Ankole (Western) 3.22 9.6 
Basoga Busoga (East Central) 2.96 8.8 
Bakiga Ankole (Western) 2.39 7.1 
Iteso Teso (East) 2.36 7.0 
Langi Lango (North) 2.13 6.3 
Bagisu Elgon (East) 1.65 4.9 
Acholi Acholiland (North) 1.47 4.4 
Lugbara West Nile (North) 1.1 3.3 
Other ethnic groups 
 
10.8 32.1 
    
Total      33.6 100 
Source: This table was compiled using data from a 2014 report by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics171 
 
At independence in 1962, the new government of Uganda inherited a state divided along 
multiple overlapping fault lines. Ethnicity, region, religion and class intersected in complex 
ways to segment both the population and the political elite whose primary interests became 
the capture and retention of state power. The relationship between ethnicity and politics in 
Uganda is as complex as it is varied.172 There is yet to be a comprehensive study of the impact 
of ethnicity on politics in Uganda. This thesis has neither the space nor the mandate to 
achieve comprehensive coverage of this important topic, but it is a critical factor in any 
discussion of Ugandan politics and opposition dynamics. A complex history of ethnically-
defined territory, colonial sub-imperialism, post-colonial dominance of various groups at 
several historical junctures and a history of ‘liberation’ that is understood in multiple ways by 
these different groups has produced a particularly convoluted relationship that is both highly 
contextual and fluid. Several regions of Uganda have a fraught or contentious relationship 
with the country’s central government, for reasons of ethno-regional marginalisation, 
grievances over political representation at the centre and/or a history of violence deployed 
along ethno-regional lines.  
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The nature of these relationships frequently finds expression in the country’s electoral 
dynamics. Regions that have historically (and with relative consistency) supported the 
opposition since the first elections under the Movement system in 1996, include much of the 
northern region (including the Acholi, Lango, and West Nile sub-regions), Kasese in the far 
west, Teso in the east, and the central region (dominated by the Buganda) to varying degrees. 
The likelihood of each region to vote against the incumbent NRM depends on the issues that 
motivate the politics of the day, including the rising and declining influence of insurgencies, 
legislative changes, and the creation of new districts to accommodate ethno-political 
demands.173 The maps provided in later sections of this chapter give a sense of how each 
region relates to the central government at each election. What stands out from the discussion 
below is the relatively low salience of ethnic bloc-voting in favour of co-ethnics, compared 
to anti-incumbent bloc-voting. Across electoral cycles, certain regions abandoned their 
‘traditional parties’ or co-ethnic leaders in favour of the newest and most ‘nationalised’ 
opposition party.174 This party, the FDC, was broadly supported by anti-incumbent voters 
even though it was led by a westerner and former Museveni-ally, as the party appeared to 
have the greatest chance of unseating the unpopular incumbent. This suggests that the 
politics of these regions may be more complicated than being merely ‘ethnic’, though 
ethnicity remains an important register for articulating grievances and coordinating popular 
demands for greater political representation at the centre.  
At independence in 1962, the colonial administration in Uganda left a bifurcated state in 
which people from the north of the country dominated the military, while people from the 
south largely controlled the commercial sectors, the bureaucracy and civilian administration. 
The initial use of Buganda’s army and administration to subjugate and then rule much of the 
population between 1894 and 1905 had produced widespread anti-Buganda sentiment.175 
When Buganda was de-militarized in 1905, recruits for the army and police  came primarily 
from the north and east of the country – people who were ostensibly more ‘militaristic’ – to 
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check the growing power of Buganda within the British Protectorate.176 The system of divide-
and-rule that emerged from this would have long-lasting consequences. As noted by Richard 
Reid:  
The British had set up a political system doomed to fail: rooted in armed force, both real and 
implied and the militarisation of political culture; a system of staggering geopolitical inequity, 
with Buganda as the capstone and outlying areas as marginalised zones of conquest; and thus 
a system which institutionalised ethnic competition and the politics of zero-sum.177   
Following the departure of the colonial administration, control over the Ugandan state would 
largely fall to northerners who were able to exert control over and demand loyalty from the 
military. The first series of long-lived Ugandan governments under the UPC and Milton 
Obote (1962-1971), Idi Amin (1971-1979), Milton Obote (1980-1985) and the Okello’s 
(1985-1986) had heads of state who were from the north of the country, while northerners 
continued to be over-represented within the government, military and police.178 However, 
when Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) came to power in 1986 after its largely 
southern-based and southerner-supported insurgency, which it framed as “Bantu southerners 
united against Nilotic northerners,”179 people in the north were sceptical of the country’s first 
southerner-dominated government.180  
The suspicion of southerners in the north was entrenched and exacerbated by the NRA’s 
violent counterinsurgency in the north to wipe out any remaining resistance – with tens of 
thousands of northern civilians interned in concentration camps, the decimation of cattle 
herds and destruction of villages under a scorched earth policy.181 When resistance to the 
NRA’s military advances manifested in armed insurrection by Alice Lakwena’s Holy Spirit 
Movement and its successor, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),182 the government’s violent 
response firmly entrenched anti-government and anti-NRM sentiment in the north. As 
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Omach (2014) argues, “Two decades of violent conflict polarised the country and entrenched 
the development of two countries and two economies: a peaceful and prosperous south and 
a conflict-ridden and poverty-stricken north.”183 From the perspective of many people in 
Acholiland, Museveni was long seen as complicit in their suffering – at best he ignored their 
plight, while the army’s insurgency claimed lives and livelihoods, at worst he intentionally 
prolonged the war and forced 1.6 million people into displacement camps to disrupt political 
opposition and justify high military spending.184 This dissatisfaction with Museveni and the 
NRM would entrench majority opposition support in the northern Acholiland sub-region, 
creating a ‘base’ from which opposition parties would try to expand their electoral support.185 
Similarly to the north, the NRA’s success was not greeted with enthusiasm in the east of 
Uganda, and it represented a serious threat to the people of the Teso sub-region. The Iteso 
people had held a privileged position under Milton Obote (II) – a northerner from Lango 
sub-region – particularly in the armed forces and police.186 Following Obote’s overthrow and 
the region’s loss of political power, Peter Otai’s Uganda People’s Army (UPA) undertook an 
insurgency against the NRM government from 1987 to 1992. The government’s response to 
the insurgency and the subsequent marginalisation of Teso sub-region – along with spill-over 
effects of the LRA incursion and cattle-rustling from Karamoja – exacerbated the region’s 
dislike of the government based in Kampala. West Nile sub-region (in the north west) also 
distrusted the NRM regime; former members of Amin’s army had staged an insurgency from 
1995 to 1997 in response to widespread perceptions of the economic and political neglect of 
the region.187 The West Nile sub-region has continued to be economically and politically 
marginalised since 1986, with few people from the region being represented within the upper 
echelons of the state. Due to the recurrent cycles of conflict and perceptions of the economic 
(and later, political) dominance of the south over the north and east, the northern and eastern 
regions of Uganda have long been bastions of opposition (anti-NRM) support. In 1996, 
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despite being a Muganda (from Buganda in the south), DP President Paul Kawanga 
Ssemogerere won significant support in Acholiland and West Nile. Ssemogerere had 
campaigned on promises of peace talks with the rebels and had been backed by Milton 
Obote’s UPC, and as a result he won 88% of the vote in strife-torn Kitgum, 86% in Gulu 
and majorities in other northern districts.188  
The cycles of conflict that emerged following the NRM’s successful insurgency would have 
a lasting impact on the voting patterns across the country, and would help define the 
opposition’s fortunes and limit the success of coalition formation in the multi-party 
dispensation. Table 2 outlines the conflicts that have occurred since Museveni took power; 
and it is in these conflict-prone areas that the opposition have largely been able to capitalise 
on anti-NRM sentiment.  
Table 2 Conflicts and Insurgencies in Museveni's Uganda, 1986-2006 
Civil War Sub-Region Years 
Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA) Acholiland (North) 1986-1988 
Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) Acholiland (North) 1986-1987 
Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA) Acholiland (North) 1987-2006 
Uganda People’s Army (UPA) Teso (East) 1987-1992 
West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) West Nile (North) 1995-1997 
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) 
Rwenzori Mountains 
(West) 1996-2002 
Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF II) West Nile (North) 1998-2002 
Source: Table reproduced from Lindemann (2011), p. 
388   
 
Buganda’s relationship to the central state also, at times, reflects the uneasy relationship 
between the state and the country’s powerful kingdoms. The central region (which is largely 
coterminous with the historical Buganda kingdom) played host to the Luweero bush war that 
brought the NRA to power, and it suffered most from the counter-insurgency of the Obote 
regime in the 1980s. During the 1980s most of the NRA’s support came from the southern 
region of the country, and from Buganda in particular. However, since 1996, the relationship 
between the region and the central government has been strained at moments, over the 
federal status of the kingdom, land usage rights, the contestation over the limits of the 
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political and cultural powers of the king (Kabaka) and the ‘return’ of 9000 square miles of 
land that was confiscated by the government decades ago.189 The Democratic Party (DP) 
originates from Buganda and has almost exclusively been led by Baganda presidents. The 
region has long been sympathetic to the DP. The Buganda sub-region also plays host to the 
country’s capital – Kampala – which, due to reasons of information access, class, inadequate 
service delivery and demographic change, has become a bastion of anti-NRM sentiment.190  
Since 1986, despite the claims of inclusivity by Museveni, successive NRM administrations 
have been marked for their over-representation of westerners and southerners in key 
positions of power and authority.191 In particular, the Banyankole and Bahima from 
Museveni’s region192 (in the south west) have been given a privileged position in successive 
cabinets, making up nearly 70% of powerful positions.193 This is mirrored in the military 
where all those appointed to the rank of full general since 1986 are Bahima, and westerners 
account for 61% of all top command positions.194 By contrast, northerners have been 
marginalised within the state, making up just 1.8% of all powerful positions between 1986 
and 2008.195 This marginalisation from the core levers of power has further entrenched a 
sense of relative deprivation and exacerbated the grievances produced by the government’s 
heavy-handed response to regional conflicts. The electoral consequences of this are that the 
regions that have suffered most under the NRM have tended to vote for the opposition, 
while the rural south-west has proven to be an unassailable NRM heartland where the 
opposition is unable to make a firm foothold – even though the main opposition leader, 
Kizza Besigye, hails from there.196  
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Following on from the above discussion regarding the motivations for coalitions, weakness 
of opposition parties and the ethno-regional support bases of both the NRM and the 
opposition, the subsequent sections will outline the negotiations around opposition coalition 
formation in Uganda since 1996. They highlight the ways in which ethnicity, party support 
bases, elite dynamics and government manipulation facilitated or hindered the successful 
formation of opposition coalitions. While the frequency of coalition efforts has helped to 
build relationships between partners, the internal weaknesses of parties and their fractious 
nature undermines cooperation. Newly-elected party leaders regularly pull their parties out 
of coalitions as they seek to test their own electoral support. When these leaders perform 
poorly in the presidential election, they often go into coalitions in subsequent polls. But this 
does not guarantee that the coalitions will cohere.  Intra-opposition competition over the 
same anti-incumbent voters helps to create competition between parties that undermines the 
collective goal of coalition-building, while uncertainty and information asymmetries 
regarding who might most effectively eat into the NRM’s vote share creates tensions within 
coalitions. These tensions may manifest in party splits and divisions that create further 
antagonism as party factions align themselves with other parties, making future coalitions 
more difficult to sustain. Contrary to Gandhi and Reuter’s (2013) suggestion that 
fractionalised party systems inhibit coalitions because parties lack a stable past of interaction, 
opposition parties in Uganda have a long history of interaction – and inter-party competition. 
This stable history of interaction has created and entrenched grievances that have 
undermined successive coalitions, as party leaders (at various levels) have used coalitions as 
forums through which to achieve their own particularistic aims, rather than privileging the 









2.2 Coalitions Under the Movement System (1996-2005) 
2.2.1 The 1996 Election and the IPFC Coalition 
The 1996 election would be held under the movement system but appeared to be a multi-
party election. Following the creation in the Constituent Assembly197 of an alliance of those 
supporting the reintroduction of a multi-party system within the Movement who allied with 
the ‘old’ parties, the DP’s President, Paul Kawanga Ssemogerere, opted to run against 
President Yoweri Museveni for the presidency. Although parties’ activities were constrained, 
they had continued to exist and members of the old parties, such as Ssemogerere, had joined 
the NRM’s broad-based government formed after the fall of the Obote regime and the 
capture of power by Museveni’s NRA. Several prominent members of the DP took up seats 
in the NRM’s administration after 1986 and Ssemogerere was granted the position of Second 
Deputy Prime Minister.198 By 1995, given the rise to prominence of the cross-party Caucus 
for Multi-Party Democracy (CMPD) within the Constituent Assembly (CA), the number of 
DP ministers had declined drastically. The party became increasingly concerned about their 
decreasing leverage within the Movement. When Ssemogerere pulled out of the broad-based 
government and announced his intention to stand against Museveni, he found that many DP 
leaders who had joined the Movement government with him were unwilling to cede their 
positions and they deserted the DP.199 This loss of party members to other parties would be 
a recurring problem for the DP when joining coalitions – and is frequently cited as a key 
reason for the party’s reluctance to join forces with larger or more prominent political 
organisations. 
Coalition Formation 
The political alliance that would become the Inter-Political Forces for Cooperation (IPFC) 
emerged from within the CMPD in the Constituent Assembly when it became clear that their 
aims to have the restoration of multi-party politics entrenched in the 1995 constitution had 
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failed.200 The key actors in the CMPD were from the DP, UPC and a group known as the 
‘Federalists’ who had advocated for the institution of a federal system. The opposition caucus 
in the CA was significant; there were 70 members of the two historical political parties within 
the CA, though two thirds of the body was taken up by movementists.201 Based on the 
consensus reached within the CMPD, the DP and a faction of the UPC formed the IPFC to 
contest the 1996 election. Despite their history of decades of animosity, rivalry and even 
bloodshed, the DP and UPC resolved to work together to try to defeat Museveni. This 
alliance was based upon ethno-regional calculus, which hoped to be able to stitch together 
the DP’s Buganda base and the UPC’s northern strongholds (Acholiland, Lango, and to a 
lesser extent West Nile and Teso). The party leaders believed this would create a broad multi-
ethnic alliance to challenge the NRM, but they underestimated the NRM’s popularity and the 
broad unpopularity of Milton Obote’s UPC in the south west of Uganda. As Milton Obote 
was still in exile in Zambia and reluctant to partner with the DP, the coalition was 
spearheaded and negotiated by UPC-heavyweight and acting-Secretary General Cecelia 
Ogwal.202 This prominent politician – who would later be dubbed the ‘Iron Lady’ – had 
established herself as a pragmatic politician and UPC reformer.203 Despite Obote’s initial 
reluctance, the two parties signed an agreement which outlined that in the event of victory, 
the two parties – rivals for 45 years – were to share power.204 Despite their apparent unity, 
the alliance would struggle to challenge the popularity of Museveni’s presidency and compete 
on a skewed playing field.  
The parties had based their campaign upon faulty assumptions – the first was that Ugandans 
would be generally sympathetic to their intentions to reinstate party politics. It had been only 
a decade since the end of the NRA insurgency – itself prompted by a divisive multi-party 
election – and the NRM had presided over significant economic growth and growing stability 
in the south, west and centre of the country. Given that the NRM had allocated blame for 
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Uganda’s previous instability to the nefarious influence of political parties, the IPFC’s beliefs 
regarding Ugandan sympathies towards parties were likely ill-founded. The alliance was also 
based on a similar calculus to the 1962 election – the DP assumed that their calls for 
federalism would endear them to the Baganda, while the UPC’s traditional base in Acholiland 
and Lango sub-region (fearing marginalisation since the fall of the Obote regime) would vote 
in favour of the recently-ousted and humiliated former ruling party and its allies. However, 
the UPC under Obote had been responsible for banning political parties and the abolition of 
the semi-federal system that existed at independence; as a result, most southern Ugandans 
were sceptical regarding the likelihood that a DP-UPC alliance would deliver on its 
promises.205 Baganda (and other groups across the south west) were sceptical of the alliance, 
fearing that it would lead to a repeat of the coup and constitutional crisis left in the wake of 
the breakdown of the 1962 UPC/Kabaka Yekka alliance.206 
Museveni played on these fears and vilified the coalition by raising the spectre of the return 
of Obote to Uganda – a trap that Ssemogerere fell into while campaigning in the northern 
city of Lira, where he promised to return the unpopular exiled president.207 This was 
disastrous for the DP’s campaign in its Buganda strongholds; this region had borne the brunt 
of Obote’s repressive regimes (1966-1971, and 1980-1985) and been hardest hit by the 
abolition of the kingdoms in 1966. The alliance’s strategic gaffe was further compounded by 
the Museveni campaign’s use of full-page adverts in the government-owned New Vision 
newspaper showing the skulls of people who had died in the Luweero Triangle (in Buganda) 
allegedly at the hands of Obote’s soldiers during the 1980s war.208 The south west of the 
country also feared that a win for Ssemogerere would ultimately lead to his overthrow by 
Obote and the return of dominance by northerners. Critically, Ssemogerere’s campaign 
served to foment disunity within the DP, as key politicians such as the Secretary General and 
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Vice President stayed away from his campaign, while DP Vice Chairman Andrew Adimola 
denounced him as “utterly incompetent to lead the country.”209  
Ultimately the IPFC’s presidential campaign was unsuccessful, with Ssemogerere garnering 
just 23.6% of the national vote compared to Museveni’s 74.3%. The alliance candidate only 
succeeded in supplanting the president in Apac, Arua, Gulu, Kitgum and Lira – the districts 
most affected by Obote’s ouster and the continuing instability in the country’s Northern 
Region. In perhaps the election’s strangest turn, Joseph Kony of the LRA had declared a 
temporary ceasefire for the duration of the election, and endorsed Ssemogerere for the 
presidency.210 In the northern region, the coalition received 56% of the vote, signalling their 
dissatisfaction with Museveni and the NRM. In the DP’s traditional Buganda stronghold, the 
coalition was routed with Museveni receiving 79%, and Ssemogerere a meagre 18%, while 
the coalition received just over 2% in the NRM’s western stronghold. Following their 
relatively dismal showing in the presidential election, the IPFC alleged that they had been 
rigged out of the election and refused to participate in the parliamentary poll.211 Despite the 
formal boycott many UPC and DP members ran for election (as independents, under the 
movement system) and some were successful in winning their seats. This allowed some 
‘multi-partyists’ to re-enter parliament and pave the way for the future formation of the 2001 
parliamentary alliance. Despite the existence of the presidential alliance, there were no formal 
coalition mechanisms to assist parliamentary candidates in their elections.  
2.2.2 Kizza Besigye and the 2001 Alliance 
The late 1990s would see the emergence of a credible threat to the NRM regime, but it would 
not come from the traditional opposition parties. In November 1999, a Movement 
‘historical’212 – Warren Kizza Besigye Kifefe – would write a missive distancing himself from 
the excesses of the movement government,213 and set himself up in opposition to 
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Museveni.214 Besigye is a Mukiga from the western region where Museveni originates from. 
The Bakiga are generally closely aligned with the Banyankole and live in Ankole sub-region 
in the NRM’s heartlands. Because of their support for the NRM and their importance within 
Museveni’s circles, the Bakiga are over-represented within the state’s institutions, relative to 
the group’s small size. They make up 7% of the population, but have held 25% of the ‘inner 
core’ positions in the NRM’s administrations between 2000 and 2008.215 As will be outlined 
below, although Besigye is from a small ethnic group that is affiliated to the NRM and is seen 
to be privileged relative to historically marginalised regions, he has proven to be able to draw 
on the votes of anti-incumbent non-co-ethnics in these places. This highlights the limits of 
co-ethnic bloc-voting in Uganda. 
Coalition Formation 
In October 2000, Besigye announced that he would be standing against Museveni as a 
Movement (and then an independent) candidate in the upcoming 2001 elections. Besigye had 
expected that the other ‘historicals’ would break with Museveni and support his bid – but 
almost all returned to the fold after Museveni promised them that the 2001 election would 
be his last.216 Instead, Besigye found himself reliant on his ‘Reform Agenda’ pressure group,217 
as well as the Parliamentary Advocacy Forum (PAFO) – a grouping of parliamentary Young 
Turks who were increasingly frustrated with the NRM’s parliamentary and government old 
guard.218  
In 2001, the official leadership of the DP (which was largely Buganda-based), facing internal 
squabbles and a succession battle pushed by a younger generation of leaders, opted to support 
Besigye’s independent presidential bid in 2001.219 A breakaway faction which included most 
of the party’s MPs and prominent Northern members decided to field their own candidate – 
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Francis Bwenge – who performed dismally at the polls. The internecine squabbling within 
the DP would continue until 2005, involving court battles, disputed internal elections and a 
regional divide that proved difficult to overcome. These battles were only papered over in 
2005 when a court ruled that the party would be unable to register in the new multi-party 
dispensation unless they resolved the leadership question.220 For their part, the UPC was also 
seriously divided between two factions – one headed by exiled party leader, Obote, and the 
second headed by UPC heavyweight Cecelia Ogwal. The Lira MP was the head of a younger 
generation of UPC members who objected to Obote’s remote control leadership of the party, 
and his prescriptions to refrain from legislative politics. The party had split in 1996 over the 
IPFC and Obote’s demands that members observe a boycott of the legislative elections – 
while Ogwal and some of the party’s parliamentary caucus saw participation in parliament as 
a way for the UPC to remain relevant under the Movement system.221 The events of 2001 
would be a precursor to the 2011 and 2016 elections, where the two older parties would be 
internally divided on strategy, leading to a regional split within the leadership ranks. After the 
DP supported Besigye’s candidacy, several prominent DP members defected to supporting 
Besigye on a more permanent basis, and ultimately joined the FDC when it was formed a few 
years later. 
The 2001 elections were hard-fought and brutal, with violence meted out by the military 
against Besigye’s supporters, leaving several people dead. Museveni derided his opponent, 
calling him and his prominent wife (MP Winnie Byanyima) traitors and accusing Besigye of 
having AIDS.222 The election was held on 12 March 2001, and after serious electoral 
malpractice and widespread claims of rigging and ballot-stuffing,223 Museveni was declared 
the winner with 69% of the vote, compared to Besigye’s 28%. Although his national tally was 
relatively low, his successes in 2001 would go on to define his future political party’s voting 
base. Besigye won in eight of the country’s 53 districts, and all but one were in the Northern 
region – in the typically anti-NRM Acholi, Lango and West Nile sub-regions. Besigye also 
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won narrowly in Kampala, with just 50.2% of the vote, calling attention to the growing 
disenchantment of urban voters with President Museveni and his administration. 224 
2.3 Multi-Party Coalitions (2006-2016) 
2.3.1 The 2006 G6 
As early as April 2002, members of the two historical parties (DP and UPC) and the Reform 
Agenda parliamentary pressure group met in Kampala to discuss the resurrection of the 1996 
IPFC alliance.225 The process was given further impetus with the success of the opposition 
National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) alliance in neighbouring Kenya later that year.226 
However, little was concretised until mid-2004 with the formation of a new political party 
that would fundamentally alter the electoral field. At a meeting in July 2004, three 
organisations (including approximately 28 MPs) would merge to form Uganda’s newest and 
most formidable opposition party. These groupings were Kizza Besigye’s ‘movementist’ 
Reform Agenda, Augustino Ruzindana’s PAFO227 and Chaapa Karuhanga’s National 
Democrats Forum.228 The newly-founded FDC included a list of prominent former 
movementists, including former ministers, an army commander and respected and outspoken 
parliamentarians from all sides – including the DP and UPC. Many of these former 
movementists, such as Besigye, Mugisha Muntu and Winnie Byanyima, had been members 
of the NRM’s (and Museveni’s) inner circle. This group also included two prominent 
members of the DP and two who had defected from the UPC. In 2005, multi-party 
competition was reinstated, but with little time ahead of the 2006 elections. It appeared that 
the NRM government intentionally stalled opposition party registration processes to frustrate 
party structure-building and candidate selection processes.229 The DP had gingerly papered 
over the cracks left from the 2001 election and the UPC was facing internal generational and 
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strategic divisions resulting from Obote’s remote-control leadership after two decades in 
exile. When Obote died unexpectedly in exile in October 2005, the UPC chose his wife – 
Miria Obote – as leader, side-lining the party’s de facto Kampala leadership. The two old 
parties were in a state of flux, while the FDC had only just begun to develop its own 
organisational structure.  
Coalition Formation and Collapse 
Two years before the election, in recognition of the weakness of their position relative to the 
NRM, six major opposition parties came together to form the Group of Six or G6. These 
were the UPC, DP, FDC, Conservative Party (CP), Justice Forum (JEEMA) and The Free 
Movement. The G6 resolved to coordinate their electoral efforts and front a single 
presidential candidate and joint candidates at parliamentary level. The G6 coordinator, 
Chaapa Karuhanga, highlighted the importance of opposition cohesion, saying that since the 
parties were being “oppressed together” it was in their interests to work together.230 “Unless 
we are stupid, we should not be divided to have each party field a candidate because we have 
one common goal of restoring democracy in the country,” noted the FDC’s Reagan 
Okumu.231 Despite the recognition that a coalition was necessary, party leaders would still 
struggle to reach consensus on who should lead the multi-party alliance.  
Commitment soon waned as disagreements emerged over the G6’s presidential candidate. 
When Besigye returned from four years in exile in South Africa on 26 October 2005, he was 
joined on-stage by members of the DP and the CP, but the leadership of the UPC and 
JEEMA were absent.232 Besigye was seen as the natural leader of the alliance from early on, 
as he had garnered 29% of the vote in the previous election, demonstrating that he had 
sufficiently broad national appeal to run against Museveni. Ultimately, however, the search 
for a joint presidential flag bearer was fruitless as the various party leaders refused to concede 
the chance to run as a presidential candidate. The UPC and DP were fronting new leaders – 
Miria Obote and John Ssebaana Kizito respectively – who had not previously run in a national 
election. Both leaders were eager to test out their electoral strength under the new multi-party 
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dispensation, and were wary of ceding the top seat in the alliance to the FDC candidate. Both 
leaders believed that the historical parties would be able to regain their old roles and 
constituencies, returning to the levels of support that they had enjoyed prior to the banning 
of political parties. These concerns over support base and strategy were further complicated 
by the NRM’s attempt to clamp down on Besigye ahead of the polls. Besigye was arrested 
and charged with treason and rape on 14 November – four weeks before presidential 
nominations – which led to him being imprisoned or shuttling back and forth to court for 
most of the duration of the election campaign.233  
Several G6 coalition partners argued that he could not front the coalition under those 
circumstances. The UPC and DP were both fronting untested presidential candidates, so the 
FDC insisted that Besigye was the most popular opposition leader and should thus lead the 
alliance.234 The UPC argued that they had supported the DP’s candidate in the 1996 election 
and that it was now time for Kizito’s party to return the favour. For their part, the DP argued 
that their candidate was the best-placed to lead the alliance as he did not have “blood on his 
hands”, unlike both the UPC’s and FDC’s leaders who had been a part of previous 
governments.235 The G6 collapsed shortly before the election, undermined by leadership 
wrangles. Besigye was registered as the FDC’s candidate in absentia, while Miria Obote ran 
on the UPC ticket and John Ssebaana Kizito fronted the DP campaign. During the campaign, 
the parties spent almost as much time de-campaigning each other as they did the NRM 
president and they ran competing candidates in subsequent by-elections.236  
In the presidential election, Besigye and the FDC’s dominance was again asserted,237 with the 
former NRM political commissar receiving 37.4% of the vote to Museveni’s 59.3%. In 
comparison, the DP’s Kizito polled a dismal 1.6%, while Miria Obote of UPC garnered only 
0.8%. The UPC’s candidate received only 3% in the party’s heartlands in the north (compared 
to Besigye’s 62.9%), highlighting how far the party had fallen since Obote’s exile and his 
death in 2005. At parliamentary level, the FDC failed to perform as well as it did in the 
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presidential poll, collecting only 37 of 309 parliamentary seats (12% of the total). The UPC 
and DP also performed relatively poorly, collecting only 9 seats each, all of which were 
concentrated in their traditional constituencies. As Gloppen et al. (2006) suggest, the 
opposition’s poor performance was a result of their inability to coalesce in the face of a 
Movement onslaught against high profile opposition ‘safe’ parliamentary seats.238 The FDC 
(which was significantly underfunded)239 had also spent most of its campaign finances on the 
presidential campaign, expecting parliamentary candidates to source their own supplementary 
funds. The weakness of all parties ahead of the 2006 election was clear. The DP and UPC 
had been reduced to shadows of their former selves under the Movement system,240 while 
the FDC had not had a chance to establish meaningful structures due to substantial state 
harassment and the short timelines between the legalisation of parties and the election. While 
the NRM could field candidates in all 215 constituencies, the FDC fielded just 127 – 
compared to the UPC’s 74 and the DP’s 68 parliamentary candidates.241  
Although both Museveni and Besigye hail from the west of the country, Besigye was again 
supported in large numbers by voters in the northern regions and in the urban areas of 
Kampala (where he won eight of nine constituencies).242 Although the UPC and DP had 
deeper historical and ethnic ties to the north and the Baganda-dominated capital, disaffected 
voters saw the FDC as having the best chance of defeating the NRM and they abandoned 
their traditional political affiliations and co-ethnic leaders. As noted by Izama and Wilkerson 
(2011), “by being the man most likely to unseat Museveni, Besigye became the North’s 
favourite son.”243 Despite having just been registered, the FDC quickly displaced the older 
parties as it became the largest parliamentary opposition – with 39 seats. Besigye’s personal 
appeal was apparent, having won 9% more than in 2001, taking 37% of the total vote. 
Museveni’s vote share declined to 59%. But, the FDC’s growth was at the expense of the 
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older opposition parties, who lost members, voters and their regional support bases to the 
new party.  
The FDC performed very well (see Figure 1 and the blue map in Figure 2), taking districts in 
West Nile, Acholiland, Lango (all former UPC heartlands) and Teso as well as Kampala and 
Kasese (in the NRM’s western heartland). This was a result of the continuing insecurity in 
the north (as noted above), the 2003 LRA insurgency and chronic insecurity in the east as 
well as the east’s growing frustration with western dominance of government positions and 
development funds.244 The Teso sub-region (in the east) provided the greatest returns for 
Besigye and the FDC, which won in every district and contributed a third of the party’s 37 
parliamentary seats.245 In Kasese (the blue district in western Uganda) Besigye’s showing was 
the result of strong opposition organisers affiliated to the local royal family, and a protest 
vote due to Museveni’s repeated refusal to recognise the Rwenzururu Kingdom – an 
important driver of local political action.246 The impressive performance of the FDC was 
contrasted with the poor performance of the older opposition parties. Obote won between 
1 and 4% of the vote across the UPC’s traditional northern base, except for two 
constituencies in Lango sub-region (Milton Obote’s home region) where she took 6 to 8% 
(see the maroon map in Figure 2 below). Ssebaana Kizito managed to attract a small 
percentage of the vote (see the green map in Figure 2) across many of Uganda’s traditional 
opposition-sympathetic regions (the north, Karamoja, Buganda), but despite being a 
Muganda from the DP and the former mayor of Kampala, he was unable to attract more 
than 5% of the vote in the central region (home to the Baganda) or the capital. Similarly to 
the 2001 and 2015 elections in Zambia, the G6 coalition faltered as the newly-elected leaders 
of parties to the coalition overestimated their own support, underestimated that of the FDC 
and ran independent campaigns. The spectacular failure of the DP and UPC’s presidential 
campaigns would then set the scene for the attempt to create yet another coalition in 2011, 
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as the party leaders realised that they were better off competing together than against one 


















Figure 1 The 2006 Ugandan Presidential Election Results by District 
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Figure 2 The 2006 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and 















2.3.2 The 2011 Inter-Party Cooperation (IPC) 
Coalition Formation 
In August 2008, five opposition parties signed a protocol to present a united front to pressure 
the NRM government and the Ugandan electoral commission to introduce electoral reforms 
ahead of the 2011 elections.247 The alliance was formed between most of the parties to the 
2006 G6; the FDC, DP, CP, JEEMA and UPC. The small Social Democratic Party (SDP) 
also joined later. The Interparty Cooperation (IPC), as it became known, was given financial 
and technical assistance by a Swedish opposition coalition, channelled through a Swedish 
NGO called the Christian Democratic International Centre (KIC).248 The KIC had signed a 
formal agreement with a Ugandan NGO, Change Initiative Limited (CIL), which then 
became the IPC Secretariat.249 The IPC would later receive funding and technical assistance 
from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and 
the Deepening Democracy Programme – a multi-donor basket fund to improve democracy 
and accountability in Uganda.250 The IPC developed a much more complex governing 
structure compared to previous coalitions. Based on a Swedish opposition coalition’s 
structure, it had a ‘Steering Committee’ (made up of two elected members of each party), the 
‘Summit’ (comprised of presidents and secretary generals) and a ‘Secretariat’ which managed 
a joint IPC bank account, oversaw ten thematic committees and the day-to-day running of 
the coalition.251 It was agreed that each party leader who supported the IPC flagbearer would 
then be considered for one of the following posts: Vice President, Prime Minister, House 
Speaker, Ministers of Defence, Finance, Internal Affairs or Foreign Affairs.252 A later 
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‘additional protocol’ also provided that all other cabinet positions would be divided 
‘equitably’ and that 40% of cabinet posts should be reserved for women.  
In 2010 the alliance shifted from a common front to push for electoral reforms, to an 
electoral coalition that resolved to front joint candidates in the upcoming 2011 elections.253 
In response, the DP pulled out of the coalition. The party had recently changed political 
leadership with the election of popular Acholi politician, Norbert Mao, to the party’s top 
post. In a missive to explain his decision to lead his party out of the coalition, Mao described 
the IPC as “a trap laid to snare the Democratic Party” and vowed to lead his party to defeat 
Museveni in the 2011 elections.254 The charismatic DP leader believed that the IPC would 
threaten the DP’s identity, and he saw it as little more than an FDC machine. Mao’s election 
was not uncontroversial, and led to a court challenge and significant dissent by the party’s 
Buganda faction.255 This faction would then – along with a few Baganda politicians from 
other parties – create a new Mengo-aligned256 pressure group to advance Ganda interests 
within the opposition field. This was in response to what they believed was the side-lining of 
the Baganda within the DP. This pressure group was called Suubi or ‘hope,’ in Luganda. The 
willingness of other opposition politicians to work with this DP breakaway faction would 
create long-lasting fissures within the fractured opposition landscape.  
Broad Coalition Collapse 
Despite repeated overtures, Mao refused to join the IPC unless he was chosen as the 
flagbearer, with senior DP figures reporting that “the coalition needs him more than he needs 
a coalition.”257 Mao argued that it was not necessary for the opposition to unite in the first 
round of the election (Uganda has a two-round presidential election system), but that if the 
opposition was collectively strong enough to bring Museveni’s vote under 50%, he would 
support the strongest opposition candidate in the second round.258 But the IPC had more 
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concerns than just the exclusion of the DP. Although the JEEMA remained within the 
coalition, there were clearly antagonistic relationships between the party and other alliance 
members. A JEEMA Bulletin in May 2009 stated that during a party convention in late April, 
the party’s ‘founding fathers’ had opposed participation in the IPC because some of the 
parties had a “verifiable history of insincerity.”259 The Bulletin accused the FDC of having 
operated in bad faith in 2006 by fielding candidates against JEEMA, in violation of the 
coalition agreement. Echoing what other parties appeared to believe, JEEMA’s internal 
newsletter feared that the party would be swallowed in an alliance, and stated that “FDC was 
a cunning opportunist merely seeking to ride on the back of unsuspecting parties in the 
proposed alliance to seize power for itself.”260 This theme of distrust ran through each of the 
major parties to the coalition.  
Although the UPC had been an early signatory – and even instigator – of the IPC, its 
participation was not guaranteed as the party was also undergoing a simultaneous internal 
leadership change. In August of 2009, Olara Otunnu, a former UN Under-Secretary General 
who had lived in exile since 1986, returned to Uganda. Within a month of his return, Otunnu 
was touring the northern and south-western regions of the country with an American 
documentary filmmaker, gearing up for his presidential bid.261 The UPC was undergoing a 
leadership crisis, following a reshuffle by President Miria Obote which ended in a court 
battle.262 Ultimately, Otunnu won the UPC presidential race by beating Milton Obote’s son 
Jimmy Akena, and lined himself up to be the UPC’s candidate for the IPC presidential 
flagbearer position. Within the IPC, Otunnu repeatedly pressured the other parties to declare 
a boycott of the elections, unless a new electoral commission was put in place. The 
commission had been found by the courts to have seriously failed in administering the 2006 
election and the commissioners were known to have extensive links to the NRM, but despite 
local and international pressure, their mandates were extended.263 The push to boycott the 
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election gained little traction within the coalition, and after prevaricating for weeks and 
delaying the choice of flagbearer, Otunnu pulled out of the IPC in mid-August 2010.264 
According to The Independent, “Otunnu alleged that IPC had abandoned the original objective 
to shun the electoral process until President Museveni disbanded or reconstituted the 
Electoral Commission. He also accused FDC of hijacking and dominating the IPC process 
and acting in bad faith.”265  
Despite his strong views on the boycott, Otunnu ultimately resolved to contest the election 
although his reported reason for pulling out of the coalition was that he believed that the IPC 
should refuse to participate in elections prior to the conclusion of an electoral reform process. 
Otunnu’s position within his own party was not secure, and he had struggled to garner 
support for participation in the IPC coalition. The UPC did not support the idea of fronting 
a joint presidential candidate, and in March during the UPC National Council meeting that 
elected Otunnu to the head of UPC, 86 members voted against having a joint IPC candidate, 
while just 40 supported the idea. The National Council resolved that they would only agree 
to a joint candidate if they were from the UPC, as they had previously allied with other parties 
and it was now their ‘turn’ to be supported by a coalition. This group apparently cited the 
1996 IPFC coalition when the UPC supported the DP’s Ssemogerere, and the 2001 polls 
when they had supported Kizza Besigye.266 When Otunnu pulled out of the coalition, but 
threatened to boycott the election, he faced a revolt within the UPC ranks as the 
parliamentary caucus – led by Jimmy Akena – threatened to run as independents.267 Thus, 
ultimately Otunnu contested. 
The entry of the Suubi pressure group into the IPC further cemented divisions within the 
opposition.268 Suubi 2011 was a Buganda Kingdom-sympathetic pressure group, formed with 
the intention of advancing the kingdom’s aims of achieving a federal system and the return 
of Buganda’s ‘lost counties.’ Suubi was the outcome of a factional fight within the DP 
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following the election of prominent Catholic Acholi politician, Norbert Mao, as the party’s 
president – ahead of Bugandan Muslim heavyweight Hajji Nasser Sebaggala. The DP was 
initially formed as a Catholic party with a Buganda base (though in opposition to the 
Protestant royal establishment), and since its inception in the 1950s, it has been led by 
Catholics and a single Anglican – but all leaders (apart from Mao) have hailed from Buganda. 
In response to Mao’s 2010 election, several Buganda-based party leaders formed the Suubi 
group to pressure politicians to advance the Buganda kingdom’s agenda within the DP, and 
beyond.269 This came on the back of increasing tensions between the Buganda royal 
establishment and the Museveni government following the controversial 2007 Land Bill,270 
the 2009 Buganda riots,271 which led to the deaths of at least 40 people, and the year-long 
closure of Buganda’s CBS radio station.272  
The Suubi group resolved to work with the IPC, and officially joined the coalition in late 
October 2010 after the signing of an agreement that would soon prove to be controversial.273 
The agreement gave the Suubi group dominance over candidate selection and mobilisation 
in Buganda sub-region, despite the existence of other parties to the agreement having their 
own candidates to run in Buganda. Suubi hoped to ensure that only pro-Mengo MPs would 
be selected as joint candidates, but this caused tensions and fractures within the coalition.274 
The distrust between the DP and the FDC – which was exacerbated by the FDC’s support 
of Suubi’s members and aims – was openly reported in the media, and would continue to 
colour the relationship between the two parties beyond the end of the 2011 election cycle. 
Mao denounced the IPC, saying that it was a ploy intended to “hoodwink the public and 
divert DP’s support in Buganda region.” The DP Publicist, Kenneth Kakande, stated that 
the coalition with Suubi “is a political ploy by FDC to grab Buganda region using our own 
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party members who have resolved to betray their party because they never supported Norbert 
Mao [DP president].”275 The DP saw the FDC’s support of Suubi as an attempt to split and 
weaken the older party, particularly in its Buganda strongholds. 
Although the FDC was undoubtedly the strongest and most popular of the remaining parties 
in the IPC (JEEMA, CP, FDC and SDP),276 the candidate selection process was still 
contentious. Polls conducted in July 2010 by the Daily Monitor newspaper and the Deepening 
Democracy Programme (DDP) put Besigye far ahead of the rest of the opposition field, with 
30% of the popular vote – ahead of all other candidates who took less than 5%. Besigye was 
the obvious choice, but the IPC flagbearer selection remained hotly contested. After a 
deadlock in negotiations, a team led by Professor Dani Nabudere and Professor Bwogi 
Kanyerezi held an eight-hour meeting and finally brokered a deal that led the other 
contenders – Hussein Kyanjo of JEEMA, CP’s Prof James Kigongo and SDP’s Michael 
Mabikke – to support Besigye.277 Ultimately, the coalition leaders agreed to have Besigye front 
the coalition due to the FDC having more effective grassroots structures; Besigye’s previous 
experience as a presidential candidate and his being “more prepared to guide the IPC to 
victory.”278 But despite having elected a single presidential candidate, the coalition failed to 
select joint flagbearers at lower levels, ultimately allowing the various parties to run competing 
candidates in the parliamentary and local races.279  
By the time that campaigns kicked off in earnest, the IPC existed in name alone.280 Following 
the retreat of both the DP and UPC from the broader coalition, the opposition leaders 
repeatedly attacked each other on stage at rallies and in the press, often reserving more of 
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their ire for fellow opposition leaders than for President Museveni.281 The coalition’s 
campaigns were sorely under-funded, while the NRM used patronage and positions to coax 
opposition members to shift allegiance.282 A 2013 report commissioned to look into the 
failings of the IPC noted that following the selection of Besigye as the joint candidate, he 
largely neglected to manage the coalition and “what followed was manipulation, intrigue and 
open rivalry among IPC constituent parties. It is that state that cost not only the IPC, but 
also other opposition parties’ seats at Parliamentary and Local Government levels mainly in 
Kampala and the Central region.”283 It noted that the DP and UPC had left the coalition after 
accusing the FDC of dominating and hijacking the process.  
In contrast to the opposition’s disarray and lack of funds, Museveni ran a high energy, high-
tech election, which, among other things, used rap music and pop stars to woo younger 
voters. He also plied voters with cash, and funds flowed liberally through the movement’s 
patronage structures,284 while using subtle threats of violence to encourage voters to give him 
‘another rap.’285 Besigye and other opposition leaders focused their electoral campaigns on 
diminishing access to services and corruption in the delivery of public goods, but this failed 
to resonate with voters – most of whose perceived access to services was improving.286 
Opposition parties’ organisational structures were generally weak and subject to political 
obstruction at the local level, undermining their electoral campaigns.287 The weakness of the 
opposition was highlighted by the number of candidates that the parties were able to sponsor 
for parliamentary races – while the NRM sponsored candidates for all but one of the 
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country’s 238 directly-elected constituency seats, the FDC sponsored just 188 (79%), 
followed by the UPC on 102 (43%), DP at 86 (36%), JEEMA sponsored 12, the CP seven 
and the SDP five.  
At the beginning of the campaign, conventional wisdom held that Museveni’s vote share 
would continue its downward slide of 2001 and 2006, and that the opposition may collectively 
be able to pull the president under the 50% threshold.288 Although eight candidates registered 
to contest the presidential election, the contest was – once again – a two-man race.289 When 
the results were announced, President Museveni had won with 68.38% of the votes (a 9% 
increase from 2006, and his highest vote share since 1996), while the IPC’s Besigye took 26% 
- this was 11% less than his total five years earlier.290 The remaining 6 candidates garnered 
just 5.38% of the total votes cast. The NRM also won 263 seats out of the new 375 seat 
parliament, with 69.3% of the constituency seats and 77% of the Woman MP seats.291 The 
remaining members included just 34 for FDC, 12 for DP, 10 for UPC, 1 for CP, 1 for JEEMA 
and 43 independents (the majority of whom are NRM supporters). The high number of MP 
candidates who contested as independents highlights the lack of appeal of the opposition, 
the legacy of ‘individual merit’ and the low salience of party labels in Uganda. After running 
separate candidates, the opposition split the vote in at least 12 of the 238 directly-elected 
parliamentary constituencies (5% of the total). Museveni and the NRM won a majority in 
every region of the country, including the opposition’s former northern strongholds. This 
was due to: four years of relative peace in the north; improved access to services;292 the return 
of displaced people to their homes; the appointments of several high-profile Acholi members 
of government and promises by Museveni regarding the region’s rejuvenation. Meanwhile, 
Mao and Otunnu’s support in Acholiland drew votes away from the FDC.293  
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Besigye won a majority of the presidential vote in just four districts, three of which were in 
Teso sub-region (see Figure 3 below) and the fourth was in Kampala. The FDC was routed 
in Teso by the NRM’s superior campaign, the opposition’s weak structures and poor 
messaging as well as due to the region’s wager that their exclusion from national development 
in the past had been a result of their anti-NRM stance.294 The DP’s Mao won a majority of 
the vote in one district and a plurality in two districts in Acholiland (see Figure 3), while 
Otunnu was the runner-up in two northern districts but failed to win a plurality of the vote 
in any district around the country. In their presidential campaigns, both Otunnu and Mao 
received less than 2% each – making it clear that neither leader could hope to win against 
Museveni in 2016 (see the green and burgundy maps in Figure 4). The two regions that had 
given the FDC their votes in 2006 – Acholiland and Teso – had voted strategically again – 
hoping to end their political and economic marginalisation by voting for Museveni.295 It was 
expected that Buganda would be a promising area of opposition support in the 2011 elections 
due to the rift that had opened between the government and Mengo between 2009 and 2010. 
However, opposition success in the region was limited by the NRM’s patronage machine,296 
the limits of the opposition’s neo-traditional platform due to the region’s cosmopolitanism 
and the rapprochement reached between the NRM and Buganda in late 2010 with the re-
opening and ‘taming’ of the Buganda radio station, CBS.297 Once again, as in 2006, the DP 
and UPC’s newly-elected party leaders were reluctant to go into a coalition in which they 
were not the flagbearer. The two new party leaders wanted to test their electoral strength 
against the FDC, and both overestimated their reach. Instead, the dramatic losses for the 
DP’s Mao (particularly in the party’s Buganda strongholds) and UPC’s Otunnu (especially in 
Lango sub-region) highlighted their lack of national reach, which would be a critical factor in 
their decisions in 2016 to contest within an opposition coalition, rather than going it alone 
once more.  
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The NRM’s Presidential Vote 
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The DP’s Presidential Vote 
 





Figure 4 The 2011 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and UPC 
















2.3.3 The 2016 Democratic Alliance (TDA) Coalition 
Coalition Formation 
On 5 April 2013, key members of the major opposition parties met once again at the UPC 
headquarters at Uganda House in Kampala to discuss cooperation ahead of the election in 
three years’ time.299 They appointed a committee to submit a working paper clearly identifying 
the failings of the 2011 pre-electoral alliance and charting the way forward for the coming 
election. The report produced by this committee highlighted the IPC’s weak regulatory and 
legal frameworks, the national campaign team’s lack of policy competency, disagreements 
within the coalition over electoral boycotts and reforms and the failure to build relationships 
with civic actors.300 Other key findings were that funding deficits and insufficient grassroots 
structures had hampered the opposition’s mobilisation efforts and vote protection system 
while a breakdown in trust between party leaders had dashed the opposition’s hopes for 
greater parliamentary representation. The committee resolved to consider creating a new 
alliance ahead of the upcoming election, and they began the process early to try to avoid 
some of the pitfalls of the IPC. The Democratic Alliance (TDA) was built upon the 
foundations laid by the multi-party coalitions in 2006 and 2011, and was facilitated by inter-
party collaboration during the 2011 Walk to Work protests and an electoral reform 
programme championed by civil society groups since 2010.301 
The coalition was formally launched to much fanfare in June 2015 and was comprised of 
seven opposition political parties and two pressure groups.302 In recognition of the failures 
of the 2011 IPC, the TDA endeavoured to institutionalise the coalition by creating a complex 
formal structure of representative bodies and committees.303 The aim of the coalition was to 
‘win power and form government’ in the form of a transitional government of national unity 
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which would govern for a 5-year period.304 The parties included Uganda’s largest opposition 
party – the FDC – as well as the DP and the UPC alongside four smaller parties with little or 
no parliamentary representation. The 2016 coalition was a product of the recognition by 
smaller opposition parties – primarily the DP, UPC and JEEMA – that they were unable to 
mount a national campaign for the presidency. Following the election of Mao and Otunnu 
to the DP and UPC presidencies, respectively, in 2010, both had opted to run in the 2011 
presidential election. However, both candidates found that they were unable to mobilise 
support beyond their traditional strongholds (see previous section). Besides political parties, 
the TDA admitted two ‘pressure groups’ and several ‘eminent persons.’305 The FDC’s status 
as the largest and most nationalised306 opposition party initially gave it an advantage in the 
alliance, and it was widely expected that – as in 2006 and 2011 – the party’s flagbearer would 
be the coalition candidate for the election. However, in early September, stirrings of dissent 
and fissures began to form within the alliance following the FDC’s election of three-time 
presidential aspirant and former FDC president Besigye as the party’s flagbearer ahead of 
Party President Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Gregory Mugisha Muntu.307 
Matters were further complicated by speculation that former Prime Minister John Patrick 
Amama Mbabazi – who had announced that he would stand as an independent candidate in 
the presidential election – might join the opposition alliance.308 Mbabazi’s entry into the race 
served to ignite debate and discussion around the potential for elite fragmentation within the 
NRM.309 Rumours circulated that a growing faction of the ruling party was increasingly 
disenchanted with NRM’s governance record and Museveni’s continued grip on the party. It 
was also expected that Mbabazi – who had served as NRM secretary general for a decade – 
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had stacked the party’s structures with his allies and that his defection would likely lead to 
widespread desertions and disarray within the ruling party. Mbabazi originated from the same 
region as Museveni, which led to speculation that people from his home region in the NRM’s 
heartland might be persuaded to vote against the NRM, in favour of their high-profile co-
ethnic leader.310 The TDA immediately began to court Mbabazi and his newly-established Go 
Forward pressure group, and he joined the alliance in mid-September, two weeks ahead of 
the summit to elect the joint presidential candidate.311  
With Mbabazi’s entry into the TDA, the cracks widened as party leaders made their own 
calculations regarding who should serve as joint candidate. The smaller parties – including 
the UPC and DP – were in favour of the Go Forward candidate fronting the alliance, as they 
expected that his alleged extensive campaign war chest would be mobilised in their favour, 
and they hoped that having an independent as the candidate would prevent the FDC from 
‘swallowing’ the smaller parties and dominating the coalition as it had in 2006 and 2011. As 
the former Attorney General, Minister for Internal Security and Prime Minister in various 
NRM governments, Mbabazi had been privy to the inner workings of both the NRM and 
state machinery – particularly with regards to past electoral malpractice – and the opposition 
expected that as flagbearer, he would use that knowledge to their advantage.312 It was also 
hoped that the mobilisation of Mbabazi’s NRM network would translate into widespread 
support for the opposition from within the government bureaucracy, army, police, prisons 
and intelligence services.313 A candidate selection committee was constituted to rate the four 
contenders who were standing for the position of joint flagbearer. The committee would 
rank the four aspirants according to set criteria and make recommendations to the TDA 
summit which was then to appoint a candidate by consensus. The emphasis on ‘fairness’ gave 
smaller parties disproportionate bargaining power and created the conditions that would 
ultimately lead to the broad coalition’s collapse. 
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Following the completion of the committee’s evaluation, seven of the nine formations within 
the TDA supported the nomination of Mbabazi as joint presidential flagbearer, with only 
John Ken Lukyamuzi’s Conservative Party and the FDC dissenting.314 While the FDC was 
determined that its flagbearer should hold the coalition’s position, the smaller parties allied 
against them to try to ensure that Mbabazi would be fronted as the face of the TDA. The 
FDC repeatedly questioned what Mbabazi (who had not yet competed in an election) would 
bring to the coalition, both in terms of resources and mobilisation structures. They felt it was 
too risky for both Besigye and the FDC to cede their dominant position within the opposition 
to an untested candidate.315 Abrahamsen and Bareebe (2016) argue that the TDA’s donors – 
or ‘donors’ more generally – pushed for the selection of Mbabazi, due to their dislike of 
Besigye’s style of politics, and their souring relationship with him.316 However, the authors 
never outline who these ‘donors’ are, and appear to conflate the groups that funded the TDA 
with the traditional donor community. They do so despite the broad consensus that the 
traditional donors in Uganda are largely supportive of the Museveni government,317 and 
denounce the so-called “activist-Ambassadors” who supported the opposition in Zimbabwe 
in the mid-2000s.318 A basket fund of Western donors gave support to opposition parties 
through the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF) and the International Republican 
Institute (IRI), but this was predominantly delivered through trainings for aspiring MPs and 
polling agents, support for elective congresses and ‘party strengthening’ activities.319 While 
the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung funded some of the TDA’s administrative budget, it appears 
that no other traditional donors gave substantial funds to the TDA. As for other potential 
TDA funders, it is possible that they placed some pressure on the coalition to choose 
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Mbabazi, but this was not confirmed. However, it is certain that if this pressure was exerted, 
it aligned with the parties’ own interests in pushing Mbabazi to the fore. 
The smaller parties – including the UPC and DP – were in favour of the Go Forward 
candidate, as they expected that his supposedly extensive campaign war chest would be 
mobilised in their favour, and they hoped that having an independent as the candidate would 
prevent the FDC from dominating the coalition as it had in 2006 and 2011. They used the 
coalition to leverage their individual aims, hoping to ring-fence their traditional strongholds 
from FDC encroachment. In contrast to Besigye and his party who were electorally popular 
in the north, Mbabazi was an independent candidate who originates from the NRM-
dominated western region. Mbabazi thus did not pose a threat to the DP or UPC presidents 
or their parties’ electoral support. This was the key point at which the broader coalition 
collapsed; the FDC felt that their candidate was better placed than Mbabazi to represent the 
TDA and when it became clear that he would not be chosen, a section of the FDC pulled 
Besigye out of the process.320 The FDC, by virtue of its dominant position within the 
opposition, felt that it could and should exit the coalition in order to preserve its position. 
Efforts at mediation by Raila Odinga in Nairobi and Kofi Annan in London in late October 
would ultimately prove fruitless, despite the signing of a power-sharing agreement that 
formalised the division of positions within the mooted coalition.321 When the attempts to 
choose a joint candidate by consensus failed, the TDA Secretariat withdrew from the process, 
insisting that what remained of the coalition which had decided to rally behind Mbabazi could 
no longer use the coalition’s brand.322 Equally, resources that had been promised to the TDA 
failed to materialise following the collapse of  the joint candidate negotiations.323 By the end 
of 2015, the splintered and now-renamed TDA-U-Go Forward was left as an ‘alliance of the 
willing’324 with the DP, UPC, UFA, PPP and JEEMA, but lacking the structures and gravitas 
of the country’s largest opposition party.  
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Disjointed Opposition Parties 
Despite its position as the largest opposition party, the FDC was not a unified force. There 
was a sense of discontent amongst some factions with Besigye’s candidacy as FDC flagbearer, 
because of divisions that had emerged around the party’s 2012 presidential election. Despite 
his popularity as the party’s founding president, Besigye’s decision to withdraw from the post 
in 2012 had been broadly commended as an attempt to move beyond the personalisation of 
the party. The race to succeed him had been contentious with two camps forming around 
retired Major General Mugisha Muntu and Nathan Nandala-Mafabi, a popular and wealthy 
politician from the Eastern Region.325 Although Muntu won the controversial election, the 
fractures that it caused would continue to dog the party until the 2016 election. Between his 
election in 2012 and the 2016 polls, a number of high profile FDC leaders expressed concerns 
in the press regarding Muntu’s leadership, arguing that he was not doing enough to raise the 
party’s profile though he defended himself by contending that he was working behind the 
scenes to quietly build the party’s structures across the country – something that would be 
increasingly important as the election approached.326 While some FDC members expressed 
concern with Muntu’s leadership, others concluded that Besigye’s brand was in decline 
following his three unsuccessful attempts at the presidency and dwindling vote share in 2011; 
they believed – like many in the wider opposition – that a new face was needed to lead the 
opposition.327 The unhappiness in some quarters with Besigye’s election as FDC flag-bearer 
would play out within the TDA as some party members opted to defy the party line, 
supporting Mbabazi as the coalition candidate.328 With all of the parties to the alliance divided 
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on strategy, the consensus required to choose the TDA’s joint flagbearer would be difficult 
to find. 
The fragmented nature of the constituent parties and the egos and interests of the key party 
leaders within the alliance undermined efforts to achieve unity. Attempts to expand beyond 
the DP and UPC’s traditional bases with the election of new party presidents in 2010 had 
caused disunity within the two parties. This resulted in diverging interests at parliamentary 
and presidential level as both parties faced down insurrections from popular leaders within 
the party’s traditional bases. Having recently suffered a damaging election battle, the UPC’s 
leadership was divided between the presidency and parliamentary caucus. Outgoing party 
president Olara Otunnu was one of the key leaders within the TDA, though it was widely 
known that the majority of the party’s MPs and the rank and file were rallied behind contested 
president-elect Jimmy Akena Obote.329 Akena, the son of former President Obote, was 
nominated as the new party president in late June 2015 but contravened the UPC’s 
procedures in order to assume the presidency, leading to a series of court challenges and 
public spats.330 Akena’s claim to the presidency was overthrown in court in December. As a 
result of the confusion within the former ruling party, both factions found themselves in 
financial trouble, unable to facilitate the campaigns of their parliamentary candidates.331 This 
confusion also impacted the alliance as Akena contested Otunnu’s leadership within TDA 
and attempted to withdraw the party from the coalition.332 Otunnu remained within the 
alliance, but without the support of the majority of UPC’s members, structures and MPs, he 
was little more than the ceremonial head of the party. 
Similarly, the DP was facing a fractious battle between DP President Norbert Mao and 
Kampala Lord Mayor and Buganda-region heavyweight Erias Lukwago. The fallout between 
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the two leaders had begun with what Lukwago termed a ‘coup’ by Mao at the point of his 
election in 2010, when the Acholi politician was selected to head the predominantly Baganda-
supported party.333 This culminated in Lukwago joining the Suubi group in 2011 and 
supporting Besigye rather than the DP President (see previous section). Following from 
Lukwago’s holding of an aborted parallel delegates conference in late 2015, he formed an 
anti-Mao pressure group named the Truth and Justice Platform (TJP) whose stated aim was 
to “restore the role of DP, the core values of the party that is; truth and justice, fundamental 
human rights, rule of law and constitutionalism.”334 Following their application to join the 
alliance, Mao refused the TDA’s efforts to admit the Lukwago faction, fearing that it would 
legitimate their putschist aims.335 As in 2011, the Lukwago camp – and his substantial 
following in Kampala – ultimately rallied behind Besigye and the FDC.336 This parallels a 
similar issue in the 2011 IPC coalition when the decision by the alliance to admit Lukwago’s 
Suubi337 pressure group led the DP to boycott the coalition efforts, opting instead to go it 
alone. Mao has repeatedly stated that he holds the FDC and Besigye responsible for much of 
the instability within DP, particularly through the informal alliance forged between Besigye 
and Lukwago’s Suubi group in 2011.338 Equally, Mao contended that the FDC had co-opted 
several of the DP’s members over various coalitions, including during the formation of the 
FDC. In an interview in September 2015, Mao stated that “as DP, our members have been 
co-opted, particularly by FDC, so that has created some tension between FDC and DP.”339 
These internal party fissures are largely responsible for the ultimate collapse of both the TDA 
and IPC.  
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Distrust also played a significant role in the collapse of the broad alliance, as concerns about 
Mbabazi’s commitment to the opposition cause were raised by the FDC340 and fuelled by the 
defection of two other key players. Former national Vice President Gilbert Bukenya had been 
admitted to the TDA as an eminent person and potential flagbearer, but his departure in early 
October pushed the process into a tailspin, fuelling fears about a hidden hand and state 
interference. Bukenya left the alliance, vowing to support Museveni’s candidacy amidst a 
storm of speculation that he had been bought off by State House.341 This was further 
compounded by the departure of the Akena faction, who also later pledged to canvass 
support for Museveni, allegedly in return for nearly a billion shillings.342 Fearing that both 
Bukenya and Akena had been sent by the state to destabilise the alliance, distrust escalated 
and divisions deepened. The Besigye camp frequently expressed misgivings about Mbabazi’s 
loyalties, given his recent defection from the ruling party and his previously close working 
relationship with the president.343 Ultimately the broad coalition was scuppered by distrust, 
vested interests, and strategic errors.  
The Fractious Coalition 
Following the withdrawal of the FDC and CP, the electoral alliance continued under the 
banner of the TDA-U Go Forward, fronting Mbabazi as their presidential candidate.344 With 
the exit of Bukenya’s Pressure for National Unity (PNU) group in October, the alliance was 
left with five smaller parties and the Go Forward pressure group. The DP’s Mao and UPC’s 
Otunnu were most visible on the campaign trail, appearing at rallies and appealing to their 
constituents in the Northern and Central Regions to support the former NRM 
heavyweight.345 Despite the involvement of opposition actors in the ostensible alliance, 
Mbabazi’s Go Forward campaign was run from his offices in Crested Towers and 
spearheaded by his sister-in-law and his daughters. Despite having joined the opposition, 
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Mbabazi attempted a tricky balancing act; he continuously insisted that he was still a member 
of the ruling NRM, but that party had lost its way, and that he should be the one to continue 
to carry the ruling party’s mantle, eradicate corruption and restore government’s credibility. 
However, the campaign was dogged by the NRM’s structured ‘anti-visibility’ campaign, 
where the ruling party anticipated each of Mbabazi’s moves, tore down his posters, bribed 
local organisers, double-booked his rally and accommodation venues and sent teams of ruling 
party supporters to chant NRM slogans while he travelled through rural towns.346 Museveni 
managed the potential ethnic fallout from his removal of Mbabazi by appointing a Prime 
Minister from the same region – Ruhakana Rugunda from Kigezi – along with five more 
Cabinet ministers from the same area and ethnic group.347 This helped contain any potential 
fallout within one of the NRM’s core constituencies. 
The final week of Mbabazi’s campaign was spent in the Northern and Central Regions where 
his coalition partners are strongest. He was hoping to capitalise on the coalition’s mobilisation 
capacity. But all was not well within the Go Forward camp; it presented a difficult working 
relationship as local level opposition mobilisers struggled to work with the NRM defectors 
that comprised Mbabazi’s teams.348 The coalition was unable to establish and maintain 
effective structures at the local level, or to coordinate effectively between existing opposition 
structures. Despite the initial momentum that the campaign appeared to have, it lost steam 
by early December as Mbabazi’s spending declined by 41%, igniting further speculation that 
he was shifting his sights instead towards 2021. The facilitation funds promised to mobilisers 
and coalition candidates never materialised and their commitment waned,349 aided both by 
state intimidation and the enticements back into the NRM fold.350 The expected widespread 
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NRM defections failed to occur, while hundreds of TDA defections were reported daily in 
the government press, with key Mbabazi mobilisers invited to State House in public displays 
of disaffection.351 The removal of key figures helped cripple the campaign in some regions,352 
contributing to the sense that the Go Forward campaign was largely absent across the 
country.353 As the election drew nearer, even purportedly committed members of the TDA 
alliance appeared to switch tack just before election day, reading the national mood and 
advising voters to use their discretion in the presidential race.354  
The campaign faced an onslaught from the ruling party; Museveni attacked the alliance at 
rallies, likening it to the unpopular ‘unprincipled political alliance’ formed in 1962 between 
the Baganda Kabaka Yekka movement and Milton Obote’s UPC.355 Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs Minister Kahinde Otafiire denounced Mbabazi as a ‘poisonous snake’ 
and warned NRM members and voters against joining the alliance and potentially dragging 
the country into turmoil.356 Museveni’s attacks were extended to the opposition more broadly:  
Politics is not a joke if you elect people from the opposition they will not be in touch with us. 
[I] am the head of government but if I can’t meet your local leader to tell me about the needs 
of the area how will I know them? So, you need to vote wisely.357  
The president frequently implored voters to ‘vote wisely’, and asked them not to support 
candidates whose election could throw the country into ‘anarchy.’358 These statements could 
be variously interpreted as valorising the NRM’s record of restoring peace and security across 
much of the country, but also as a veiled threat that the NRM – and by extension, the army 
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– would not accept an opposition victory. This was anything but an idle threat considering 
the NRM’s history of having won power through an insurgency begun following a disputed 
election. Given that 44% of Ugandans surveyed in a Research World International (RWI) 
poll reported that their main fear at election time was political instability, Museveni’s warnings 
are likely to have resonated with many voters.359 Forty-one percent of respondents believed 
that political power could not be transferred peacefully through an electoral process,360 while 
a similar poll conducted in August 2015 found that 61% of those polled believed that 
Museveni would not peacefully surrender power if he was defeated.361 In contrast to TDA-
U-Go Forward, Besigye’s campaign had picked up momentum, riding a wave of energy and 
excitement that made the election appear highly competitive. His rallies were notable due to 
the high numbers of people who turned out and the donations made in both cash and kind 
to the party. The FDC campaign was not subjected to the same levels of disruption as that 
of the Mbabazi alliance, though the last few days of the campaign saw increased levels of 
police intervention – most notably when Besigye was arrested three days before the election 
and again on polling day. 
As the results began to come in, it became apparent that Mbabazi’s presidential campaign 
had performed poorly; he came a distant third in the race with 1.4% of the vote behind 
Museveni’s 60.62% and Besigye’s 35.61%. This was far lower than the 12% that he had polled 
in surveys conducted just prior to the election.362 His best performance was in Acholiland in 
the North where he received between 8% and 20% of the vote in six of the region’s seven 
districts (see the burnt orange map in Figure 6).363 In the same region, Besigye captured 
42.03% compared to Museveni’s 41.1% (see the blue map in Figure 6). Between Besigye’s 
count and Mbabazi’s 10.91% of the vote, most voters in the Acholi sub-region voted against 
the incumbent. Mbabazi’s performance, though hardly impressive, was due to Mao’s 
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influence and strong anti-incumbent sentiment in the Acholi sub-region.364 By contrast, 
Otunnu was unable to swing the UPC’s traditional voting bloc in Lango sub-region in favour 
of the former premier. Mbabazi received only 1.64% in Lango compared to Besigye’s 41.6%; 
much like results at the national level, the FDC candidate had consolidated the anti-
incumbent vote in the region.365 The FDC’s vote in 2016 was not as geographically 
concentrated as it had been in 2006 (see Figure 5), but his vote was more evenly spread across 
the country – including in the west where he took between 20% and 30% of the vote in most 
districts (see blue map in Figure 6). Most of his support came from the northern, eastern and 
central regions – echoing voting patterns in the 2006 poll.  
The TDA’s overwhelming concentration on the joint presidential candidate selection process 
led the coalition to neglect the selection of joint parliamentary candidates. Ultimately, what 
remained of the TDA fronted 157 Go Forward-leaning independents for the directly elected 
seats. The opposition parties that remained under the coalition banner ran competing 
candidates in 68 constituencies. The alliance also competed against the FDC in all 157 
constituencies. The FDC contested just 65% (262) of the 402 directly-elected parliamentary 
seats. Ninety-one constituencies or 22% of the seats available in 2016 were not contested by 
an opposition candidate. The failure to coordinate their candidates and campaigns led the 
opposition to split the vote in 14 constituencies, allowing the ruling party or NRM-leaning 
independent to win the seat with a plurality of the vote. In sum, the TDA elected fifteen 
members of DP, three UPC-leaning independents and four Go Forward-leaning 
independents. None of the four smaller parties secured the election of their members to 
parliament. Overall, Go Forward leaning candidates performed very poorly, frequently 
coming last in the parliamentary polls. Thirty-six members of the FDC were elected, giving 
a total of 58 official opposition MPs of the 402 directly-elected seats (14%). Meanwhile, 66 
independent MPs were elected – exceeding the size of the opposition caucus – the majority 
of these were NRM-leaning independents who had lost out in the party primaries. Despite 
the high turnover of NRM MPs, the opposition performed relatively poorly leaving the NRM 
with 283 MPs and approximately 32 NRM-leaning independents, giving them over 80% of 
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the seats in parliament prior to the addition of the 25 reserved seats for the military, youths, 
persons with disabilities and workers. Despite Besigye’s increase at the presidential poll, it is 
a hollow victory as it was not followed by a corresponding increase in the number of FDC 
or opposition parliamentarians. The fragmented coalition dashed hopes for both regime 
transition and greater parliamentary representation. 
After the elections, Jimmy Akena’s faction of the UPC – which had supported Museveni’s 
bid – was granted two Cabinet posts, one of which went to Akena’s wife. Beti Kamya, the 
president of the UFA, which had ostensibly been party to the TDA, was given the position 
of ‘Minister of Kampala Affairs’ within Museveni’s Cabinet. Within the opposition, these 
appointments gave further credence to suspicions that some members of the coalition had 
been operating in bad faith, and had instead been ‘planted’ by the NRM to undermine the 
alliance.366 These appointments highlight how the NRM under Museveni plays a strategy of 
divide-and-conquer, using positions and patronage to undermine trust amongst the 
opposition. In a context where the ruling party has managed to capture and contain political 
competition within its structures, opposition parties have been relegated to a somewhat 
secondary position. Coalitions have thus become how the opposition attempts to achieve 
relevance and to pose a meaningful challenge to NRM hegemony.  
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Figure 5 The 2016 Ugandan Presidential Election Results by District 
 
The NRM’s Presidential Vote 




The FDC’s Presidential Vote 
 
Figure 6 The 2016 Ugandan Presidential Election Results for the NRM (yellow), FDC (blue), DP (green) and 
TDA-U-Go Forward (burnt orange) in order of declining vote share  




2.4 Constant Coalition Formation, Constant Fragmentation 
Why Coalesce? 
The motivations for building coalitions in Uganda are clear – in a context where political 
party activities were restricted for more than two decades, opposition parties are weak, 
fragmented and plagued by severe resource deficits. Unable to build or sustain effective 
organisations, parties are limited to their traditional strongholds or to areas where a strong 
opposition leader has succeeded in building a loyal following and is able to draw on an 
individualised network of power and patronage. The NRM’s dominance in the rural south 
west remains unassailable, which leaves opposition parties competing amongst themselves 
for the votes in anti-incumbent regions across the north and east. The limited geographical 
reach of parties then prevents them from challenging the NRM effectively at the national 
level, raising the incentives to cooperate. But despite the consensus that exists around the 
need to coalesce – and entering into regular negotiations – a broad coalition of opposition 
actors continues to elude Uganda’s opposition.  
Why Collapse? 
The fractiousness of Ugandan opposition parties means that coalition negotiations are not 
straightforward with party presidents simultaneously negotiating on multiple fronts and 
trying to combat threats to their positions. In a context of party instability and factionalism, 
party leaders endeavour to use coalition negotiations to serve their own interests, undermine 
their rivals and settle scores with other parties. While funding concerns, per Arriola,367 were 
an important driver of decision-making for the smaller parties, it was certainly not the only 
consideration. Intra-party competition and attempts to safeguard electoral ‘strongholds’ 
undermined the unity that the coalition sought to achieve. Party principals made strategic 
choices based on little reliable information regarding actual electoral support and 
assumptions regarding what would be in their own best interests. As the smaller opposition 
parties felt threatened by the larger party and found themselves competing for the same 
electoral constituencies, they sought to protect their own gains. This suggests that coalitions 
may be more successful or cohesive when parties have complementary rather than competing 
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bases of support – as in Kenya where relatively reliable ethnic voting produces somewhat 
more predictable outcomes depending on turnout levels in ethnic strongholds.368 In other 
words, contrary to Arriola, when ethnic groups are geographically contained and can be relied 
on to bloc vote for their ‘ethnic’ political party, this may in fact produce more stable 
coalitions.  
Intra-opposition competition for the anti-incumbent vote has historically been largely limited 
to urban areas and the anti-NRM parts of Northern, Eastern and Central Regions. 
Opposition parties thus compete for the same voters rather than having different, 
complementary constituencies, which creates intra-opposition rivalries that undermine 
cooperation. While the FDC is able to run a national presidential campaign and front 
competitive parliamentary candidates across much of Uganda (Table 3), the DP and UPC 
have found their support to be increasingly limited to enclaves. Although there is some pro-
FDC sympathy in the NRM’s heartland in the rural South West,369 this region continues to 
vote overwhelmingly in favour of the ruling party at both presidential and parliamentary level 
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 DP 6 9 5  0 0 0  1 0 0 
  UPC 5 9 1   0 0 0   0 1 0 
 Source: This table was compiled using data from the Ugandan Electoral Commission website (ec.or.ug), 
collated by Sam Wilkins. 
a the 2006 totals do not include the numbers of women MPs as party affiliation was not supplied for candidates 
by the Electoral Commission. 
 
The FDC’s growing success in the DP and UPC’s strongholds (Central, Eastern and 
Northern Regions respectively) has created tensions amongst the opposition. The region with 
the lowest intra-opposition competition is in the NRM’s western strongholds, where the 
ruling party maintains its dominant position and crowds out opposition competition. These 
parties thus find themselves competing for support among the more opposition-sympathetic 
voters of West Nile, Acholiland, Lango, Buganda and Teso sub-regions, where the FDC has 
run an increasing number of candidates in every parliamentary poll. This helps to explain why 
the leaders of the smaller parties would seek to use the coalition negotiation process to try to 
consolidate their own gains and protect their electoral enclaves from what they see as the 
encroachment of the FDC. In cases where opposition parties are unable to break into the 
ruling party’s strongholds, and instead find themselves competing for the same groups of 
voters, party presidents may behave cynically within coalitions in order to try to ring fence 
their constituencies from competition and protect their own positions from pressure exerted 
by lower level functionaries.  
Finally, many broader coalitions in Uganda collapsed due to the defection of newly-elected 
party leaders, who sought to test their electoral viability and contain the threats to their 
leadership that emerged during the race to succeed a former party leader. As shown in Table 




4 below, when new opposition leaders are elected to the head of their respective parties, they 
almost always withdraw from coalitions and seek to contest elections under their own party 
banner.  
Table 4 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Uganda, 1996-2016 
Candidate* Party Election 
  1996 2001 2006 2011 2016 
Yoweri Museveni Movement/NRM 75.50% 69.40% 59.26% 68.38% 60.62% 
Paul K Ssemogerere Movement/DP 22.30% Coalition - - - 
Milton Obote* UPC Coalition Coalition - - - 
Muhammad K. 
Mayanja Movement/JEEMA 2.20% 1% Coalition - - 
Kizza Besigye Movement/FDC - 27.70% 37.39% 26.01% 35.61% 
Ken Lukyamuzi*** CP - - Coalition Coalition Coalition 
John Ssebaana Kizito DP - - 1.58% Coalition - 
Abed Bwanika Indep/PDP 
RP 
Coalition Coalition 0.95% 0.65% 0.90% 
Miria Obote UPC  - - 0.82% Coalition - 
Asuman Basalirwa*** JEEMA - - - Coalition Coalition 
Norbert Mao DP - - - 1.86% Coalition 
Olara Otunnu UPC - - - 1.58% Coalition 
Beti Kamya UFA - - - 0.66% Coalition 
       
*Independent candidates and those not sanctioned by their parties have been excluded 
**Milton Obote was living in exile at the time 
***Lukyamuzi’s CP and Basalirwa’s JEEMA have not contested in a presidential election, because of their small 
constituencies 
RP Coalition: the opposition leader went into a coalition with the incumbent 
 
Following their poor results achieved in their debut election, these leaders – such as Miria 
Obote, Norbert Mao and Olara Otunnu – almost always choose to enter into a multi-party 
coalition in the polls that follow. However, for the reasons mentioned above, this still does 
not necessarily ensure that the coalition will cohere until election day. 
Finally, this chapter highlights an often-neglected aspect of coalition negotiation – the costs 
that alliances impose on parties. These costs are frequently counted in members, supporters 
and sympathisers lost to a rival political party, party instability (particularly between the party 
hierarchy and parliamentary caucus), and the loss of party leaders who defect to a more 
effective or better-funded opposition party. In Uganda, the TDA process has served to 
further corrode trust within the fractured opposition. The FDC has emerged battered and 




rudderless without a coherent strategy to deal with the loss of the election.371 The DP and 
UPC are also more fragmented following the election. Given the high costs of the TDA for 
party unity and the low rewards produced by the coalition, future coalition-building may be 
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3. Opposition Coordination in 
Zambia’s Fluid Party System 
3.1 Introduction 
Zambian coalitions are understudied. Opposition coordination has not yet been the subject 
of significant academic study, despite being frequently cited as a case where consistent 
opposition fragmentation has allowed the ruling party to retain power.372 In the 2001, 2006 
and 2008 elections, the opposition collectively commanded a majority of the presidential 
vote, and it is frequently suggested that the formation of an opposition coalition in one of 
these polls may have led to a different outcome. Zambia presents a conundrum for ‘coalition’ 
scholars; despite the clear need for coordination amongst opposition actors, a review of the 
literature appears to suggest that no coalitions were formed to challenge the ruling party’s 
hegemony between 2000 and 2016. This chapter will show that this apparent lacuna is not in 
fact the result of a lack of coalition negotiation and formation, but rather due to differences 
in the definitions and measurements deployed by political scientists, which has led to a lack 
of academic consensus in accounting for coalitions in Zambia. The only scholar to account 
for a coalition in Zambia is Leonardo Arriola. In his coalitions database, Arriola (2013) codes 
the 1991 election in Zambia as a ‘coalition’ case, in effect arguing that the MMD was a 
coalition rather than a single political party. However, although the MMD constituted a broad 
alliance of forces, including trade unions, civic groups and politicians from across the political 
spectrum, it was still a political party rather than a multi-party coalition.373 Defining coalitions 
as loosely as Arriola does is problematic, but it does raise important questions regarding the 
unit of analysis employed. This has proven to be a recurring problem in Zambia, as this 
chapter will highlight. Coalition negotiations are messy, complex political processes and the 
resulting alliances frequently defy simple characterisations. 
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Rakner and Svasand (2004) suggest that coalitions in Zambia are discouraged by the electoral 
system – a FPTP system for both the presidency and parliament.374 This is a common 
argument in the coalitions literature, which suggests that electoral systems have significant 
bearing on coalition formation. The electoral system (and highly presidential nature of 
government) remains fairly constant over time, so one might expect that coalition-building 
would also consistently fail. However, this is not the case (see the section on the 2006 UDA). 
Similarly, when the electoral system changed from a plurality to a majority system in 2016, 
the effect on coalition formation did not conform to predictions. Rather than discouraging a 
first round coalition in favour of a second-round coalition, the majority system encouraged 
first-round cooperation. This is predominantly because opposition actors believed that there 
was little likelihood of any of them being able to achieve 50% of the vote individually (this 
had not happened since the rise of more competitive elections in 2001) and they did not trust 
that the ruling party would allow the election to go to a second round. This suggests that, 
although the electoral system has a bearing on coalition formation, there are intervening 
factors that determine the ways in which electoral systems impact on coalitions.  
In Zambia, political parties seem to appear and disappear with almost clockwork-like 
regularity as politicians fall out with members of their previous party and form a new electoral 
vehicle. While some parties – such as the Patriotic Front (PF), Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD), the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) and United Party 
for National Development (UPND) – have been a stable presence across electoral cycles 
since 2001, dozens of smaller parties have been formed and dissolved. Many of Zambia’s 
political parties appear to be little more than a collection of notables whose political allegiance 
can vary greatly between just two elections. This fluidity can make it tricky to define coalitions 
in instances such as the 2015 presidential by-election where the opposition UPND was in a 
‘coalition’ with Charles Milupi’s Alliance for Democracy and Development (ADD). The 
ADD (and by extension, the resulting coalition) would not be considered ‘electorally 
significant’ as per Gandhi and Reuter (2013), as the party had only won a single parliamentary 
seat and 0.9% of the presidential vote in 2011.375 Equally, in the same election, approximately 
20 of the MMD’s remaining 35 members of parliament supported the UPND president, even 
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though their own party president was standing in the same election. Do such endorsements 
– particularly when so widespread – count as a coalition? This chapter will argue that such 
informal arrangements, though not entirely new, are a result of failed coalition attempts and 
the highly personalised nature of politics in Zambia. Despite their lack of coverage in the 
academic literature, there has been at least one coalition negotiation process that has 
characterised each of the five elections held in Zambia between 2001 and 2016. However, 
most of these coalitions did not survive until election day. Why are coalitions so frequently 
mooted in Zambia? And why do they so often collapse?  
Unlike Uganda where opposition political parties continued to exist, to have nominal 
structures and to participate in government under the movement system, the Zambian one-
party state was much worse for political party identities. No political party except UNIP 
survived the one-party era, though the informal alliances and networks of people who had 
served in them would continue to influence Zambia’s politics in the Third Republic.376 When 
the political system changed from the one-party state to multi-party democracy in 1990, many 
of the actors who had been key to Kaunda’s administration joined the newly-formed 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). This rapid shifting of political loyalties would 
set the tone for politics in the new multi-party dispensation, where politicians’ allegiances 
would shift drastically both between and at election time.377 This has led to the emergence of 
what is known in Zambian media and popular culture as the ‘recycled politicians’ 
phenomenon.378 Politicians who have fallen out of favour with the ruling party frequently 
shift political allegiances ahead of elections, and the same politician may shift parties 
drastically between and across election cycles. Michael Sata, the fifth Republican President, 
is emblematic of the fluidity that characterises the Zambian party system. Sata served as 
Governor of Lusaka and a cabinet minister under Kaunda’s United National Independence 
Party (UNIP) government (1985-1991); he was the head of four different ministries and 
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Frederick Chiluba’s right hand man within the MMD (1991-2001), and after falling out with 
Chiluba in 2001, he formed the Patriotic Front (PF) party with which he won power in 2011. 
This fluidity interacts with and impacts on the process of coalition formation as – particularly 
prior to and since the 2011 election – individual endorsements and the recruitment of party 
and ethnic elites has increasingly short-circuited messy inter-party coalition negotiations. This 
chapter will argue that the turn towards individual endorsements, or what Sishuwa Sishuwa 
(2016) terms ‘elite inclusion’, was part of a learning process following a series of failed 
coalition negotiations between 2006 and 2011. This problematises Arriola’s argument that 
opposition parties fail to learn from previous coalition experiences.379 By tracing the 
emergence and frequent collapse of coalitions in Zambia between 2000 and 2016, this chapter 
will seek to demonstrate the ways in which previous coalition attempts impact on future party 
strategies, the relationships between opposition parties and the ways in which they seek to 
maximise votes in future elections. In doing so, it will also point to the limitations of existing 
theories, and highlight the ways in which funding impacts coalition formation, problematising 
Arriola’s ‘pecuniary’ coalition building theory. The maps that are included in the pages that 
follow will give the reader a sense of the regional strongholds of parties in Zambia, and how 
opposition parties have attempted to broaden their electoral support through building cross-
ethnic multi-party coalitions. 
This chapter begins by contextualising party politics and the logic of coalition formation in 
Zambia. In Section 3.1.1 it outlines the weakness of Zambian political parties, the fluid nature 
of political allegiance and the political salience of ethnicity. Section 3.2 the sets out, in 
chronological order, the six elections held between 2001 and 2016, and outlines the 
negotiation processes that accompanied each poll. The chapter will highlight the reasons for 
the collapse of negotiations in 2001, 2008, and 2011 and the failure of broader multi-party 
coalitions in 2015 and 2016. It will argue that the repeated failure of inter-party coalition 
building – along with a fluid political elite and increased likelihood of electoral success – 
produced a successful shift in strategy from party coalitions to individualised elite inclusion 
to broaden out the opposition’s electoral base and appeal to new ethno-regional 
constituencies. The following historical analysis will reflect upon the coalitions literature 
outlined in Chapter 1, highlighting the limits of Arriola’s pecuniary theory of coalition 
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formation, and illustrating the dynamics that undermined successful coalition-building. The 
cases of coalition formation and collapse outlined below suggest that financial incentives for 
coalition formation are insufficient explanators for coalition survival (as in 2011 and 2015); 
that parties should be taken more seriously as multi-level actors as lower level functionaries 
frequently act to scupper coalitions (2011); and that newly-elected party leaders380 who have 
not yet competed in a national poll are less likely to enter into coalitions (2001, 2006, 2015).  
Following the failure of many of these coalitions, opposition parties sought to bypass the 
difficult and time-consuming process of party cooperation by instituting an individualised 
‘elite inclusion’, securing the endorsements of each political notable individually. In 
concluding, this chapter will suggest that it was intra-party politics and a lack of trust that 
undermined earlier coalition efforts. Similarly to Uganda, newly-elected opposition leaders 
frequently snubbed coalition negotiations in favour of running alone, and seeking to form 
coalitions in later electoral cycles. In Zambia, as in Uganda, financial incentives often proved 
inadequate to entice collaboration, indicating that these negotiations are significantly more 
complex than has previously been considered. 
3.1.1 Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in 
Zambia 
Party Weakness and Elite Fluidity 
There is no legislation specifically governing political parties in Zambia; parties instead fall 
under the Societies Act (Chapter 119) of the Zambian constitution. This act includes any type 
of club or society (of which a political party is considered to be) and thus contains no specific 
information governing the behaviour of parties as a specific type of club with important 
public political rights and responsibilities. Partly because of this lack of regulation, parties 
tend to function as relatively opaque organisations where the divulgence of information 
regarding structure, constitution, internal procedures and funding models is done largely at 
the whim of the party leadership. Due to this legal gap in the governance of political parties, 
there is also no legislated provision of state funding to opposition parties unlike in other 
countries in the region, including Zimbabwe. Regular funding from other sources (such as 
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investments and property) is also largely unavailable; unlike the ANC in South Africa or even 
UNIP in Zambia, no other Zambian parties have created investment arms or amassed assets 
such as property which would bring them a regular income. This leads opposition parties to 
be largely dependent on private donations from members, parliamentarians, local and foreign 
businesses, and international ‘sister parties’, as well as other, more illicit, funding sources. 
While there is a vibrant private sector in Zambia which donates funds to the opposition, their 
incentive to do so is limited as many businesses still fear being victimised by the ruling party 
for supporting the opposition.381 
Partly because of funding concerns, parties in Zambia acquire a particular structure and are 
hampered by several serious shortcomings. The party’s day-to-day activities are funded by 
contributions of approximately K3000-3500 per month from their elected members of 
parliament. These funds may be enough to sustain the very basic party structures on a 
monthly basis, but they are certainly insufficient for running large, expensive election 
campaigns at parliamentary or presidential level. It also means that once a party faces a decline 
in its number of parliamentarians, the party’s ability to sustain itself and its broader 
programme is severely compromised. Candidates running for parliamentary seats are – due 
to limited party funding – expected to largely finance their own constituency-level campaign 
as well as that of the candidates for council and local government positions. When in 
government, the MMD would finance approximately 50% of their campaigns with MPs 
making up the shortfall, while in opposition, MPs are often expected to finance 80 to 100% 
of the costs.382 This limits participation in politics to those who have already acquired 
substantial wealth, which is frequently sourced through prior access to government positions 
or contracts. This produces a tendency towards the circulation of positions within a small 
elite political class. It also increases the likelihood that prominent parliamentary candidates 
will desert the party if they feel that a particular party ticket may hurt rather than help their 
electoral prospects. Because parliamentary candidates are largely left to self-fund their 
expensive campaign efforts (and by extension, much of the constituency-level presidential 
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campaign), they have few incentives to remain in parties that appear to be unpopular with 
the electorate. This is a similar dynamic to Uganda, where opposition parties are comprised 
of prominent individuals who are able to abandon the party at will to find a better deal – 
either with the incumbent or another opposition party. By contrast, in Zimbabwe, party labels 
are important social signifiers, the opposition itself had substantial funding (at least until 
2013) and there are relatively high levels of party loyalty amongst voters, which prevents 
parliamentarians from establishing their own power bases independent of the party. This is 
illustrated by the dire electoral fortunes of parties established from splits in the two main 
Zimbabwean parties (see Chapter 4). 
One of the main criteria when a Zambian opposition party selects a presidential or 
parliamentary candidate is the personal wealth of the individual or at least their ability to 
undertake significant fund raising in order to fund their own campaigns and supplement the 
party’s war chest.383 The contentious 2006 leadership battle within the UPND following the 
death of Anderson Mazoka was largely decided by the personal finances of the two 
contenders.384 Party presidents are expected to carry the party financially, which leads to the 
centralisation of power and control within the person of the president. The result for parties 
is the overwhelming importance of individuals and personalities in determining party agendas 
and activities. The funding and personalisation of parties lead to a generalised lack of intra-
party democracy, whilst the importance of MPs in funding and running their own campaigns 
often creates tension within party hierarchies when big personalities feel that they are being 
side-lined or their ambitions are being frustrated. This exacerbates the tendency towards 
fluidity in political allegiances and the likelihood that politicians will shift parties depending 
on their assessments of the likelihood of electoral success or financial incentives. It also 
presents a potential source of conflict between the parliamentary caucus and the party 
leadership when differences in strategy arise. 
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In contrast to Uganda’s semi-polarised and Zimbabwe’s polarised political party system,385 
Zambia is characterised by an extremely fluid political elite whose position within and 
between parties may change dramatically across election cycles. An opposition party 
spokesman highlighted this following the 2001 election when his Zambian Republican Party 
(ZRP) lost to the ruling MMD; he stated that opposition MPs would not be spared from the 
‘scourge’ of being bought by the MMD and that “Zambia will witness a flow of such 
politicians who have a nose for cash from the opposition to the ruling party. They will move 
at the twinkle of an eye where they think there is a new deal.”386 This phenomenon was not 
limited to the early 2000s, but it has a long history387 and has continued into the present. Of 
the 40 Cabinet members appointed by President Edgar Lungu after the 2016 election, at least 
18 ministers had previously held positions in other political parties. Of the 18, twelve 
ministers had belonged to the previous ruling party, the MMD. Justice Minister Given 
Lubinda is a current PF cabinet minister who was central to the rise of President Lungu in 
2015; he was previously an MP for the UPND (2001-2006), and who in 2006 following a 
contentious succession battle, abandoned the party for the newly-formed United Liberal 
Party (ULP) just to stand on a PF parliamentary ticket two months later.388 This kind of party 
switching is a common theme in Zambian politics, repeated across election cycles since the 
first fracturing of the ruling MMD in 2001. To attract and retain the ‘best’ political notables 
– particularly from outside their home regions – opposition parties need to demonstrate their 
electoral viability. By appearing to be a viable alternative government, which could later offer 
its own share of patronage and lucrative state contracts and appointments, opposition parties 
could attract notable power-brokers from outside their regional strongholds, and in doing so 
they are able to attract voters and sway electoral results. 
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Parties and Ethno-Linguistic Mobilisation 
The relationship between parties and the electorate in Zambia – and their methods of 
mobilisation – has recently become the subject of significant debate. Bemba is the largest 
ethno-linguistic group in Zambia, comprising about 33.5% of the population and followed 
by Nyanja (14.8%) or Nyanja family (24.6% including Nyanja, Chewa, Nsenga, and 
Tumbuka), Tonga (11.4%), and Lozi (5.5%).389 While Bemba-speaking groups originate from 
the north of the country (Northern, Luapula, Muchinga Provinces), they are also a dominant 
group on the Copperbelt and in urban Lusaka. Nyanja-speaking and affiliated groups 
originate predominantly from the eastern parts of the country, but Nyanja has also 
increasingly become a lingua franca in Lusaka and other urban areas. Tonga-speaking (and 
related language) groups predominate in the rural south of the country (Southern Province), 
but they share some socio-political identity markers with the so-called ‘Bantu Botatwe’ group 
(the Toka, Tonga, Ila, Sala, Lenje, Totela and Subiya – and sometimes also the Lunda, Luvale 
and Kaonde)390 who come from the Western, Central, North-Western and Southern 
Provinces. Finally, Lozi-speaking groups are largely concentrated in Barotseland, or what is 
now called Western Province. Each ethno-linguistic group is largely geographically-
concentrated, and none of them make up a majority of the population, which makes it 
difficult for parties to use a strictly mono-ethnic method of electoral mobilisation. Instead, 
parties must seek to build multi-party coalitions that knit together a multi-ethnic constituency 
which can carry them into power. 
Posner (2005) highlights the important role that ethnicity plays in driving political behaviour 
in Zambia. Posner’s argument is that the way in which party politics developed in the post-
colonial period created a strong relationship between the ethnic identities of politicians, 
parties and their constituencies. He notes that, “notwithstanding the fact that many Zambian 
political parties have historically enjoyed significant support across ethnic lines, every major 
political party in Zambia since independence has been perceived, to at least some degree and 
by some citizens, to represent the interests of a particular ethnic group or region of the 
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country.”391 As a result of high levels of ethnic fragmentation and the lack of a majority ethnic 
group (the largest ethno-linguistic group, the Bemba, constitute only 33.5% of the populace), 
political parties “must win support across ethnic communities, and this means eschewing 
public identification with any single ethnic group… The goal… is to construct a solid ethnic 
coalition in the party’s home region while still preserving the ability to win pan-ethnic (or 
non-ethnic) support in the rest of the country.”392 Scarrit (2006) takes Posner’s conclusions 
further, and tried to prove that all relevant Zambian political parties are, to some degree, pan-
ethnic. He uses an analysis of electoral results to suggest that all successful parties in Zambia 
have sought to build pan-ethnic alliances to win the presidency, and that as of 2006, the only 
‘potentially ethnic’ party was Sata’s Patriotic Front.393 Following from this, Cheeseman and 
Hinfelaar (2010) highlighted the ways in which Michael Sata sought to mobilise the Bemba 
ethnic group using the language of grievance and marginalisation, but also wielded economic 
and class-based appeals in urban areas to build a multi-ethnic constituency in 2008.394 
Cheeseman and Larmer (2015) highlighted the same trend, that some parties in and beyond 
Zambia will use both ethnic and populist appeals to bring together citizens with diverse 
interests and motivations in order to create a broad alliance of voters that constitutes a 
‘minimum winning coalition.’395 Building multi-party (and thus multi-ethnic) coalitions or 
using populist appeals represent two of the various methods of mobilisation that have been 
used (to varying degrees of success) by parties in Zambia.  
The relationship between political parties and ethnicity in Zambia has changed over time. 
Following from Kenneth Kaunda’s inclusive elite bargain in the early years of independence, 
his governing alliance became more exclusive in the 1980s.396 The MMD – which replaced 
the UNIP government in 1991 – had initially represented a broad, multi-ethnic alliance of 
forces. However, Chiluba’s third term bid and perceptions of the dominance of his Bemba-
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speaking group increasingly undermined the party’s broad ethno-regional alliance.397 As the 
opposition to Chiluba’s MMD fragmented into smaller parties, each party developed its own 
regional strongholds, mobilising using existing affective, ethnic and party-political ties to 
build and consolidate their own bases before broadening out beyond their region.  
In the first multi-party elections in 1991, UNIP had been reduced to a regional party with all 
25 of its parliamentary seats being won in Eastern Province.398 Kaunda’s party would never 
recover from this marginalisation. The UPND, formed by a Tonga-speaking Southerner in 
1998, was intended as a national party and it swallowed the National Party (NP) – an MMD 
splinter group with strong support in North-Western (and to some extent, Western) 
Province.399 In the early days of the UPND, the majority of President Anderson Mazoka’s 
vigorous campaigning was done in Lusaka and his home region of Southern Province, 
capitalising on popular sentiments regarding political and economic marginalisation of the 
South – particularly in the wake of the MMD’s reduction of farming subsidies in the 1990s 
in the predominantly agricultural region. He also capitalised on pre-existing political 
sympathies towards the defunct but still regionally-popular African National Congress 
(ANC),400 attracting the children of the party’s leader and espousing a very similar political 
and economic platform. Finally, the UPND attracted important figures in Western Province 
and managed to knit together an alliance that was comprised of voters from Southern, 
Western and North-Western Provinces as well as attracting some support in the more urban 
and disaffected Lusaka, Central and Copperbelt provinces. As Michael Sata established the 
PF in 2001, he sought to bring established MMD structures with him into his new party, 
capitalising on the affective, political and economic networks in the Bembaphone North that 
he had cultivated in UNIP and the MMD.401 The Forum for Democracy and Development 
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(FDD) was another offshoot of the MMD’s internal battles; the party was expected to be the 
largest challenger to the MMD in 2001, but its limited structures and mobilisation capacity 
meant that its vote was largely confined to chipping away at UNIP’s dominance in the East 
(where the party’s leader hailed from) and the MMD’s urban vote share in Lusaka.402 Since 
2001, coalition-building focused on broadening out the regional representation of parties 
through party coalitions, and then increasingly through systems of ‘elite inclusion’ following 
the failure of a multi-party coalition in 2011.  
3.2 Multi-Party Coalitions – 2001-2016 
3.2.1 Fragmentation and Realignment in 2001 
After the labour-backed MMD came to power in 1991 on the back of sustained anti-UNIP 
momentum driven by high food prices and labour militancy, the party’s hegemony continued 
largely unchecked until 2001.403 In 1991, the party was carried into government with 76% of 
the vote and after controversially blocking former president Kaunda’s candidacy in 1996, the 
MMD maintained its enormous lead by gaining 73% of all votes cast. But by 2001, the party’s 
reputation was in shambles. The structural adjustment programme that had been so 
enthusiastically carried out under Chiluba had begun to bite; there were daily reports in the 
independent press of widespread corruption in the MMD and Chiluba’s attempt at a third 
term bid had galvanised the opposition and civil society into a broad movement challenging 
the ruling party.404 The key factor that drove the reversal of the MMD’s fortunes was 
Chiluba’s attempt to retain the presidency, which led to him – and his right-hand man Michael 
Sata – expelling 22 party MPs, and sending ruling party cadres to intimidate and beat MMD 
members who refused to toe the line.405 The political ructions produced by this led to the 
formation of a myriad of new parties including the Forum for Democracy and Development 
(FDD),406 the Heritage Party (HP), the Zambia Alliance for Progress (ZAP), and the Zambia 
Republican Party (ZRP). These new parties joined older – but often little more established – 
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parties formed from previous splits and expulsions such as the National Party (NP)407, 
Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC)408, Agenda for Zambia (AZ), and the United Party for 
National Development (UPND). When his attempt at a third term was defeated, Chiluba 
overlooked Michael Sata in favour of Levy Mwanawasa for the MMD’s presidential nominee. 
Sata left the MMD with the doors banging behind him, and formed the PF just three months 
before the election. It was in the context of economic contraction, a fragmented opposition 
playing field, a discredited ruling party suffering daily defections and an unpopular ruling 
party presidential candidate that the 2001 elections were held.  
Even in 2001, a coalition of the fragmented opposition was mooted.409 Called the 
Government of National Unity (GNU), it was proposed to unite six relatively small political 
formations with the three-year old UPND. These parties were: the former ruling United 
National Independence Party (UNIP), UPND, the FDD, National Citizens' Coalition (NCC), 
ZAP, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Agenda for Zambia (AZ).410 The front-runners 
to lead the coalition were Anderson Mazoka (UPND), ex-Legal Affairs Minister Vincent 
Malambo (FDD) and Dean Mung'omba of the ZAP. The UPND’s Mazoka appeared to have 
the upper hand in the negotiations to lead the grouping. The UPND had been formed in 
October 1998 by Anderson Mazoka, a charismatic Tonga-speaking businessman411 from the 
south. The new party built upon – and claimed – the political legacy of the country’s first 
nationalist party the African National Congress (ANC), which had been particularly popular 
in Zambia’s southern region prior to its incorporation into the ruling UNIP in 1973. Along 
with political elites from the south, many others joined the new UPND including elites from 
the Western and North-Western Provinces, creating a broad alliance across the south and 
west of the country. By the time of the 2001 elections, the small north-west-based NP had 
been integrated into the UPND, and the party held the largest bloc of opposition seats in 
parliament, with a total of 11 MPs.412 Because of the UPND’s prominent position within a 
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burgeoning opposition field, the party’s president Anderson Mazoka believed that he should 
carry the flag for the nascent opposition coalition. 
In the 2001 election, the parties to the mooted coalition agreed to front a joint candidate out 
of concern that the proliferation of parties might split the vote and allow the unpopular 
MMD to retain State House with just a plurality of the vote.413 But soon after negotiations 
commenced, party leaders publicly attacked each other and questioned each other’s 
commitment to the project.414 All of the parties’ leaders were grand-standing and trying to 
prove – in the absence of any strong evidence of national electoral support – that they were 
stronger and more capable than the others. The FDD argued that the UPND was seeking a 
coalition because they were weak, while the UPND disparaged the FDD as being an 
‘untrustworthy’415 ‘offshoot of the MMD’ and offered that ‘no amount of cleansing will 
distinguish it from the MMD.’416 The FDD president was attacked in the press by UPND 
leaders, and accused of abusing the national constitution whilst in the ruling party, and in 
response the FDD vice-chairman declared: “some of these parties have been calling us 
names, how do you expect us to join them?”417 Ultimately, negotiations broke down in 
October 2001 and all parties decided to contest the election independently, leading to a 
packed field of eleven contestants vying for the presidency. Their lack of unity and over-
confidence in their own abilities led the MMD – with the aid of substantial electoral 
irregularities418 – to be declared the winner with just under 29% of the vote.  
The key reasons for the collapse of the alliance were first, the lack of certainty regarding the 
electoral support that each party could muster as almost all were new and had not yet 
contested an election, and second, that enough funding was being dispersed to the opposition 
parties individually that none of them were reliant on funding from the coalition to make the 
concessions that the coalition effort demanded. According to Africa Confidential, the FDD’s 
convention in 2001 was conspicuously well-funded, with all delegates housed at expensive 
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hotels and with a five-star hotel providing the catering for the event.419 This kick-started the 
Lusaka rumour mill, with critics alleging that the money had been provided by Rwandan 
President Paul Kagame (apparently a good friend of Tembo’s) or the regime in Luanda.420 
However, a senior party member countered this by saying that the money had been raised 
from ‘well-wishers’ in the United States.421 Either way, contemporaneous reports suggest that 
the party’s campaign was well-supported, and that commitments had been made which were 
difficult to go back on. The UPND, too, was well-funded ahead of the 2001 election.422 
Former party functionary and political scientist, Dr Neo Simutanyi, contended that the 
UPND was supported during the 2001 elections by groups from the DRC as well as the 
Anglo-American Mining Corporation.423 Anderson Mazoka had held the position of 
Managing Director of Anglo-American in Zambia, prior to his resigning in 1998 to form his 
own political party.424 Anglo was suffering from a major public relations scandal in 2001 as 
criticism mounted that the corporation had broken OECD rules during mining privatisation, 
and the company had been referred to Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry.425 By 
December, the company was in a tussle with President Chiluba and had deferred projects 
and cut output on the Copperbelt.426 The company’s withdrawal from Zambia and 
announcement to divest from its holdings just a month after the election also suggest that it 
may have been holding out for an administration that was more willing to make further 
concessions to cushion the blow of historically low copper prices.427 Mazoka was also likely 
receiving funds from a Lozi cultural association which had pushed him to create the UPND 
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as a vehicle for advancing a ‘Bantu Botatwe’ political agenda.428 Suggestions abounded that 
the party was very well-funded in 2001, but as always, it is very difficult to trace the source 
of those funds and verify reports of party funding. The most likely scenario in 2001 was that 
the UPND had access to a mix of funds – including from prominent Lozi interests, farmer’s 
unions in the South and foreign financiers. In any event, it is clear that significant funds were 
flowing to the major opposition parties in 2001, and this provided a disincentive to make the 
necessary concessions to form a coalition in the face of uncertainty over the electoral support 
that each party could muster. This supports Arriola’s focus on funding, and suggests a 
potential limitation to his theory of pecuniary coalition building – that when parties are 
sufficiently well-funded, they may have little interest in selling their endorsements to other 
party leaders. 
The 2001 polls were the first seriously competitive election since Zambia’s return to multi-
party democracy in 1991. However, despite the adverse circumstances, the ruling party 
managed to clinch victory from the jaws of defeat due to the fractured and divided 
opposition. With 28 registered political parties and 11 presidential candidates contesting the 
elections, a divided ruling party faced a divided opposition field.429 Because of the division in 
opposition ranks, five parties split the presidential vote – each winning the presidential vote 
in multiple constituencies (see Figure 7 below) – and the MMD’s Mwanawasa scraped 
through with just under 29% of the vote. Only 35,000 votes or 1.9% separated Mwanawasa 
from Mazoka, in an election that was plagued with irregularities and is still widely believed to 
have been ‘stolen.’430 Christon Tembo’s FDD came third with 13%, followed closely by 
UNIP on 10% and the Heritage party at 8% of the vote. Collectively, the opposition shared 
71% of the presidential tally. The MMD only won 69 of 150 seats in parliament, and even 
failed to reach a parliamentary majority after appointing its eight presidential nominees. 
However, the ruling party remained the most ‘nationalised’ party (see Figure 8 below for each 
party’s electoral support) – or the party whose electoral support was most evenly spread 
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across the country.431 The UPND had won the presidential vote in four of the country’s nine 
provinces – Southern, Western, North-Western and Lusaka – while the MMD won in 
another four and UNIP won in just the Eastern Province. Seven parties were represented in 
parliament, but the UPND’s dominance within the crowded opposition field was clear as it 
held 49 of 150 seats (to the FDD’s 12 and UNIP’s 13) and it thus formed the official 
opposition.  
The UPND had performed impressively in the south, west and centre of the country, but 
failed to capitalise on dissatisfaction on the Copperbelt and in the north (see Figure 8). UNIP 
and the FDD were largely confined to the Eastern Province, though Tembo’s party also 
performed relatively well in the north. The PF, mentioned as little more than a footnote in 
the 2001 election, proved to be confined to just a few constituencies in the Bemba-speaking 
north, and mustered lukewarm support on the populous Copperbelt. At the national level, 
Michael Sata achieved only 3% of the total presidential vote, which belied the impressive 
growth that the party would achieve ahead of the next election. The 2001 election results 
proved that if they wanted to win an election, these regionally-limited parties would need to 
work together to overcome the MMD’s electoral machine – on their own they could not 
easily build the necessary cross-regional coalitions to defeat the ruling party. The opposition’s 
failure to overthrow the MMD’s hegemony in 2001 and the regional spread of party support 
(indicated in Figure 8) would provide the major impetus for the proposed formation of the 
United Democratic Alliance (UDA) in 2005, as the parties sought to build a complementary 
coalition of their various regional strongholds to overcome MMD dominance. Ultimately 
though, fate – or possibly government agents – would intervene to scupper the opposition’s 
plans.432  
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Figure 7 The 2001 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency 
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Figure 8 The 2001 Zambian Presidential Election Results for MMD (blue), UPND (red), UNIP (orange), FDD 
(yellow) and PF (green) in order of declining vote share 




3.2.2 The United Democratic Alliance and the 2006 elections 
Between 2001 and 2006, the ruling MMD was responsible for fomenting distrust and disunity 
amongst the opposition. Considering Mwanawasa’s weak electoral mandate in 2001, his 
predecessor’s continued control over the ruling MMD and the opposition’s collective 
majority in parliament, the president set about trying to consolidate his power and build a 
working coalition in parliament. To do this – particularly following his purge of Chiluba allies 
in Cabinet – Mwanawasa poached several opposition MPs. In 2003, President Mwanawasa 
appointed three FDD MPs to ministerial positions (Dipak Patel, Geoffrey Samukonga and 
Chance Kabaghe) and a UPND MP to the post of deputy minister. In addition, two UPND 
MPs (UPND SG Benny Tetamashimba and Austin Liato) were also appointed to sit on 
Mwanawasa’s Constitutional Review Commission, contrary to the party’s wishes. These MPs 
were expelled by their parties, and most were adopted by the MMD to stand in the by-
elections triggered by their expulsions. Most expelled MPs successfully defended their seats 
on a ruling party ticket, reducing the size of the opposition caucus and fomenting distrust 
within and between opposition parties. Between 2002 and 2003, seven opposition MPs were 
tempted to join the MMD, expelled by their parties and re-elected on a ruling party ticket.433 
This allowed Mwanawasa to build a majority in parliament and foment dissent within the 
ranks of the numerically-dominant opposition. That these MPs were re-elected despite 
hopping from one party to another suggests that many won their seats on the strength of 
their individual networks rather than those of their previous parties, highlighting the trend 
noted in the first section regarding the weakness of parties, importance of the personal 
profiles of candidates and the fluid allegiances of Zambia’s political elite.  
By the end of the 2006 election period, although the MMD retained the executive, the PF’s 
Michael Sata had emerged as the poll’s ‘big winner.’ Having risen from seventh place in the 
2001 presidential elections, Sata was second to Levy Mwanawasa by 2006 and had expanded 
the PF’s parliamentary caucus from one to 43 seats, while taking hegemonic control of most 
of the municipal councils along Zambia’s line of rail. The PF dominated on the urban 
Copperbelt, in Lusaka and in the Northern Province capital of Kasama. Although in 
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retrospect it may appear that Sata’s success in 2006 and the rise of the PF to the position of 
the largest opposition was inevitable and foreseeable, this was simply not the case. As Gould 
(2010) does, this section argues that Sata’s rise owes a great debt to ‘Mazoka’s ghost’ and the 
ill-fated coalition between the three strongest opposition parties to emerge from the 2001 
election. Gould notes that, just ten months before the election, political pundits in Lusaka 
could hardly muster even ‘lukewarm support’ for Sata.434 Certainly, a review of the coverage 
of political manoeuvring in 2006 in The Post newspaper – Zambia’s largest daily and (at the 
time) the most reliable independent print publication – shows that even influential newspaper 
mogul, Fred M’membe, did not see Sata as a serious contender until just weeks before the 
polls. Sata’s rise was due in part to the rapid demise of the prospects of the UPND and the 
coalition that it intended to lead to victory in late 2006. 
Given that in the 2001 elections, the opposition had collectively garnered 71% of the 
presidential vote, it was clear to all opposition parties that a broad coalition should be formed 
ahead of the next general election. Equally, in 2002, the opposition in Kenya had united and 
overturned the three-decade-long hegemony of KANU, a point not lost on the Zambian 
opposition. In January 2003, the opposition began to discuss the possibility of fronting joint 
candidates in parliamentary by-elections, but the defeat of the joint opposition candidate in 
February by-elections in Keembe (Central Province) rattled the nascent alliance.435 By June 
2003, the budding coalition had all but collapsed as UNIP went into an alliance with the 
ruling MMD and the UPND pulled out, blaming the other opposition parties for not working 
together.436 However, in early 2005, opposition leaders again began to meet to plan for a pre-
electoral coalition to unite all of the key players.437 Early on, Sata had called for a coalition of 
opposition forces with himself as the presidential candidate.438 This was rejected by other 
opposition parties on the grounds that the PF had just a single seat in parliament and had 
garnered only 3% of the presidential tally in 2001, compared to the combined 74 seats and 
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50% of the executive vote collected by the other candidates. Instead, the parties decided to 
use the 2001 results as a guide for distributing positions in the nascent alliance, with the 
implicit agreement that the leader of the party that won the largest proportion of the 2001 
presidential vote would be the face of the coalition.  
The resulting United Democratic Alliance (UDA) was launched on 1 March 2006 to much 
fanfare, with the leaders of the constituent parties appearing in each other’s party colours in 
a broad show of unity at the Mulungushi Conference Centre.439 But the celebrations did not 
last long, as bickering soon set in amongst the three parties to the coalition – Edith Nawakwi’s 
FDD,440 the UPND and Tilyenji Kaunda’s UNIP. The pre-electoral coalition was conceived 
to bring together the complementary constituencies of the various opposition parties – the 
UPND’s Southern, Central, Western and North-Western support, the FDD’s Northern and 
Eastern base, and UNIP’s Eastern Province strongholds. Between them, the parties held 74 
of the country’s 150 parliamentary seats, across seven of Zambia’s nine provinces.441 But this 
neat arrangement of ethnic balancing and complementary alliance building was soon 
shattered by ego, interests, and tragedy.  
Although many believe that the UPND won the 2001 elections,442 by 2006 the party was 
suffering from a crisis. The party’s president and primary funder, Anderson Mazoka, was 
gravely ill and had spent most of 2005 in South Africa seeking medical treatment. His deputy, 
Sakwiba Sikota, had done much of the day-to-day running of the party in Mazoka’s absence 
and when the party president died in Johannesburg on 24 May 2006, Sikota expected to 
inherit the leadership of the party. Instead, a fierce war erupted with outspoken factions of 
the party (including Mazoka’s wife) demanding that only a southerner – a Tonga-speaker, as 
Mazoka was – could take over the party’s reins.443 The public spat was splashed across the 
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pages of The Post newspaper for more than six weeks, with accusations of ‘tribalism’ and 
ethnic exclusion marring the party’s image. When Hakainde Hichilema, a relatively unknown 
but wealthy southern businessman was elected president amidst accusations of bribery and 
intimidation, Sikota and many party heavyweights – Princess Nakatindi, Sikota Wina, Inonge 
Wina, Robert Sichinga and Given Lubinda amongst others who were predominantly from 
Western and Bembaphone provinces – deserted the party to start their own or to join the 
ruling MMD. Sakwiba Sikota, Lubinda and others formed the United Liberal Party (ULP), 
which they initially used to try to join the UDA coalition,444 but after being blocked by the 
UPND445 they went into an alliance with Sata’s PF.446  
The UPND split was extremely acrimonious, with insults and accusations of ‘tribalism’ – that 
the UPND was increasingly ethnically exclusivist – flying daily across the pages of Zambia’s 
major newspapers. This severely weakened the party’s profile and support base, particularly 
in Western Province where many of the party’s structures were taken over in their entirety 
by the ULP.447 Of the UPND’s 13 Western Province MP’s elected in 2001, eight defected to 
the ULP in 2006, three failed to recontest, and two stood again – of which only one 
parliamentarian retained their seat. From 13 of the 17 provincial seats they had held in 2001, 
the UPND (within the UDA) retained only a single seat, with most seats going to the ruling 
MMD. The ULP only won two seats in Western Province, their insurrection was largely 
overtaken by the MMD’s resurgence. Due to the split within the UPND and perceptions that 
the party was ethnically biased against Sikota (a prominent Lozi from Western Province) and 
Westerners more generally, Hichilema’s presidential vote share in the province was just 12% 
in 2006, compared to Mazoka’s 49% in 2001. The MMD also won the presidential vote in 
every constituency in Western Province, unlike in 2001 when the UPND had almost achieved 
a clean sweep in the West. The MMD’s resurgence was also based partly on the support of 
the Lozi Litunga, the prominence of Western politicians such as Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika 
and Mwanawasa’s popular agricultural policies which provided a steady supply of fertiliser 
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and farming inputs.448 Meanwhile, in Southern Province, Sakwiba Sikota was returned to his 
Livingstone parliamentary seat – the only seat that his ULP would win in the province. 
Despite the turmoil in the UPND, the UDA attempted to continue building the alliance. 
Following Mazoka’s death, it was widely claimed that it had been agreed between the three 
parties that the UPND leader had been granted the presidency of the alliance, and that 
Nawakwi was to hold the post of secretary general on behalf of the FDD.449 Most 
commentators argued that this would be ‘natural’ as the UPND was the largest party in the 
alliance, having won 49 seats in parliament in 2001 in contrast to the FDD’s 12 and UNIP’s 
13. Equally, Mazoka had received more than double the vote share of either of the two parties 
in the previous presidential election. As Anderson Mazoka had negotiated the UDA 
agreement, was the likely leader of the alliance and had subsequently died, the coalition also 
suffered from the turbulence within its largest constituent party. Publicly, alliance members 
– who had a vested interest in the leadership selection – involved themselves in debates over 
the choice of the new UPND president, undermining trust and fomenting personal 
rivalries.450 When it became clear that a relatively unknown businessman with no direct 
political experience was to assume Mazoka’s mantle, FDD President Nawakwi announced 
her intentions to run as the coalition’s presidential candidate. In response, the FDD’s party 
chairperson publicly accused Nawakwi of ‘opportunism’ and of destabilising the alliance, 
arguing that the president of the smallest party to the alliance should not attempt to mount a 
challenge for the presidency.451 The chairperson was subsequently expelled and a public war 
of words ensued.452 In the wake of infighting and uncertainty amongst party leaders regarding 
the relative strengths of each of the opposition parties, the FDD opted to engage in last-
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minute bargaining with Sata’s PF.453 However, the prospective agreement fell through due to 
Nawakwi’s hefty demands – she allegedly insisted on being granted 56% of the parliamentary 
seats and an executive prime ministerial position.454 Ultimately, the FDD remained within the 
UDA alliance – at least publicly. On the 3 August, it was finally announced after a contentious 
debate between the coalition’s partners, that Hichilema would be the UDA candidate.455 
As the election drew nearer, Hichilema’s tactic was to campaign actively in the populous 
Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces, and to try to court traditional leaders in Northern and 
North-Western Provinces to broaden his vote outside of his Southern Province base.456 But 
the problems in the alliance were clear and were frequently reported on in both the 
government and independent press. The FDD’s Nawakwi rarely appeared with Hichilema 
on the campaign trail,457 and was not present at the filing of his nomination papers at the 
supreme court or the rally at the Freedom Statue thereafter – a rare opportunity to use a 
public show of force in Lusaka to project party strength and win over undecided voters. 
News reports circulated that the rift had deepened to the degree that FDD candidates were 
denied funding by the UDA and Nawakwi had begun printing campaign materials for her 
candidates in the FDD’s colours rather than under the coalition’s banner.458 Reports 
suggested that Nawakwi had ‘gone underground’ and would only reappear again after the 
election,459 while she told reporters that she was giving Hichilema ‘space to make it for 
himself.’ The internal fighting within the alliance was not just present at the top levels of the 
party, but also locally; tension was exacerbated by the imposition of parliamentary candidates 
in some constituencies, and one such incident nearly led to violence between FDD and 
UPND cadres.460 The imposition of candidates allegedly led to the FDD having just 32 
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candidates in the parliamentary race, less than the 50 of 150 that had been agreed upon. The 
instability within the coalition’s constituent parties introduced uncertainty over each party’s 
electoral strength, which prompted infighting for the position of coalition leader – ultimately 
undermining the success of the alliance. The negative coverage of the coalition continued 
until election day and the three parties did not seem to pull together, whilst Sata grabbed 
headlines – and the post of opposition leader – through his mega-rallies, popular slogans, 
anti-China rhetoric and populist electioneering in the urban areas along the line of rail.461  
While the UDA was fighting, Sata’s party was turning Mwanawasa’s anti-corruption 
campaign into an ethno-regional campaign issue. The PF grew in leaps and bounds between 
2001 and 2006, with many of the FDD’s and MMD’s northern Bemba-speaking elites 
defecting to join the party. All of former president Chiluba’s allies that had been expelled by 
Mwanawasa crossed to the PF, a trend which was aided by Mwanawasa’s apparent anti-
Bemba campaign. In 2001, for the first time in Zambian history, two non-Bemba’s occupied 
the top two seats in government and Mwanawasa filled the public service and foreign 
missions with non-Bemba speakers, further entrenching a sense of Bemba political 
marginalisation and fuelling the growth of Sata’s ethno-regional party in northern Zambia.462 
As Sata’s party rose in the north, the PF’s campaign in 2006 was reported to have been ‘flush 
with money’ which was believed to have come from former President Chiluba and others 
indicted on corruption charges, as well as from Taiwanese interests.463 According to internal 
US Embassy memos, it was widely rumoured that former Director of Intelligence Xavier 
Chungu (from Luapula Province in the north), who had been expelled from the MMD and 
prosecuted alongside Chiluba, had provided extensive financial support for the PF’s 2006 
campaign.464 Sata had also promised, while campaigning in Luapula in 2006, that he would 
allow Chungu to return to Zambia from exile without fear of facing corruption charges, and 
he also promised to drop the charges against Chiluba.465 The funding that Sata was able to 
access helps to explain why he was able to resist entering into a coalition with the UPND and 
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others – he was not in need of the funds that an alliance with the UPND would offer, and 
he saw the alliance as an anti-Bemba political machine.466 This again suggests that Arriola’s 
theory of pecuniary coalition building is limited, that its efficacy depends on the lack of 
availability of funds from other sources. When funding is readily available to most players, 
this reduces the utility of financial incentives to cooperate. 
As the dust settled after the election, it became clear that Mwanawasa had won the 2006 polls 
by a significant margin, and that Sata’s PF had supplanted the once-mighty UPND as the 
official opposition, taking 29% of the total (see Figure 9). Mwanawasa had reclaimed many 
rural areas (see the blue map in Figure 10) and Sata had increased his electoral support outside 
of his Northern Province base, capturing disaffected urbanites in Lusaka and mining 
communities in the Copperbelt (see the green map in Figure 10). The UDA’s Hichilema 
achieved only 25% of the national tally, collapsing in the cities and winning predominantly in 
rural Southern and Eastern Provinces (see the red map in Figure 10). In parliament, the PF’s 
seats had increased from one to 43, while the PF took hegemonic control of most of the 
councils along the line of rail – namely, the urban Copperbelt, and in Lusaka and Kasama. 
By contrast, the UDA’s collective 74 seats in 2001 had shrunk to just 26 seats – two in Central 
province, four in Eastern, two in North-Western, 17 in the Southern Province and a single 
seat in Western Province.  
Following their relatively poor showing in the 2006 election, UDA Vice President Nawakwi 
announced that she would seek to stand as the alliance’s presidential candidate in 2011.467 She 
argued that there had been a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ that if the 2006 UDA candidate lost 
the election, the runner up (in this case, herself) would stand as the coalition candidate in 
2011.468 In response, Hichilema and the UPND protested that Nawakwi had tried to ensure 
that the UDA lost the 2006 election; a defecting FDD coordinator even went so far as to say 
that she had ‘de-campaigned’ the UDA during the campaign period.469 Ultimately, the UDA 
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coalition did not last long beyond the election – the distrust between the parties scuppered 
any meaningful inter-election cooperation and would have lasting repercussions for relations 
between the UPND and the FDD. In 2012, Nawakwi opened up to reporters about her time 
in the UDA while reflecting on a mooted alliance between the UPND and MMD:  
I hope that the UPND will accept that they are the junior partner. I hope that my colleagues 
in UPND calmly take the statement that they have fewer seats, they are younger because that 
is how we felt. I hope that they are not feeling as bad as we felt when we were being told we 
had 12 seats in the House and that we didn't have enough money. They should take their status 
calmly and accept it just as they expected us to accept it because we were being told that we 
couldn't provide helicopters and we only had 12 seats. It is the same language which is being 
played on them that they played on us.470  
 
This perceived slight was something that Nawakwi would continue to resent until 2016, and 
it would help prevent the formation of any future coalitions between the two parties.  
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Figure 9 The 2006 Zambian Presidential Election Results by Constituency 
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Figure 10 The 2006 Zambian Presidential Election Results of MMD (blue), PF (green) and UDA (red) in 
order of declining vote share 




3.2.3 The 2008 Presidential By-Election 
When President Levy Mwanawasa died suddenly in August 2008, it triggered the first 
presidential by-election in Zambia’s history. With just 90 days to arrange an election, parties 
scrambled to raise funds and put together a campaign which would carry them into State 
House. The MMD was riven by factional battles, but ultimately Mwanawasa’s Vice President, 
Rupiah Banda, emerged victorious and called the election more than two weeks early, hoping 
that the opposition would be caught unprepared by the short timeline. Sections of the 
opposition – eager to make the most of another chance at the presidency – attempted to set 
aside their differences and form yet another coalition. On 16 August, Sata and Hakainde 
Hichilema (popularly known as HH) held a joint rally in Lusaka to protest cabinet members 
awarding themselves huge salary increases.471 The two had been trying to negotiate an alliance 
since early August, but with limited success. At the urging of his son, Lt Col Panji Kaunda, 
former President Kaunda met with UPND President Hichilema on 24 September to try to 
encourage the formation of an alliance with the PF.472 The following morning, the leaders of 
the PF and UPND met at Kaunda’s residence to discuss the formation of an electoral alliance 
to contest the election that was to be held in a month’s time. The meeting was brokered by 
Panji Kaunda, a known supporter of HH’s, who tried to persuade Sata to renounce his 
candidacy in support of Hichilema.473 “As you know, I support HH and the UPND; I saw a 
danger that [if] each opposition political party goes each way, they will split the votes,” Panji 
Kaunda argued.474 Following reports of the meeting’s collapse after Michael Sata and Guy 
Scott (the PF vice president) stormed out, Hichilema told reporters that “we cannot withdraw 
for Sata, unless there is another person of quality. Sata is just a dictator. We don’t want those 
dictatorial tendencies.” The pact had collapsed because the two politicians did not trust each 
other, each had refused to step aside for the other and the short timeline ahead of the polls 
did not allow for a compromise deal to be negotiated.475  
Meanwhile, at the MMD’s final rally in Mandevu township in Lusaka, Rupiah Banda rolled 
out a bevy of opposition leaders who had lined up to endorse him for the election, including 
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the UNIP Vice-President, former Vice-President Christon Tembo, National Democratic 
Focus (NDF) President Mwila, ULP President Sakwiba Sikota and FDD President Edith 
Nawakwi.476 Nawakwi and the other opposition leaders launched into scathing critiques of 
the PF and UPND leaders, warning that if they won the election, the country would be 
plunged into instability. It had been alleged a few weeks earlier that the ruling party had been 
paying smaller opposition parties to endorse Banda’s presidential candidacy. The Secretary 
General of the Zambian Republican Party alleged to The Post that the party had resolved to 
endorse Hichilema for the presidency, but that a meeting with MMD presidential candidate 
Rupiah Banda and an envelope of K15 million (approximately $1 500) had changed the party 
president’s mind.477 As theorised by Arriola, this kind of ‘cash for support’ accusation is 
common in Zambia and elsewhere, with frequent reports emerging of party presidents and 
candidates paying off members of their own or other parties during electoral contests. 
Hichilema was accused of similar bribery during the UPND elective congress and the UDA’s 
candidate selection meeting in 2006. When the election was called in 2008, the PF’s campaign 
coffers were empty. The Taiwanese government, who had allegedly supported the PF 
campaign in 2006 had been embarrassed by Sata’s campaigning behaviour and would not 
offer further support in 2008.478 Senior PF representatives – including the secretary general 
– had approached US embassy staff in Lusaka for campaign donations as they did not have 
sufficient resources for the campaign or polling station agent deployment.479 However, 
despite their financial hardships, the PF declined the UPND’s advances. This suggests that, 
contrary to Arriola’s (2013) thesis, there is more at play than a simple exchange of funds for 
political support. When the presidential by-election results were announced, it became clear 
that, as in 2001 and 2006, the opposition had again garnered most of the votes – with a 
collective 58% compared to Rupiah Banda’s 40%.  
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3.2.4 The PF-UPND Pact from 2009-2011 
Coalition Formation 
Less than ten days after the 2008 poll, the UPND began to consider the creation of another 
electoral alliance with the PF ahead of 2011.480  On 4 June 2009, the two parties signed a 
memorandum of understanding on the creation of an opposition coalition – known as ‘The 
Pact’ – with which to remove the MMD from power in the 2011 election.481 In response, the 
MMD moved quickly to confirm Rupiah Banda as the ruling party’s candidate in a ‘pre-
emptive strike’ to enforce party discipline.482 It appeared that the battle lines had been drawn 
and Banda’s beleaguered MMD would finally face a united front that combined opposition 
strongholds in the north, the south and urban centres – potentially a demographically 
dominant alliance.483 The Pact managed – partly by virtue of the complementary 
constituencies held by the two parties – an impressive degree of coordination in 
parliamentary and local government by-elections. Wins in 60% of the parliamentary by-
election races held between 2009 and 2011 made the Pact appear almost unassailable.  
After the formation of the Pact, the alliance fronted joint candidates in ten parliamentary by-
elections. Of the ten, the PF and UPND each won three seats, in their respective Northern, 
Copperbelt, North-Western and rural Lusaka strongholds. However, despite their remarkable 
outward success in winning by-elections and stifling intra-Pact competition, internal papers 
show high levels of distrust and disunity between the partners to the agreement. While the 
Pact tried to score political points early on by initiating impeachment procedures against 
President Rupiah Banda in July 2009, it back-fired when 18 PF MPs refused to support the 
motion,484 triggering distrust and disunity between the party’s parliamentary caucus and its 
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executive. This exacerbated tensions that had emerged when 22 PF members had refused to 
follow the party’s directive not to participate in President Banda’s National Constitutional 
Conference (NCC). The UPND had resolved to participate in the NCC, and ultimately voted 
in favour of introducing a constitutional clause that required that presidential hopefuls 
possess a university degree – automatically disqualifying Sata from the presidential race.485 
This cemented disunity within the coalition which was exploited in the government press.486 
Sata responded by stating in an interview that his presidential ambitions would not be 
deterred, while Hichilema retaliated by declaring that he would run in the presidential race.487 
Inexplicably, the NCC ultimately threw out the degree clause,488 but the damage had already 
been done to trust within the Pact.  
Coalition Collapse 
Much of the Pact’s internal discussion in 2010 – documented in Wynter Kabimba’s personal 
papers489 – related to how the two parties would split up the various provinces. The substance 
of most of the communications contained debates between the two which revolved around 
the allocation of seats in Western Province. As noted in the previous section, the UPND had 
suffered a devastating collapse in Western Province during the succession battle that followed 
Mazoka’s death in 2006. While the PF had not been the primary beneficiary of this collapse, 
the party had inherited some of the UPND’s structures in the province that had defected to 
the ULP. The UPND was determined to use the Pact to regain its previous levels of support 
in Western Province, but equally the PF saw the area as ripe for its own expansion. The 
marginalised region became a key Pact battlefield. Within internal PF documents, accusations 
flew that the UPND was trying to recruit PF members and leaders in the province.490 In 
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Solwezi in the North-Western Province, the PF had complained that the UPND had been 
distributing flyers that stated “Vote Hakainde Hichilema for President.”491 A few weeks later, 
PF officials in the Western Province wrote to the party’s secretariat to say that the UPND 
had been telling the public in Western Province that it had been allocated to them and was a 
“no go area for PF.” According to the PF officials, local UPND structures had been 
“assassinating the character of our Party President, the aspiring candidates and PF as a 
party… that is no [sic] all, they are busy poaching some of our aspiring candidates and 
influential members to join them.”492 The letter went on to request that the PF dissociate 
itself from the Pact. A flurry of letters passed between the two parties’ headquarters, but the 
UPND did not deny or dissociate itself from the accusations levelled by the PF’s local 
structures.493  
Parliamentary by-elections proved to be a key front as the two parties tried to jostle for 
supremacy within the coalition. The fight for Luena constituency in Western Province’s 
capital city of Mongu was particularly acrimonious, as both parties tried to lay claim to the 
province. In May 2010, the two parties convened a joint fact-finding mission to determine 
the relative strengths of the Pact members in Mongu ahead of the by-election to be held in 
August. They used a ‘random sampling’ technique while driving around the constituency and 
asking people the question “which party would you like to contest the Luena seat between 
UPND led by President Hakainde Hichilema and PF led by President Michael Sata?”494 Of 
the 67 people randomly selected, 52 were reportedly in favour of the UPND contesting the 
seat. During a meeting to discuss the results of the trip, the PF accused the UPND of having 
influenced the results through the airing of a radio programme the night before in which 
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UPND officials urged people to vote for the UPND rather than the PF.495 The distrust 
between the coalition partners deepened when the PF advertised for members to contest the 
by-election despite an agreement that the UPND would front the joint candidate.496 The 
UPND ultimately fronted the joint Pact candidate,497 but despite the findings of the fact-
finding mission, the candidate placed a dismal third with only 21% of the vote, undermining 
the party’s claims of its popularity in the West and reinforcing the PF’s suspicions that the 
informal survey had been rigged.498 There were frequent claims from both sides that the other 
was operating in bad faith, and this lack of trust undermined both the working relationship 
between the parties and the Pact’s prospects. In turn, the campaigns highlight how 
competition for the same seats forces opposition allies to compete amongst themselves, and 
raises the possibility that parties will behave cynically to outwit their competitor. This helps 
to foment distrust and undermines cooperation at the local (and potentially the national) 
level.  
Throughout the life of the Pact, speculation was rife in both the government and independent 
media concerning who would lead the coalition in 2011. Internal discussion documents 
suggest that this question was glossed over and not addressed until early in election year. 
Reports surfaced in mid-February 2011 that the Pact had decided on an allocation of seats 
and cabinet posts – with the presidential seat going to Sata and Hichilema serving as his vice 
president.499 In addition, 60% of parliamentary and cabinet positions were to go to the PF 
with 40% of allocations going to the smaller UPND. These media reports would finally lead 
to the disintegration of the promising coalition. The allocations were mentioned as part of a 
confidential internal memo written by Professor Clive Chirwa – at that point the UPND 
Chairman for International Relations. The memo had been sent to the leadership of both 
parties for discussion when PF Secretary General, Wynter Kabimba, called a press conference 
and – flanked by senior party leaders Guy Scott and Inonge Wina – announced that a deal 
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had been reached and Sata was to be the Pact candidate.500 In response, the UPND denied 
that it had sanctioned the document and castigated Kabimba for releasing it. Following a 
public war of words – covered extensively by the delighted government press – both parties 
declared that the Pact was dead.501  
Despite the obvious benefits of pooling the two parties’ complementary constituencies, it 
appears that neither party was entirely committed to the fractious partnership. During an 
interview with Guy Scott in 2015, shortly after the presidential by-election, Scott alleged that 
the 2011 Pact was in fact pushed by Xavier Chungu (the PF’s 2006 election campaign 
financier), who had tired of funding multiple parties. Despite the pressure from his funders, 
Sata was resistant to working with other members of the opposition. Sishuwa Sishuwa (2016) 
suggests that the reason for Sata’s unwillingness to enter into party coalitions was that he was 
determined to become the president and, as a result, would refuse to enter into any coalition 
where he would not be the presidential candidate.502 There is merit to this analysis, as Sata 
was indeed determined to elevate himself into the presidency, however the collapse of the 
Pact in 2011 was not solely attributable to Sata’s intransigence. The Pact agreement was 
ultimately scuppered by PF Secretary General Wynter Kabimba, when he called the press 
conference and publicly declared the Chirwa proposals to be Pact policy.503 Kabimba had 
presidential ambitions and was to be the first in line to succeed his ailing party president. The 
coalition with the UPND would have meant him ceding his position to the UPND president 
and possibly losing his place in line altogether. Ultimately, Kabimba’s gamble paid off as the 
party went on to win the 2011 elections alone, though his succession plans were later thwarted 
by Sata in 2014. This highlights the importance of lower-level party players in driving 
coalition collapse when their interests are threatened by inter-party cooperation. 
The results of the 2011 elections – as depicted in the maps below – highlight the way in which 
the PF successfully merged a Northern ethno-regional campaign with Sata’s populist 
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messaging amongst more cosmopolitan urbanites on the Copperbelt and in Lusaka.504 In 
addition, through making promises and appealing to local grievances in Western Province, 
Sata managed to increase his vote-share in the province, gaining a surprising 23% of the vote 
(just behind the UPND’s 28% and Rupiah Banda’s 33%) which helped to push him over the 
electoral threshold and into the presidency (see the green map in Figure 12).505 While this 
balancing of interests and constituencies was enough to get Sata into State House, his hold 
on government was fairly precarious. The PF had 60 members of parliament, just five 
parliamentary seats more than the displaced MMD and far short of a majority in the 150-seat 
parliament. For their part, the UPND became even more confined to the Southern and 
Western regions of the country, as its ascendance in the east (as part of UDA in 2006) was 
checked in 2011 by the resurgence of the MMD in the eastern region (see Figure 11) – 
predominantly due to substantial support for easterner MMD President Rupiah Banda. While 
the MMD continued to have the greatest geographic spread of any party (common for ruling 
parties),506 the party gained relatively low proportions of votes in most constituencies (see the 
blue map in Figure 12). The 2011 results and Sata’s need to manufacture a parliamentary 
majority in the wake of electoral turnover would drastically reshape Zambian politics ahead 
of the next election in 2015. 
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Figure 12 The 2011 Zambian Presidential Election Results of PF (green), MMD (blue) and UPND (red) in order 
of declining vote share 




3.2.5 Informal Alliances and Political Realignment – The 2015 By-
Election 
As with most party coalitions, it is not possible to understand the drivers of coordination 
without understanding the realignments that occurred within parties over the course of a 
parliamentary cycle. The opposition United Party for National Development (UPND) – 
which since the rise of the PF in 2006 had been largely confined to its stronghold in the 
Southern Province – had begun a resurgence. Widely labelled as a ‘Tonga’ party, the UPND 
had ceased to be a national challenger after the disputed 2001 elections. But the ethnic group 
that comprises the party’s key constituency makes up only about 17% of the population, 
making it impossible for a party to win an election based solely upon the support of Tonga-
speaking (and even allied) groups. Major shifts occurred within the former ruling party after 
their unanticipated loss in 2011, which provided an enormous opportunity to both the ruling 
PF and the ascendant UPND. Similarly, the fractures that opened within the PF during the 
drastic and hasty realignment that occurred in the wake of President Sata’s death in late 2014 
caused a fundamental shifting of the political playing field and the apparent emergence of a 
two-party system. Under tight deadlines with an unexpected election looming, the opposition 
UPND managed to secure the electoral support of a series of notable politicians and smaller 
parties – forming a broad anti-PF alliance, while the ruling party was mired in a dirty 
succession struggle. Having learnt from Sata’s strategy to entice disgruntled members of other 
parties into his own individualised ‘coalition’ following the failure of the Pact coalition, 
Hichilema had spent the three years since the 2011 elections in dialogue with key party 
heavyweights, waiting for the political tide to turn. This preparation paid off as the PF 
appeared to implode before the 2015 election, and the UPND enticed the support (both 
formal and informal) of disgruntled members of the ruling party and the dwindling MMD.  
Following the MMD’s bruising loss to the PF and Sata in 2011, the party underwent a process 
of introspection and reconfiguration, and then imploded. When Rupiah Banda stepped down 
from the party’s presidency in 2012, he hoped to ensure the election of a favourable – and 
malleable – successor. A contentious party convention witnessed the battle between Felix 
Mutati, a former Minister of Commerce and party notable and the eventual winner, Nevers 
Mumba, a former pastor and Vice President under Levy Mwanawasa. Since his election with 
a parliamentary minority in 2011, Sata’s strategy had been to buy off opposition MPs with 




cabinet and government positions and trigger parliamentary by-elections to bolster his 
parliamentary contingent. The PF began its parliamentary consolidation by petitioning the 
results in 50 parliamentary constituencies where it had narrowly lost the race.507 Having 
learned from Mwanawasa’s post-2001 strategy, Sata divided the opposition by appointing 13 
opposition MPs to serve in his government as ministers or deputy ministers. By May 2013, 
the defections and wins in by-elections prompted by this strategy had increased the PF’s 
representation in parliament to 71. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the resource 
constraints and the personality-focused nature of Zambian political parties had led many 
former-MMD politicians to switch allegiance to the new governing party. For those who 
stayed within the MMD, they soon became disgruntled with the actions of the new party 
president who alienated and marginalised the losing faction after the 2012 election. 
For the PF, the presidential by-election campaign began with a shaky start, marred by 
infighting, intimidation and intra-party violence.508 Following the announcement of Sata’s 
death on 28 October 2014, a rapid realignment occurred. Prior to his final trip to London, 
ailing Sata had announced that during his absence, Defence and Justice Minister Edgar Lungu 
would be the acting president. When Sata subsequently died, the succession battle that had 
been quietly raging in the background for nearly three years came to the fore. The amorphous 
succession struggle coagulated into two camps and a fight soon ensued between Guy Scott’s 
faction and Edgar Lungu’s faction. This was over whether the acting president at the time of 
the president’s death (Lungu) or the Vice President (Scott) would take on presidential duties 
during the 90-day window before a presidential by-election could be held.509 Ultimately, Scott 
continued as interim president, and the battle shifted to the selection of a new presidential 
candidate. The party was divided over the choice of Sata’s successor, with eleven candidates 
vying for the top job including Sata’s uncle, nephew, wife and a host of other heavyweights. 
Acting President Scott attempted to block Lungu’s rise at every turn while trying to position 
his preferred candidate – Deputy Commerce Minister Miles Sampa – for the party’s top 
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job.510  Following a long string of accusations, suspensions, court injunctions and public spats 
that played out in the media, the party only united behind Lungu just before the nomination 
of presidential candidates on 20 December 2014. With only a month left to campaign and a 
relatively unknown candidate for the presidency, Lungu played on President Sata’s popularity 
and charisma, standing on a platform of ‘continuity’ and positioning himself as the guardian 
of the late president’s legacy. 
Forming a Broad Coalition 
In contrast to the PF, the opposition wasted little time. Foreign businessmen with a stake in 
Zambian businesses – many of whom saw the PF as ‘anti-business’ – sought to influence the 
outcome of the elections by facilitating the formation of an alliance between the MMD and 
UPND. Africa Confidential reported that prior to Sata’s funeral on 11 November, the South 
African Oppenheimer-funded Brenthurst Foundation had sponsored a meeting in South 
Africa between Hichilema and Rupiah Banda (who had links to the foundation and still 
commanded significant support within the MMD) to try to facilitate a coalition to oust the 
PF.511 The coalition formateurs represented business interests in mining (Anglo-
American512) and arms and aerospace (Paramount Group, represented by Ivor Ichikowitz) 
who seemingly hoped that under a new, more amenable political dispensation, their interests 
would be better served. Regional business elites were dissatisfied with the PF largely due to 
policy inconsistency and unpredictability, which was creating an insecure investment 
environment and undermining their returns.513 It was also due to alleged rent seeking 
behaviour on the part of ruling party members and the PF’s tendency to award contracts only 
to foreign firms that could pay larger bribes. In addition, the mining tax regime introduced 
by the PF in 2014 threatened to significantly cut into mining profits and had undermined 
investor confidence514 and finally, business leaders had far greater confidence in a future 
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UPND administration due to Hichilema’s significant business background and pro-business 
political platforms.515 The Brenthurst Foundation had allegedly invited the leaders together 
as their research had shown that none of the opposition parties could win the election without 
the backing of the others. The coalition negotiation meetings between Hichilema and Banda 
were brokered by former Nigerian President and Brenthurst Chair Olusegun Obasanjo, who 
asked Banda to supply a list of lieutenants to be appointed as ministers in a potential 
Hichilema cabinet. In return for supporting the UPND president, it was expected that 
Hichilema would restore Banda’s immunity from prosecution,516 ensure that corruption 
charges were dropped against Banda’s son Henry – who was living in exile – and grant him 
a prestigious government position. Banda initially agreed to the deal but, recognising his 
strong negotiating position, he went back on the agreement when asked to sign a formal 
MoU a few days later.517 Banda insisted that Hichilema should support him instead, and the 
talks ultimately collapsed.518 Meanwhile, Rupiah Banda returned to Lusaka to foment an 
insurrection within the MMD – which was still heavily reliant on his funding – and stage his 
own push for the presidency. 
Following the breakdown of the talks with the former president, the negotiators sought to 
bypass Banda, and flew MMD President Nevers Mumba to South Africa to offer him a 
similar deal. The meeting ended in a stalemate when the MMD’s Muhabi Lungu519 said that 
the leaders were unable to reach such a decision amongst themselves, and would need to put 
it to the National Executive Committee (NEC) instead. The two leaders agreed to continue 
talks in Lusaka following Sata’s funeral on 11 November, and the negotiating teams (minus 
the leaders) came up with a template for the agreement. The mooted agreement suggested 
that whoever ran for the presidency in the 2015 by-election would stand down for their 
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supporter in the 2016 election – a scheduled tri-partite election which was to be held in just 
over 18 months.520 The draft agreement also suggested that whichever party was granted the 
presidential ticket, they should only be granted 40% of the cabinet posts, while their partner 
should be granted 60% of the portfolios in cabinet. Muhabi Lungu, who largely drafted the 
proposed agreement, confided that many of the clauses that he included were intended to 
test the commitment of the UPND to an ‘equal’ arrangement: “there were a number of issues 
that were specifically designed – one, to determine their level of seriousness and genuineness 
and trust, and secondly to be able to determine whether they were actually prepared to cede 
control and whether they were willing to govern in a real coalition.”521 The distrust between 
the partners and unwillingness on both sides to cede the top position or negotiate an 
unfavourable arrangement largely scuppered the talks.  
In the same week that party leaders were meeting in South Africa, a meeting was held between 
the MPs from various parliamentary opposition parties.522 At this meeting, the MP’s – 
including approximately half of the MMD’s parliamentary contingent – decided to coordinate 
their actions ahead of the looming presidential by-election. They believed it to be necessary 
as they were convinced that none of the opposition parties could win alone, and they named 
the mooted coalition the ‘Jubilee Alliance’,523 perhaps inspired by the Jubilee Alliance in 
Kenya which had won the country’s presidential election the previous year. The MPs 
involved in discussions to form this coalition were from the ADD, MMD, UPND and an 
independent MP – Lubansenshi MP Patrick Mucheleka.524 These MPs agreed to engage the 
leadership of their various parties on the formation of a broad alliance, to back the UPND’s 
presidential campaign. The majority of this committee was MMD, with two MPs per province 
represented in the meeting – including some Eastern Province MPs who would later support 
a ‘mutiny’ in favour of Rupiah Banda.525 At the MMD’s NEC meeting held on 16 November, 
MPs were briefed on the discussions that had taken place at both executive and parliamentary 
caucus levels and a report was tabled on the forging of a formal alliance between the MMD 
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and the UPND.526 But it was at this meeting that events began to unravel – as former 
President Rupiah Banda staged his bid for the party’s presidential nomination.527  
At the MMD NEC meeting on Sunday 16 November 2014, following discussions of the 
modalities of an opposition alliance and the appointment of a committee to negotiate 
formally with the UPND, the next item on the agenda was the selection of the presidential 
candidate for the upcoming election.528 It was expected by many that the meeting would 
endorse President Mumba, but it soon became apparent that Rupiah Banda had a critical 
mass of supporters on the NEC – predominantly Eastern Province MPs and committee 
members. The meeting was adjourned following a lack of consensus on the choice of 
candidate, and the two leaders were requested to report back following discussions the 
following day.529 Rumours spread on the 17 November that Mumba was seeking an 
injunction against the holding of the meeting and the finalisation of the choice of candidate, 
and in response, the Banda-supporting faction held their own parallel NEC meeting. Nevers 
Mumba was overruled and Rupiah Banda was installed as the ‘official’ candidate for the 
MMD. In response, each leader suspended the other and their supporters530 in parallel NEC 
meetings, which were decried as illegal by the opposing side, and finally Mumba took the 
issue to court. A protracted court battle ensued in which the two party leaders tried to wrest 
control of the party from the other. Rupiah Banda appeared to be in control of the party 
secretariat and running battles were staged between cadres loyal to the two factions outside 
the party’s headquarters in Kabulonga.531  
When Nevers Mumba was finally reinstated on 18 November 2014, following a Supreme 
Court judgement,532 it was agreed that he would be engaged to join the de facto alliance that 
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had emerged between the UPND and 22 of the MMD’s MPs. But instead, contrary to the 
wishes of the majority of the MMD’s MPs and the NEC, Mumba decided to register to 
contest the by-election on the MMD’s ticket with the backing of just two of the party’s 
parliamentarians.533 As for Rupiah Banda, he and approximately five Eastern Province MMD 
MPs aligned themselves with the PF, and vowed to deliver the MMD’s support in the East 
for PF candidate Edgar Lungu. Mumba’s decision was difficult to understand, and two 
reasons were offered for his choice.534 The first was that he – never having contested a 
national election as MMD president – out of ego and an inflated sense of his own popularity, 
wanted to take his chances in the election. The second was due to financial concerns.535 
Several MMD MPs suggested that Mumba had decided to contest because he had already 
made commitments to and received and spent finances from his backers, and was thus unable 
to change course. Mumba (an ordained pastor and head of his own ministry) had also 
allegedly received a prophecy from two different West African churches who had predicted 
that he would be the next president – something which he reportedly firmly believed.536 
Again, another newly-elected party president declined a financial incentive and the potentially 
high returns from cooperation for supporting a stronger candidate, and opted to run 
independently despite there being no reasonable prospects of success.  
The Broad Alliance and the Campaign 
On 23 November, the UPND launched its electoral campaign at a small, Chinese-owned 
hotel in downtown Lusaka. Despite the collapse of negotiations with both MMD leaders, the 
campaign launch was attended by a who’s-who of Zambian politics. Maureen Mwanawasa – 
the popular widow of former President Mwanawasa – sat to Hichilema’s right, while 
controversial veteran MMD politician and diplomat Vernon Mwaanga537 and former 
Secretary to Cabinet Sketchley Sacika sat far to the left. The event was also attended by 
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Rupiah Banda’s son Andrew, Geoffrey Samukonga, the former MMD MP for Chawama, 
former army commander Malimba Masheke, former MMD Chimbamilonga MP Brian 
Sikazwe and former MMD treasurer Suresh Desai.538 Each of these well-known personalities 
endorsed the UPND leader for the presidency, and continued to do so at a massive rally held 
hours later in the low-income, high-density Kanyama constituency in Lusaka.539 Several 
notable personalities turned up for Hichilema’s rally including former MMD Defence 
Minister Michael Mabenga, former Mines Minister Maxwell Mwale, political activist Dante 
Saunders, former MMD Foreign Affairs Minister Kelly Walubita, former MMD Minister of 
Commerce Dipak Patel and popular local musician Pilato.540  
In the days that followed, other high profile leaders and politicians offered their 
endorsements of the UPND candidate, including ADD President Charles Milupi.541 The 
group of parliamentarians that had agreed to endorse Hichilema did so at a media briefing 
outside parliament542 and again at a press conference where a memorandum was handed over 
to Hichilema by the group’s leader, MMD MP Felix Mutati.543 The endorsements made the 
so-called ‘Tonga’ party appear to be more ethnically and regionally diverse, as Northerners, 
Westerners and politicians from Central, Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces lined up to 
support the party’s presidential candidate. Despite the failure to form a formal coalition with 
any major opposition party (except the small ADD), the UPND had created a broad alliance 
with prominent individuals that would help to redefine its political fortunes. Charles Milupi 
– a member of the traditional leadership in Mongu, Western Province – was elected MP for 
Luena in a 2011 by-election on the ticket of his Alliance for Democracy and Development 
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(ADD) party. He had formed the party after splitting from the MMD and intended to use it 
to enlist dissatisfied members of the UPND and MMD in Western Province to build a base 
and launch pad for Lozi political demands.544 The Lozi leader had come fourth with 11% of 
the vote in Western Province in 2011, and had won the presidential vote in Luena 
constituency. In 2015, Milupi threw his weight (and his finances)545 behind Hichilema, while 
the party was also actively supported by the campaign efforts of MMD MPs across the 
country.  
Ultimately around 20 MMD MPs actively supported the UPND’s campaign, with several 
others displaying lower levels of commitment. In some places – such as Kasama Central – 
disgruntled PF MPs also gave implicit support to Hichilema’s campaign, ensuring that cadres 
were discouraged from tearing down posters, beating opposition supporters and encouraging 
their supporters to attend the UPND’s campaign rallies. Kasama had previously been a site 
of significant violence during elections, not least because of the influence of the area’s PF 
MP, Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba (popularly known as GBM).546 However, in 2015, he was a 
relatively peripheral member of the anti-Lungu camp within the PF, and as such, he helped 
to facilitate Hichilema’s campaign in the PF’s Bemba heartland by arranging transport to 
rallies and preventing his cadres from pulling down opposition posters. 
Despite the failure of the executive-level coalition with the MMD, the alliance formed with 
the 20 MMD MPs was surprisingly effective in changing the electoral fortunes of the UPND. 
In trying to understand how this came about, it is important to consider how the PF grew 
between 2001 and 2011. Sishuwa Sishuwa (2016) notes that Sata’s strategy was to grow his 
party through ‘elite inclusion’, that as local political elites became disenchanted with the 
MMD or fell out of favour with the leadership, they were approached by Sata and his party. 
A common thread from all the MMD MPs who supported the UPND in 2015 was that they 
had all been approached by Hichilema, either in person or through an intermediary, between 
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2011 and 2016. A significant portion of the coalitions literature assumes that every coalition 
negotiation represents a negotiation between elites who have no links or ties, and that each 
attempt requires the building of relationships and trust.547 However, in Zambia (as in many 
other countries), while parties may be relatively unstable (forming and disappearing between 
election cycles), the collection of politicians that populate them is relatively stable over time. 
Many of these politicians had served together in a party or coalition previously, or were 
childhood friends. Politicians leverage these affective ties to build coalitions and alliances 
when elite cohesion within the ruling party (or other opposition parties) breaks down or the 
party appears capable of losing an electoral contest. Hichilema learnt from Sata’s party-
building strategy and had approached and persuaded enough politicians from within the 
ruling PF and MMD that when party-level coalitions faltered, his mobilisation strategy 
remained effective based on individualised elite inclusion. At rallies in high density areas, 
public ‘defections’ of local elites and councillors (and even the occasional entire MMD or PF 
branch office) were staged, to the delighted cries of the crowds. The UPND had learnt from 
the populist toolkit of Michael Sata, and used his tactics to increase the profile and vote-share 
of the UPND in 2015.  
According to most observers including the public and independent press, the 2015 election 
was significantly marked by regional and ethnic voting patterns and was, in the eyes of one 
diplomatic observer, a “very tribally determined election.”548 There was a clear split between 
former North Eastern Rhodesia (Northern, Eastern, Muchinga and Luapula Provinces) and 
North Western Rhodesia (Western, Southern, North-Western, and Central Provinces), 
almost down to the constituency (see Figure 13).549 It was expected that the former ruling 
party would perform badly, but the full extent of its collapse was astounding: Nevers 
Mumba’s MMD declined by 973,000 votes compared to 2011, receiving just over 15,000 
votes out of a total of 1.7 million. By comparison, HH’s share of the vote climbed by nearly 
30% from 18% in 2011 to 47% in 2015 – from a distant third-placed candidate to losing the 
election by just 27,000 votes. The UPND’s inclusion of local elites bolstered its vote share in 
non-traditional constituencies, gaining 25% of the vote in Lunte Constituency (HH received 
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just 0.9% there in 2011) in the Northern Province, on the back of steady campaigning in the 
region and the support of MMD MP Felix Mutati. In the Northern Province capital’s Kasama 
Central constituency, with the implicit support of PF MP Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba, the 
UPND attained 22% of the vote – a dramatic rise from less than 1% five years earlier. Having 
gained few votes in the Northern and Eastern regions as well as the urban Copperbelt and 
Lusaka Provinces in 2011 (refer to the maps in Section 3.2.4), 31% of the UPND’s vote share 
came from these non-traditional regions in 2015.550 However, the clear majority (60%) of 
Hichilema’s vote share still came from the party’s three stronghold provinces – Southern, 
Western and North-Western Provinces, while Central Province also swung behind the 
Southerner. The spread of the UPND’s vote share in 2015 is illustrated by the red map in 
Figure 14. The UPND consolidated its vote share in its strongholds but the party also 
managed to gain at least 3% of the vote in every constituency, and gained significant ground 
in the Eastern, Central and far Northern regions. The informal alliance formed around the 
2015 by-election would set the stage for a highly contentious and competitive election just 
18 months later. 
 
 
                                                 
550 This was the combined share of Hichilema’s vote that came from Northern, Luapula, Muchinga, Eastern, 
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over new districts and constituencies (approximately 6). This had relatively little impact on the appearance of 
the maps. 




3.2.6 Consolidating the Playing Field in 2016 
Much of the literature on coalitions assumes that a two-round majority voting system 
discourages first round pre-electoral coalitions, that in circumstances where a strong-but-
divided opposition can force the ruling party under the 50% threshold, opposition parties 
often opt to contest separately and coalesce in the event of a second round.552 However, in 
Zambia in 2016 the opposite was true. Opposition MMD MP Felix Mutati noted in 2015 that 
“On the basis that the new constitution is passed and there is the 50%+1, there will be no 
single party that is going to cross the 50+1. So, it will give a much, much stronger case for 
alliances.”553 In 2016, this change to the electoral laws prompted rapid-fire bargaining 
between opposition parties who believed that a united opposition would have a 
‘demonstration’ and ‘contagion’ effect, increasing the proportion of the vote that the 
opposition could draw and increasing the likelihood of victory. As was the case in Zambia, 
opposition parties rarely trust that a second-round election will be fair – as Zimbabwe’s 
experience in 2008 demonstrated – and prefer to win decisively in a first round before the 
ruling party can regroup and force an electoral victory. This may help to explain why the 
literature on the relationship between electoral systems and the likelihood of coalition 
formation is plagued by divergent conclusions; there are hidden intervening variables such as 
the opposition’s levels of trust in the fairness of the electoral system. In Senegal, which has a 
long history of democratic elections and some stability in the party system, coalitions are 
most frequently formed in the second round, and ruling parties have consistently lost to 
electoral challengers under such circumstances.554 The level of trust in the system is clearly 
high enough to allow parties to negotiate following an inconclusive first round, rather than 
believing that the stakes are too high to allow for a first-round loss. 
In the 2016 Zambian election, what might be considered an atypical coalition or broad 
alliance was formed. Most studies of coalitions have a high threshold for what they consider 
to be electorally significant coalitions, in most instances they code only coalitions in which 
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the junior partner to the coalition received at least 5% of the vote in the previous election – 
suggesting that they were electorally important.555 Intuitively this makes sense, but it tends to 
obscure other important dynamics around the role of political notables and their personal 
networks in party mobilisation. In Zambia, as this chapter has outlined, parties are made up 
of collections of notable politicians who have developed their own local patronage and 
political structures, and who are often able to campaign on the basis of those structures and 
appeals to ethno-linguistic ties. These individuals are tied to particular constituencies or 
regions where they have developed a base, and they may be able to wield that support in 
favour of the ‘coalition.’ When, as in 2015 and 2016, these politicians defect to a party that 
has previously been seen as appealing to a narrow ethno-linguistic group and campaign 
alongside the leader of that party, it makes the party appear to be more national in character 
and to represent a broader range of identity groups. This effect is even more pronounced 
when many such notables join a party’s campaign, entreating their co-ethnics to vote for a 
non-co-ethnic party leader. In Zambia, such individualised coalition-building or ‘elite 
inclusion’ is also a response to the failure of previous multi-party coalitions, to sidestep 
complex negotiations and coalition instability. 
The 2016 Zambian coalition was officially formed between the UPND and two smaller 
parties, Miles Sampa’s United Democratic Front (UDF) and Charles Milupi’s ADD – with 
Nevers Mumba’s faction of the MMD joining later in the campaign. While the ADD is almost 
completely electorally insignificant – coming fourth in 2011 with 0.95% of the national 
presidential vote – Charles Milupi is one of the wealthiest politicians in Zambia. Although no 
details have been leaked of the deal struck between the two parties, it is likely that Milupi 
contributed significant funds towards the campaign in return for an important position in the 
future cabinet. At the same time, as noted in the previous section, Milupi is an important 
figure in the traditional leadership structures of the Lozi-speaking Western Province, and he 
had built up an independent political base for himself in the province. Milupi had placed 
fourth in Western Province’s 2011 presidential race, with a reasonable 11% of the vote and 
a winning count in a single constituency. Although the alliance with the ADD would add 
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little at the national level, it made the UPND appear more inclusive and more able to garner 
votes in the western region of the country. 
As for the UDF – it had not existed in previous elections and had a relatively small following, 
but was nonetheless important. The UDF president, Miles Sampa, is the nephew of popular 
former president Michael Sata, and was a key member of the PF. He is a Bemba-speaking 
politician who set up his own party after losing to Lungu in the race to succeed Sata at the 
helm of the PF in early 2015. Following the frustration of their attempts to run their own 
presidential candidate in August 2016, the UDF allied itself to the UPND – broadening the 
UPND’s appeal to Bemba-speaking voters – who make up 33.5% of the population and 
reside predominantly in the rural Northern, Muchinga, Luapula and Copperbelt provinces.556 
Nevers Mumba – another Bemba-speaking politician – brought his faction of the MMD into 
the UPND’s broad coalition, and campaigned extensively on its behalf in Bemba-speaking 
regions. The UPND was also able to attract the endorsements of a wide range of Bemba-
speaking politicians and prominent personalities from other parties, including late President 
Sata’s son as well as veteran politicians Robert Sichinga and Vernon Mwaanga. These 
politicians went on to appear at UPND rallies in Bemba-speaking regions, entreating fellow 
citizens to vote for the party. At the same time, most of the MMD MPs who had supported 
the UPND in 2015 resigned from their parties and contested their seats on a UPND ticket 
in 2016. Four Western Province MMD MP’s also defected to the UPND, and were ultimately 
re-elected on the party’s ticket. 
The existing literature on coalitions is unable to account for the broad alliance that emerged 
(which may appear as little more than a collection of notables) and their impact on the 
election results. According to the coding used by most scholars in the field, neither the UDF 
nor the MMD coalition with the UPND would be considered significant as the MMD had 
received less than 1% of the vote in the previous election and the UDF didn’t exist prior to 
2016. Yet it is clear that the coalition had a significant impact at the subnational level, and 
ultimately at the national level. On the Copperbelt, the UPND went from 3.5% of the vote 
in 2011 to 35% in 2016. Similarly, in Northern Province the party had received 0.78% in 2011 
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but 22% in 2016. Contrary to existing hypotheses regarding the nature of ‘ethnic voting’ in 
Zambia and the limited support of the UPND outside of Southern Province, 45% of HH’s 
2016 vote share came from the predominantly Bemba-speaking Copperbelt, Muchinga, 
Luapula and Northern Provinces, as well as Nyanja-speaking Eastern and Lusaka Provinces 
– areas outside of the UPND’s traditional strongholds.557 This suggests that the cross-ethnic 
alliance that was built by the UPND was successful in its attempts to broaden the party’s 
support beyond its traditional electoral base. The UPND chose to create a broad coalition 
and a strategy of inclusion because it needed to broaden its appeal beyond its traditional 
strongholds. The party found itself in a strong bargaining position as it had become the largest 
opposition contender after the 2015 presidential by-election where it proved its capacity to 
win, though the UPND still lost the election by just 27,000 votes.  
As for the FDD President Edith Nawakwi, who had been the UPND’s alliance partner in 
2006, she had placed third but garnered just 0.9% of the popular vote in 2015. As Hichilema 
sent out his envoys to approach politicians to join him in a coalition, an envoy was sent to 
invite the FDD leader to join the alliance. When she was approached to join an opposition 
coalition in 2016, she insisted that she should lead the alliance because she had supported the 
opposition front-runner in a 2006 coalition, and it was now his turn to support her.558 This 
was despite the low likelihood of FDD success at the ballot box, the UPND’s proven levels 
of support in 2015 and the likely exchange of offers of financial incentives to encourage the 
FDD leader to join Hichilema’s campaign. This suggests firstly that politicians’ experiences 
in previous coalitions (as noted in the section on the 2006 UDA) do help to shape the 
likelihood of entering into another coalition in the future, and secondly that financial 
incentives are insufficient motivators of coalition behaviour.  
The UPND has, historically, had a very limited impact in Bemba-speaking regions. When the 
presidential election was held in 2011, the UPND received over 71% of the vote in its 
Southern Province stronghold, but took just 0.78% and 3.57% in Bemba-speaking Northern 
and Copperbelt Provinces respectively. In the 2015 and 2016 elections, three things were 
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different. The first was that the UPND campaigned extensively in the North, something that 
they did not have the resources (or incentives) to do in 2011. The second difference was that 
between 2011 and 2015, the UPND had actively courted prominent Bemba-speaking 
politicians – predominantly those marginalised within the MMD and PF – resulting in a 
powerful line-up of Northern and Copperbelt elites joining the party on the campaign trail 
in 2015 and 2016. The third was the absence of a viable Bemba party leader – someone who 
commands support in Bembaphone provinces in the way that Sata had done between 2006 
and 2014 when he died. The absence of such a leader meant that Bemba-speaking voters had 
to find another leader either from their own ethno-linguistic group or beyond it, perhaps 
from parties where one or more Bembas occupied senior or top leadership positions. Because 
of both the MMD’s implosion and the PF’s shifting internal balance of power, marginalised 
Bemba politicians from within both parties were susceptible to the UPND’s advances and 
they helped the party to rebrand and appear more diverse. Critically, a northern Bemba-
speaking former PF heavyweight – Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba – was appointed party Vice 
President and presidential running mate in 2016 after he defected from the ruling party. The 
UPND’s National Chairperson, Mutale Nalumango, was another prominent Northerner who 
had deserted the MMD a few years earlier to join the UPND. The coalition with MMD 
President Nevers Mumba and the UDF’s Miles Sampa was also used to bulk up the 
representation of Bemba-speaking politicians. These politicians campaigned almost 
exclusively in the Bemba-speaking provinces, trying to change preconceptions of the 
UPND’s mono-ethnic disposition using a range of economic, class-based and ethnic appeals 
to Bemba-speaking voters.559 By 2016, Hichilema was speaking Bemba on the campaign trail 
in Bembaphone provinces, attempting to change widespread perceptions (peddled by 
opposing politicians) that he was just a Tonga ‘tribalist.’560 At the same time – and because 
of the collapse of the MMD’s electoral viability – the UPND consolidated the anti-incumbent 
vote around the country. 
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It is clear from Figure 15 below that the polarisation of the political space into two camps 
which began with the 2015 by-election was consolidated in 2016. The MMD supported the 
UPND president and did not run their own candidate, which meant that the 2016 election 
was effectively between the PF and UPND. The third-placed candidate, Edith Nawakwi, 
received just 24 000 votes or 0.7% of the total vote. President Edgar Lungu was re-elected 
by a wafer-thin margin, making it over the new 50% threshold by 0.35% of the vote, or 13 
022 ballots.561 The difference between the tallies of the two candidates was 100 000 votes, 
with Hichilema taking 48% of the total. As noted above, the results were remarkable for the 
extent that the UPND branched out beyond its traditional base, garnering at least 6% of the 
vote in every constituency across the country and receiving 92%, 87% and 82% in Southern, 
North-Western and Western Provinces respectively. But even in provinces where the party 
had previously performed extremely poorly, Hichilema’s results were surprising. The UPND 
received 22%, 16%, 14% and 13% from Northern, Eastern, Luapula and Muchinga provinces 
respectively. Despite his ethnicity and because of his broad coalition, Hichilema consolidated 
the national anti-incumbent vote and came within inches of winning the presidency against 
a sitting incumbent. This challenges the ‘ethnic census’ model of African electoral 
behaviour,562 suggesting that voters are more open to voting for candidates outside of their 
ethno-linguistic groups than is generally recognised. This appears to confirm the research of 
Basedau and Stroh (2011) that “elite strategies, cross-cutting cleavages, and rational 
preferences” are also important drivers of voting behaviour. In Zambia in 2015 and 2016, 
the atypical coalitions that were formed through both elite inclusion and multi-party pacts 
were successful at rebranding the UPND, and enabling the party to draw on larger and more 
diverse electoral constituencies.  
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Figure 16 The 2016 Zambian Presidential Election Results of PF (green) and UPND (red) in order of 
declining vote share 
 




3.3 From Coalitions to Elite Inclusion 
Why Coalesce? 
Despite the lack of scholarly coverage, opposition coalitions – both formal and those 
characterised by elite inclusion – are a frequent feature of Zambian electoral politics. When 
opposition fragmentation allowed the unpopular ruling MMD to retain the presidency with 
less than a majority of the vote in each poll since 2001, opposition parties frequently sought 
to address this by building coalitions to bring together their diverse electoral constituencies. 
Parties in Zambia have always been perceived, to varying degrees and by various groups, to 
represent the interests of one ethno-linguistic group or region.563 Without a clear majority 
ethno-linguistic group, parties were forced to seek out cooperation with others who could 
draw on complementary constituencies to build a winning majority. But despite these 
frequent attempts to forge unity, it continued to elude the main opposition parties. 
Why Collapse? 
Politicians are aware that coalitions are likely to increase their ability to defeat the ruling party 
– and thus are mooted at every election – but they often collapsed due to vested interests at 
various levels of the party, or because of grievances formed in previous rounds of coalition 
negotiations. Crucially, the existing literature on coalitions fails to take parties seriously, 
treating them as though they are little more than vehicles for the personal political 
advancement of the party leader. While parties in Zambia are highly personalised, it is often 
at the lower echelons of the party that the most resistance to coalitions is present. This was 
the case during the 2011 Pact between the UPND and the PF – when, despite the 
complementary constituencies held by the two parties and the demographic dominance it 
allowed, the coalition was scuppered by the PF Secretary General who was concerned about 
his own position in the coalition and resulting government. While it is usually easier to 
negotiate a coalition when parties are not competing for the same seats (as was largely the 
case in 2006), the 2011 Pact shows that this can also be a fraught process, as a lack of trust 
and vested interests in both parties can lead to very public spats and the collapse of a 
promising alliance. The Kabimba Papers show that the intra-coalition competition for the 
parliamentary seats in ‘expansion zones,’ or areas where neither party has a clear claim to the 
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constituencies, can help to foment distrust and undermine the parties’ working relationship. 
Such public spats and divisions can also damage the partners to a coalition and possibly 
reduce their share of the national vote – making coalition-formation a risky and potentially-
costly exercise. 
While Arriola (2013) proposes a ‘pecuniary’ theory of coalition building where coalitions are 
only likely to be formed in countries with a liberalised financial sector, which affords 
businesspeople the independence to be able to finance opposition coalitions, this chapter 
argues that the role of finances in coalition formation are significantly more complex. 
Funding for coalitions may also come from outside the country – as in the 2015 presidential 
by-election – and even that may not be enough to persuade political elites to back the 
strongest opposition contender. In 2015, despite the financial and other incentives on the 
table, the MMD’s Rupiah Banda took his allegiance to the ruling PF while Nevers Mumba 
opted to contest the election alone, contrary to advice from within his own party. The deals 
brokered frequently involve both the exchanging of promises of future positions, and 
financial incentives – either used to fund campaigns or to ‘sweeten the deal’ and entice an 
opponent to cede their claims to a position. But whose deal is accepted is frequently a 
function of the subject’s assessment of where they are likely to receive the most benefits and 
face the lowest costs. If it appears that the ruling party is likely to lose, promises of positions 
may ring hollow and larger financial incentives may be required, or smaller opposition leaders 
may just flock to the strongest opposition candidate as they believe that having a small stake 
in the state is better than making a lucrative short-term deal to then be locked out of future 
positions within a new governing party.  
The evidence in this chapter also suggests that coalitions are easier to form when there are 
reliable indicators of party strength – as this helps parties to make more informed decisions 
as to the electoral viability of the various candidates and the potential division of future 
benefits. In 2001, most of the parties to the nascent coalition were just a few months old, 
and headed by formerly prominent politicians from the MMD government. Each party 
appeared to be well-funded, and speculation abounded regarding the electoral viability of 
each. In the absence of reliable indicators of party strength, each party leader could make 
excessive demands which ultimately scuppered the negotiations. However, after the 2001 
elections, it was apparent that the UPND was by far the most popular party in the opposition, 




and the ‘strongholds’ of each of the other parties had become apparent, making coalition 
negotiations more straightforward. In later coalitions, calculations regarding the dispersal of 
positions and benefits were made based on electoral support in the previous election – 
though several parties still made untenable demands that were unsupported by their levels of 
popular support.  
Similarly to the Ugandan case, newly-elected party leaders who have not yet competed in a 
national election are less likely to enter into multi-party coalitions in which they are not the 
leader (See Table 5). The reasons for this may vary, though it appears that they often 
overestimate their levels of popular support, and need to be accountable to their political and 
financial backers. Opposition leaders in Zambia – as outlined at the beginning of this chapter 
– have extremely fluid political allegiances, and are thus far more likely than their Ugandan 
counterparts to go into a coalition with the ruling party.  
Table 5 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Zambia, 2001-2016 
Candidate Party Election 
  2001      2006      2008 2011 2015 2016 
Levy 
Mwanawasa MMD 29.15% 42.98% -   - - - 
Anderson 
Mazoka UPND 27.20% - - - - - 
Christon 




Coalition -  - - 
Tilyenji Kaunda UNIP 10.12% Coalition -  0.36% 0.58% 0.24% 
Godfrey 
Miyanda HP 8.09% 1.57% 0.76% 0.17% 0.34% - 












Coalition - - - 
Hakainde 
Hichilema UPND - 25.32% 19.70% 18.17% 46.67% 47.63% 
Edith Nawakwi FDD - Coalition 
RP 
Coalition 0.24% 0.92% 0.65% 





Charles Milupi ADD - - -  0.94% Coalition Coalition 
Elias Chipimo NRP - - - 0.38% 0.36% - 
Edgar Lungu PF - - - - 48.33% 50.35% 
Miles Sampa UDF - - - -  - 
Coalition
** 
        
*Christon Tembo negotiated the UDA, after which the party presidency was assumed by Edith Nawakwi  
**Sampa was unsuccessful at registering as a candidate, and subsequently went into a coalition  
RP Coalition: the opposition leader went into a coalition with the incumbent or ruling party candidate  
 




As suggested by Van de Walle (2006), the increased likelihood of an electoral loss by the 
ruling party makes coalition-building easier and more stable, (as in 2015 and 2016) as elites 
flock to the strongest opposition party. But in some cases, and despite the obvious 
predominance of one party to a coalition – as was the case with the UPND after the 2015 
by-election – the leaders of smaller parties are still unwilling to enter coalitions with larger 
parties. This was the case when the FDD’s Edith Nawakwi rebuffed the advances of the 
UPND in 2016, arguing that they should instead endorse her for the presidency, even though 
the UPND had displayed its evident popularity in the 2015 election. Clearly, party leaders are 
at times motivated by interests and concerns that do not fit into the ‘rational actor’ framework 
that is generally employed to predict coalition behaviour.  
Zambia presents an interesting test case for various theories of coalition formation and 
survival. Much of the literature casually dismisses coalitions formed with small opposition 
parties who either did not exist in the previous election or received a very low vote-share. 
However, the results of the 2015 and 2016 elections – in which the UPND went into an 
alliance with two relatively electorally insignificant parties – show that in countries like 
Zambia, where ethnic representation matters, coalitions with small parties or collections of 
political notables can still have an impact on shifting voting patterns. Finally, this chapter 
highlights how parties might learn from failed coalition attempts. Following the poor 
outcomes of the 2006 and 2011 coalitions, the UPND had learnt from the PF and sought to 
employ an individualised elite inclusion strategy to circumvent complex inter-party 
negotiations. Despite the failure of the 2015 coalition between the MMD and the UPND, 
the support of the MMD MPs helped to drive the UPND’s success in the presidential by-
election, which ultimately undergirded the success of its 2016 campaign.  
 
 




4. Opposition Coordination in 
Zimbabwe’s Polarised Party System 
4.1 Introduction 
Zimbabwe is rarely mentioned by coalition scholars. The exception is the 2008 elections 
when opposition parties won more than 50% of the national vote. In so doing, they forced 
the ruling ZANU-PF to a second-round election, but if they had created a pre-electoral 
coalition, might have carried the polls in 2008 and fundamentally altered the course of 
Zimbabwean history. Since the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
in 1999, several attempts at building pre-electoral coalitions were scuppered due to resistance 
from lower echelons of opposition parties and the belief that the party could rely on a base 
of other social groups such as trade unions, activists and civil society groupings to assist in 
mobilisation efforts. As these groups have declined and their relationships with the 
opposition has soured post-2013, the MDC has become increasingly open to coalition 
formation as a mobilisation strategy. If coalitions are consistently mooted in Uganda because 
of party weakness, lack of geographical reach, weak associational mobilisation and a lack of 
resources, might party strength, national reach, strong associational mobilisation and a 
relative abundance of party resources in Zimbabwe have played a part in the MDC’s decision 
– under the leadership of Morgan Tsvangirai until his death in February 2018 – to forego 
coalition efforts ahead of the 2008 and 2013 elections? And might the shifting playing field 
– with Mugabe’s departure from power and Tsvangirai’s death and changed socio-economic 
climate – now be contributing towards greater sympathy to creating a broad opposition front 
ahead of 2018? With 6 weeks to go until the 2018 Zimbabwean elections, sections of the 
opposition have finally managed to forge a degree of unity from a now-fractured playing 
field, with more than 50 political parties and 23 presidential candidates registered to compete 
in the polls.564 
                                                 
564 ‘Zim Readies for Crunch Election... over 100 Political Parties Set to Contest’, News24, 22 May 2018, 
https://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/zim-readies-for-crunch-election-over-100-political-parties-set-
to-contest-report-20180522; Tendai Mugabe, ‘Presidential Race Breaks Record - 23 Vie for Zim’s Highest 
Office’, The Herald, 15 June 2018, https://www.herald.co.zw/presidential-race-breaks-record-%e2%80%a223-
vie-for-zims-highest-office-%e2%80%a2its-biggest-number-since-1980/. 




Despite some important differences, Zimbabwe and Uganda are similar on several key 
dimensions. Both regimes are the product of a ‘liberation struggle’, which led to military and 
intelligence elites holding significant power within the post-conflict political establishment, 
while long-serving autocrats have become increasingly intolerant of challengers to their 
continued rule.565 From independence in 1980 until President Mugabe’s removal through 
military intervention and mass protests in 2017, Zimbabwe has held regular multi-party 
elections but had only a single president and has not experienced a transition from one party 
to another. Both governments came into power with significant levels of domestic and 
international legitimacy, having defeated unpopular regimes – and both governments have 
continued to deploy this history as their key source of regime legitimation.566 As both 
countries’ ruling parties have come under increasing pressure from resurgent opposition 
parties since the early 2000s, they have stepped up both legal and extra-legal attempts to 
undermine opposition mobilisation. This was done through passing legislation that made 
opposition mobilisation more difficult, imprisoning opposition members and leaders on 
dubious grounds, deploying violence and threats of violence to undermine parties, and using 
state institutions to infiltrate and divide the opposition. This has had disastrous effects on 
intra-opposition trust, making opposition coalition formation more difficult. While in 
Uganda, there are relatively high levels of fluidity within opposition parties – with many party 
members shifting allegiance between parties – Zimbabwe presents a much more polarised 
political system where breakaway factions and independents are much less likely to succeed 
at the polls (see Section 4.1.1). This has made coalition-building an even more difficult 
prospect, as the largest opposition party can and does deride its smaller coalition partners as 
electorally insignificant. Like Uganda, opposition parties in Zimbabwe find themselves 
competing for the same voters – notably in urban areas and the opposition heartlands of 
Matabeleland – which hinders the successful formation of coalitions. This competition for 
the same voters makes compromise over joint candidates (particularly at parliamentary level) 
                                                 
565 Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds., Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008 
(Harare: Weaver Press, 2009); Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda. 
566 Terence Ranger, ‘Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation: The Struggle 
over the Past in Zimbabwe’, Journal of Southern African Studies 30, no. 2 (1 June 2004): 215–34; Reuss and 
Titeca, ‘When Revolutionaries Grow Old’. 




and the division of constituencies more difficult to attain, while a lack of trust between leaders 
and access to other avenues for electoral mobilisation limits the incentives for cooperation.  
This chapter will outline the Zimbabwean opposition’s history of fragmentation and 
subsequent coalition negotiations and offer insights into why coalition-building has so 
frequently failed. The tone for opposition coalition negotiations was set in the 2000 
parliamentary election, where smaller opposition parties requested that the newest opposition 
party – the MDC – agree not to compete against their parliamentary candidates in return for 
their support at presidential level. Unwilling to cede even a single seat, the MDC gambled 
that they would easily monopolise the opposition field, a gamble which paid off as the 
political playing field quickly consolidated into two behemoth opposing camps. The party-
based political polarisation that ensued made coalition formation difficult and costly, while 
intra-elite squabbles and competition for the same voters scuppered negotiations. 
Tsvangirai’s MDC, the darling of international donors and preferred electoral vehicle for civic 
bodies, could forego coalitions due to this support. But as the funding dried up and the party’s 
ability to count on civic actors waned after the 2013 elections, the party has increasingly 
looked to coalitional politics to regain its predominance. Ahead of the next presidential 
elections scheduled for 2018, the MDC-T has formed a coalition with key opposition players 
– notably reuniting the MDC parties that broke away in 2006 and 2014 – in the ‘MDC 
Alliance’ on 5 August 2017. This chapter will analyse the various opposition coalitions that 
were brokered in 2000, 2008 and 2013 and the key reasons for their collapse, and look ahead 
to the 2018 polls which will be contested by a broad opposition coalition.  
The Zimbabwean case contributes to the broader discussions around the importance of 
funding for pecuniary coalition building, and the role of lower-level leaders in undermining 
coalition negotiations. It will also highlight the ways in which restricted electoral mobilisation 
and funding options has forced the largest opposition party to turn to coalitional strategies 
to regain its lost momentum which peaked in the mid-2000s. 
4.1.1 Political Parties and the Logic of Coalition Formation in 
Zimbabwe 
There are two dimensions of Zimbabwean politics that need to be explored to unpack the 
dynamics of opposition politics and cross-party coalition formation. Two key cleavages 




animate Zimbabwean politics: party-based polarisation and ethnicity. This section will 
explore each of these, first describing the way in which Zimbabwe’s political landscape 
quickly became bipolar following the emergence of the MDC in 1999 and how party-
cleavages became the key locus for political action. Second, it will address the issue of 
ethnicity, which impacts on voting patterns, party support bases and inter-party coalition 
negotiations. The rest of the chapter will then outline how these two dynamics shaped 
opposition politics and the complex negotiations around pre-electoral coalitions. 
Polarisation 
Two social cleavages have influenced the bases of political parties in Zimbabwe. From the 
1980 independence elections until 1987, just two major parties existed in Zimbabwe.567 The 
Shona-dominated Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) held 60% of the 
parliamentary seats, while a Matabeleland-based Patriotic Front–Zimbabwe African People’s 
Union (PF-ZAPU) held just 20%.568 Following a counter-insurgency campaign by the ZANU 
government and the military suppression of popular dissent and PF-ZAPU in the 
Matabeleland provinces,569 PF-ZAPU was forcedly integrated into the governing ZANU in 
1987. This created a multi-ethnic dominant party system under Robert Gabriel Mugabe’s 
ZANU-PF which would rule the country virtually unchallenged until the emergence of the 
MDC as a coalition of civic groups, church bodies and trade unions in 1999.  
With the formation of the MDC, Zimbabwe’s politics in Zimbabwe coagulated into a bipolar 
system which became more polarised with each election cycle.570 This polarisation – driven 
by rhetoric, violence and ideology – became the primary constraint on the actions of political 
elites. This is driven primarily by the partisan ideological project of the ruling party, and 
attempts by the opposition to construct an alternative narrative. While in the 1980s, ZANU-
PF had mobilised the concepts of ‘reconciliation,’ ‘development,’ ‘unity’ and nationalism as 
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its legitimating discourse, its response to growing popular dissatisfaction and the economic 
crises of the 1990s that midwifed the opposition movement was to construct a new 
legitimating ideology with ‘liberation’ as its fundamental principle. As the 1990s structural 
adjustment programme began to bite and the failure of ZANU-PF to deliver economic 
development became apparent, the party reinvigorated its tried and tested appeals to 
‘nationalism’ and the selective deployment of violence against those identified as the 
‘enemies’ of the nation.571 Zimbabwe’s ruling party uses ‘revolutionary’ and ‘liberationist’ 
rhetoric to legitimate its continued rule,572 and to denigrate those who were not part of the 
liberation struggle as unworthy of holding political power. Various authors have sought to 
unpack the stark liberation nationalism constructed by ZANU-PF, and the way in which the 
‘nation’ and nationalism is conceived.573 Ranger (2004) dubbed the ruling party’s nationalist 
construction of history as ‘patriotic history;’ suggesting that the ruling party has created a 
dominant nationalist discourse in which a sympathetic reading of Zimbabwe’s past 
legitimates its rule in the present and into the future.574 Patriotic history – which emerged 
shortly before the 2002 elections – and its ideological and political projects are central to any 
understanding of contemporary Zimbabwean politics.  
Patriotic history was the ideological foundation of party polarisation. Viewing Zimbabwean 
politics through the lens of this ideological project illuminates the ways in which the ruling 
party and opposition parties battle for control by appealing to history and a legacy of 
‘struggle.’ Alternatively, as in the case of most opposition parties, these appeals are couched 
in a discourse of human rights (decried as ‘bogus universalism’ by ideologues of patriotic 
history)575 and economic deprivation. As Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012) noted, “since 
assuming power in 1980, ZANU-PF quickly penetrated the state and nation… through 
selective deployment of history, memory, and commemoration to claim uncontested political 
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legitimacy.”576 This has continued into the present, as captured in ZANU-PF’s 2013 election 
manifesto which states that:  
This People’s Manifesto is a solemn call from the fallen and living heroes of our liberation 
struggle, indeed from the wailing bones that lie in many places known and others yet to be 
discovered, for every Zimbabwean to patriotically cherish and jealously guard the gains of our 
heroic liberation struggle.577  
The manifesto goes on to denigrate external forces for the economic ills of the period, and 
to exhort Zimbabweans to go out and perform their ‘national duty’ of voting for the ruling 
party – the party that brought liberation.578 Patriotic history also polices politico-geographic 
boundaries – it glorifies (pro-ZANU-PF) rural peasants and farmers and derides (pro-
opposition) urban populations as ‘unpatriotic’, ignoring trade union and worker struggles.579 
It is precisely this construction of the nation, national history and duty that has defined 
Zimbabwe’s political discourse since 1980, but particularly since 1999 when the ZANU-PF 
came to face a more serious electoral threat in the MDC. 
The president, party and ZANU-PF-aligned intellectuals have used this constructed history 
to create a polarised national narrative of ‘patriots’ or ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘sell-outs.’580 This 
has been effectively mobilised against the threat posed by the MDC and against the much-
maligned external ‘neo-colonial’ threat posed by the interference of British, American and 
European governments in Zimbabwean affairs.581 Ndlovu-Gatsheni highlights the way in 
which the ruling party articulated and wielded the concept of chimurenga (‘legitimate’ violence 
in service of the ‘nation’) to: 
…polarize the nation, fragmenting the people of Zimbabwe into patriots, war veterans, 
puppets, traitors, sellouts, born-frees, and enemies of the nation. The category of patriots and 
veterans is reserved for those who participated in the liberation struggle in general and all 
members of ZANU-PF specifically. Members of MDC political formations are categorized as 
traitors, sellouts, and puppets who deserve to die if the Zimbabwe [sic] nation is to live.582 
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This discourse has dominated Zimbabwe’s political landscape since 2000, polarising 
Zimbabweans and even influencing scholarship on the country. Although it is relatively 
widely known and accepted that the opposition received funding from Western governments 
and government agencies in the early 2000s, this has not yet been covered in the academic 
literature. This is likely the result of fear by scholars that exploring this aspect of opposition 
politics would legitimate the ruling party’s narrative that the opposition “are not an authentic 
Zimbabwean political party but rather a creation of the U.K. and the U.S. as part of their 
neoimperialist [sic] agenda of regime change.”583 It was precisely the use of earlier academic 
histories by scholars such as Ranger that formed the (skewed) historical base of patriotic 
history, giving credence to concerns that academic research written on the topic of 
opposition party funding would be used to discredit the MDC.584 This means that a critical 
political variable – party funding – that influences opposition parties’ behaviour is left 
unexamined in the scholarship on Zimbabwe’s 21st century history. This thesis will aim to 
begin the conversation on the ways in which foreign funding influenced opposition party 
behaviour in Zimbabwe. 
But what was the role and purpose of this polarisation and the political binaries it created? 
And was it just the hegemonic narrative or was it adopted, shaped and re-deployed by 
opposition forces as well? As Adrienne LeBas (2006) argues, political polarisation served a 
distinctly political agenda for both the ruling and opposition parties – it politicised 
constituencies, increased parties’ mobilizational capacities and prevented organisational 
fragmentation.585 Polarisation forces groups (in this case parties and political actors) to define 
themselves in opposition to one another, limiting interaction and negotiation across group 
boundaries, boosting internal solidarity and silencing moderates by accusing them of 
disloyalty.586 In such polarised political circumstances, it is difficult for individuals or groups 
to claim neutrality, and the middle ground of politics is “hollowed out.”587 This is precisely 
what occurred in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2013 – political and civic actors (including 
the churches, unions, civic groups and NGO’s) were brought willingly or unwillingly into the 
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binary constructions of patriotic history and its antithesis.588 In order to counter ZANU-PF’s 
hegemonic narrative, the MDC deployed a rights-based discourse premised on political 
morality, painting members and supporters of the regime as morally corrupt. Both the MDC 
and ZANU-PF utilised political polarisation to police group boundaries and make partisan 
identities the central political cleavage. 
The two parties – ZANU-PF and MDC – resorted to ever-more confrontational tactics, using 
the rhetoric of ‘traitors,’ ‘patriots,’ legitimacy and illegitimacy to drive the distinction between 
the in-group and the out-group; the ‘us’ and the ‘them.’ Party members and sympathisers 
were policed and in turn policed others for signs of sympathy for the ‘other,’ leading to ever-
more extreme behaviour and violence meted out against those accused of disloyalty. 
Polarisation was in turn intensified by state-sponsored violence which reified the boundaries, 
increased the costs of defection and led to increased opposition radicalisation and intra-
opposition violence.589 In the face of rising state-perpetrated repression, the MDC began to 
refer to its struggle in explicitly moral terms,590 which in turn increased the polarisation of 
less-politicised civil society members and citizens into camps of ‘for’ and ‘against.’ 
Polarisation had a critical impact on reducing defections, making the party brand more 
important than the stature of local elites and reducing elite fluidity (compared to Zambia and 
Uganda).591 However, when defections occurred, the resulting parties were treated with as 
much disdain and contempt as the party’s main rival. Party polarisation would thus also have 
a decisive impact on how opposition parties perceived themselves and their ostensible 
opposition ‘allies’ – limiting the potential for negotiation and compromise during coalition 
negotiations. Equally, in the coalition negotiations with former ZANU-PF insiders who had 
defected to the opposition (or been pushed out of ZANU-PF) ahead of the 2018 elections, 
it would help to complicate bargaining. But did patriotic history serve another purpose? What 
cleavages does this selective binary seek to hide or paper over?  
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Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Muzondidya (2007) note that ethnicity is an ‘echoing silence’ within 
Zimbabwean historiography, but that despite this lacuna, “ethnicity has continued to shape 
and influence the economic, social and political life of Zimbabwe since the achievement of 
independence in 1980.”592 Ranger argues that ZANU-PF’s memorialisation of the liberation 
struggle – and posthumous valorisation of Ndebele nationalist Joshua Nkomo – also seeks 
to paper over ethnic divides. Patriotic history seeks to provide a unitary narrative of the 
nation, downplaying ethno-regional divisions and refusing to acknowledge the murder of 
approximately 20 000 Ndebele civilians in Matabeleland in the 1980s.593 Gukurahundi, as this 
campaign was known, was an anti-insurgency operation carried out by the North Korean-
trained 5th Brigade between 1983 and 1987 in the Ndebele (ZAPU) political heartlands.594 
Brian Raftopoulos argues that patriotic history attempts to “naturalize the unity of the nation 
by concealing the internal ethnic tensions within the polity and the reality of Shona political 
dominance.”595 While ethnicity is not a part of the political discourse in Zimbabwe in the way 
that it is in Kenya or Zambia, this is not to say that it is not an important – though less visible 
– motivator of political behaviour. It is commonly stated that the Zimbabwean population is 
not constituted by a multiplicity of ethnic groups like Zambia and Uganda; instead it is said 
to be made up of only two, the Shona-speaking majority (82% of the population) and a 
Ndebele-speaking minority (14% of the total population). However, this is an over-simplified 
account which overlooks the importance of intra-ethnic clan structures and minority ethnic 
groups. Zimbabwe is in fact a multi-ethnic society in which several minorities live on the 
country’s periphery. The Shangani/Tsonga/Hlengwe occupy the South-Eastern region, the 
Venda live in the South and on the border with South Africa, the Tonga people in the North 
(on Zambia’s frontier), while the Kalanga, Sotho-Tswana and Ndebele occupy the South-
West of the country.596 However, these smaller groups are often marginalised from the 
broader public discourse.  
                                                 
592 James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘“Echoing Silences’’: Ethnicity in Post-Colonial 
Zimbabwe, 1980-2007”’, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (1 January 2007): 276. 
593 Ranger, ‘Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History and the History of the Nation’, 233. 
594 For more, see ‘Report on the 1980’s Disturbances in Matabeleland & the Midlands’ (Harare: Catholic 
Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe, March 1997). 
595 As quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Rethinking “Chimurenga” and “Gukurahundi” in Zimbabwe’, 14. 
596 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Do ‘Zimbabweans’ Exist?, 97. 




Although the ‘Shona’ are often presented as a single group, they are linguistically and spatially 
dispersed into the Karanga (Southern plateau including Masvingo), Zezuru and Korekore 
(Mashonaland West, East and Central Provinces), and Manyika and Ndau in the East 
(Manicaland and Chipinge to the Mozambican border).597 A colonial-era attempt (led largely 
by missionaries) to unify linguistic dialects for education and devotional purposes led to the 
standardisation of the Shona language and contributed to the founding of a greater ethno-
regional Shona identity that stands in opposition to the greater Ndebele ethno-regional 
identity.598 Ranger (1984) and others have illustrated that the Shona sub-groups were initially 
little more than loose groupings or geo-spatial monikers, but over time and through 
administrative practice and shared history and grievance, these ‘invented’ categories became 
filled with social and political meaning.599 At the same time, the creation of colonial 
administrative units along these ethno-linguistic divisions would shape the future of the 
state’s boundaries and partly explain regional voting patterns in the post-independence state. 
The colonial state divided the country into: Matebeleland for Ndebele-speaking groups; 
Mashonaland for Zezuru-speaking Shona; Fort Victoria (later named Masvingo) for Karanga-
speaking Shona people; and Manicaland for Manyikas, incorporating other ethnic minorities 
into these units and subsuming their identities within the larger groups.600 
The supposed Shona-Ndebele binary also fails to grasp the distinctions within these groups. 
Although the Manyika people are part of the larger Shona ethno-linguistic group, they self-
identify as a distinct group.601 The Manyika (from the Manicaland region of Zimbabwe) have 
– at times – supported the opposition in significant numbers due to grievances with the ruling 
ZANU-PF which originated during the liberation struggle602 when the Manyika ZANU 
national chairman and popular nationalist – Herbert Chitepo – was killed, allegedly by ZANU 
members of Karanga and Zezuru origin.603 The Manyika have continued to feel marginalised 
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by the dominant Karanga and Zezuru groups within the ruling party and dominant ethnic 
group;604 a feeling that has been exacerbated by the violence meted out against people in the 
Marange diamond fields in Manicaland and the expropriation of all mining proceeds since 
2006 by central figures of the (Zezuru- and Karanga-dominated) ZANU-PF regime.605 The 
struggle that raged within the ruling party to succeed Mugabe in 2017 – as with previous 
succession battles and factional struggles – took on an ethnic dimension.606 While the smaller 
ethnic groups who live in the country’s hinterlands are all but ignored by the state, the major 
groups that constitute the Shona ethno-linguistic group debate amongst themselves over 
perceived state bias in appointments and cabinet positions.607 Although neither the ruling 
party nor the main opposition parties position themselves as representing the interests of one 
ethno-linguistic group – in fact both attempt to paper over ethnic difference by constructing 
a party-political binary – ethno-regional considerations certainly play into Zimbabwean 
politics.608  
History and grievance has produced a Ndebele identity which emerged amongst the people 
living in the Matabeleland regions. Their experience of state-orchestrated violence in the 
1980s and a common sense of economic and political marginalisation has produced a sense 
of unity even amongst non-co-ethnics.609 These grievances against ZANU-PF and perceived 
ethnic marginalisation by the government have led the people of Bulawayo and the 
Matabeleland provinces to repeatedly reject the ruling party at the ballot box, and this has 
turned the region into a battleground for the major opposition parties, as will be outlined 
below. While both the MDC and ZANU-PF have invested in polarising the political sphere 
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along party rather than ethnic lines, the MDC has also endeavoured (as do all opposition 
parties) to mobilise voters on the basis of political grievances which correlate with regional 
and ethnic divisions. The outcome of this will be outlined below. 
These two dimensions of Zimbabwean politics – polarisation and ethnicity – are important 
because they help to explain opposition party behaviour and to complicate coalition 
negotiation. The polarisation that began with patriotic history – which was internalised and 
redirected by the MDC – was also used against splinter factions who broke away from the 
main opposition formation (see below). This made coalition negotiation difficult, as the 
relationship between the parties, and between party leaders, was strained. Similarly, ethnicity 
and ethnic- and clan-based patterns of opposition support undermined coalition formation 
in two ways. First, perceptions of ethnic bias within the MDC prior to 2006 and within 
national politics more broadly made cross-party collaboration difficult. Second, a history of 
ethnic marginalisation produced opposition ‘strongholds’, which provided the base of the 
MDC’s electoral support. As a result, opposition parties were wary of stepping down for the 
other in the region’s parliamentary races – fearing that they would alienate their base and lose 
their positions. As noted in the introduction, when opposition parties compete for the same 
seats rather than having complementary constituencies, pre-electoral coalitions are much 
more difficult to sustain. So, while ethnicity was not necessarily a direct inhibitor of coalition 
formation (as per Arriola, 2013), it interacts with electoral patterns and intra-elite dynamics 
in ways which can (and did) undermine opposition coalition formation. The prevailing 
theories of coalition negotiation and formation also concentrate solely on the level of 
principals, failing to recognise that political parties are multi-level organisations and that 
coalitions are often formed and fractured below the level of party presidents. As will be 
outlined below, it was party actors in the upper echelons – but below the party president – 
who scuppered the coalitions in 2008 and 2013. This was done due to vested interests, 
competition over constituencies in the opposition heartlands and a fear by these party 
functionaries that they would lose their ‘special status’ within their parties and within their 
ethnic homelands. 
 




4.2 Multi-Party Coalitions – 2000-2016 
Party Formation, Fragmentation and Realignment – 2000-2006 
Currently the largest opposition party in Zimbabwe, the MDC(-T), was established in 1999 
after waves of popular protest against the regime. The party initially emerged from a multi-
stakeholder platform that included numerous actors outside of the state, which came together 
to advocate for constitutional change.610 At its launch the MDC had the backing of 
Zimbabwe’s church movements, the powerful trade union congress and the student 
movement amongst others. The party presented itself as a ‘broad church’, which incorporated 
all ‘progressive’ elements advocating for constitutional change, improved governance and 
greater respect for human rights. In its early years, the MDC grew its organisational reach on 
the back of the trade union movement and other aligned civic bodies.611 However, the party 
soon faced high levels of repression and violence from the state, which sought both to 
eradicate the new party’s structures and its sources of funding and support. It was against 
this background of obstruction and state sponsored violence that the MDC would seek to 
change the country’s government. However, a series of intended and unintended 
consequences would arise from this violence, notably the growing paranoia of the opposition 
party’s leadership and an increasingly entrenched culture of intra-party violence which would 
lead to two splits, in 2006 and 2014. It was with these former comrades that the MDC-T612 – 
led by Morgan Tsvangirai – would seek to build coalitions around the 2008, 2013 and 2018 
elections.  
In 2000, following the overwhelming success of the MDC-driven ‘No’ campaign in the 
constitutional referendum, the government rolled out its now-infamous ‘fast track land 
reform’ programme, which sought both to pacify ZANU-PF’s increasingly restless ‘war 
veterans’ and to undermine the MDC’s core funders and supporters.613 Over that period, 
approximately 12 000 MDC supporters fled from rural areas afflicted by farm invasions and 
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inter-party violence, many had been subject to arson, beatings, torture and property 
destruction.614 Similar violence against the opposition continued – and became more 
structured and coordinated – between 2000 and 2005, frequently escalating around 
elections.615 By 2002, violence against the opposition was systematic and there was a ‘seeking-
out’ of political activists, teachers and suspected MDC members by ruling party members 
and ZANU-PF’s new youth militia – the “Green Bombers.”616 Although the 2005 elections 
were characterised by lower levels of violence, the threat of violence was pervasive and 
violence continued in the months prior to the election, even if it decreased at election time.617 
Following the election, in May 2005, the government carried out Operation Murambatsvina 
(‘clearing the filth’) which destroyed the homes of an estimated 600 000 urban dwellers, 
apparently in retaliation for widespread urban support for the MDC.618 The emerging party’s 
support base was predominantly urban; in 2005, the MDC had swept all the seats in Bulawayo 
and all but one of the urban seats in the country’s capital – Harare – winning 80% and 76% 
of the total vote respectively.619 
In response to this violence meted out against the opposition and its supporters, the MDC’s 
leadership became increasingly paranoid. They became suspicious of party members who 
they suspected might have been ‘planted’ by the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) to 
                                                 
614 LeBas, 194. 
615 ‘Organised Violence and Torture in the June 2000 General Election in Zimbabwe’ (Bulawayo: Amani 
Trust, 28 February 2002), http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/hr/amani_ovt2002_020228.pdf; Justice Sisi 
Khampepe and Justice Dikgang Moseneke, ‘Report on the 2002 Presidential Elections of Zimbabwe’, 2002, 
https://cdn.mg.co.za/content/documents/2014/11/14/reportonthe2002presidentialelectionsofzimbabwe.pd
f; ‘Beating Your Opposition: Torture during the 2002 Presidential Campaign in Zimbabwe’ (Bulawayo: Amani 
Trust, 25 June 2002), http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/hr/amani020625.pdf. 
616 LeBas, From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa, 194. 
617 Grant Masterson and Maureen Moloi, ‘Political Violence and Intimidation in Zimbabwe’s 2005 
Parliamentary Elections’ (Johannesburg: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, 10 May 2005), 
http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/elec/050510eisa3.asp?sector=ELEC&year=2005&range_start=31; 
Karin Alexander and Brian Raftopoulos, ‘A Long-Term Analysis of the 2005 Parliamentary Election and Its 
Implications for Democratic Processes in Zimbabwe’ (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 
July 2005), 6, 
http://archive.kubatana.net/html/archive/elec/050701ijr.asp?sector=ELEC&year=2005&range_start=31#d
ownload. 
618 ‘Hoping without Hope: Murambatsvina – Ten Years On’ (Durban: Ukuthula Trust & Solidarity Peace 
Trust, October 2015), 23, http://www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/download/report-
files/Hope%20without%20hope%206%20october%202015.pdf. 
619 Alexander and Raftopoulos, ‘A Long-Term Analysis of the 2005 Parliamentary Election and Its 
Implications for Democratic Processes in Zimbabwe’, 19. 




undermine the party.620 As a result, the MDC became less tolerant of dissent and clamped 
down on perceived internal threats to its leadership. Already by late 2005, Raftopoulos noted 
concerning trends within the opposition movement – that it had begun to develop a political 
culture reminiscent of that found in the ruling ZANU-PF.621 As a result of debates within the 
party over the merits of political and electoral participation versus mass action in a context 
of shrinking democratic space – which played out largely between the President and the 
Secretary-General – a faction cohered around the party’s president, Morgan Tsvangirai, 
which constructed a parallel structure for mobilisation.622 This integrated and formalised 
activist groups that were formed earlier, such as the ‘Drug Section’ – a self-protection and 
mobilisation unit formed in the high density suburb of Mabvuku.623 Adrienne LeBas (2005) 
described the parallel structures as a “shadowy party structure… designed to facilitate top-
down organising and speedy response to orders from national leadership.”624 The parallel 
structures were also used to mobilise violence against MDC members and enforce party 
discipline, a fact which first emerged in 2004 with the beating of party officials at the party’s 
headquarters.625 Violent incidents intensified in 2005, and were a significant driver of the split 
that occurred in February 2006626 when MDC Secretary General Welshman Ncube led his 
faction’s attempted expulsion of Tsvangirai and then formed a breakaway MDC party.627 
Following this split, violence was again meted out against Tsvangirai’s critics, after which the 
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party again failed to address the key drivers of the use of violence by party cadres.628 Such 
violent incidents continued in the years leading up to the next elections scheduled for July 
2018.629 They contributed to another split between Secretary General Tendai Biti and 
Tsvangirai in 2014 when the former was identified as part of a faction calling for the latter’s 
resignation following the MDC-T’s disastrous performance in the 2013 elections.630 
4.2.1 Mooted Coalitions for the 2000 Election 
Coalition Negotiation 
Prior to the emergence of the MDC, there were several other small opposition parties in 
Zimbabwe that had a limited impact during the elections held in 1990 and 1995. When the 
MDC was formed in 1999, only one of these small parties formally disbanded and joined the 
MDC. The rest – led by Margaret Dongo’s Zimbabwe Union of Democrats (ZUD) – 
proposed an electoral pact with the MDC ahead of the 2000 parliamentary elections.631 The 
pact was to include the United Parties, ZANU-Ndonga (a ‘regional’ party which mobilised 
the Ndau sub-group) and the small Liberty Party. The agreement offered to the MDC was to 
work together on the condition that they did not compete against the other parties’ candidates 
in several constituencies. LeBas (2011) suggests that the MDC refused to agree to the deal as 
they did not see the parties as attractive coalition partners (they lacked popular constituencies) 
and such a deal was incompatible with the MDC’s process of locally-based party 
nominations.632 It is also likely that the MDC was over-confident due to its historic defeat of 
ZANU-PF’s draft constitution a few months earlier and the new party was keen to test their 
wings alone. The MDC was unwilling to cede too much to other parties for an uncertain 
reward. This strategy paid off – the MDC delivered an astounding result in the parliamentary 
elections, capturing 47% of the national vote and winning 57 of 120 seats. As noted in the 
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chapters on Zambia and Uganda, it is common for new parties and parties with new 
leadership to forego coalitions to test their electoral viability. 
Surprisingly for such a recently-established party, the MDC ran candidates in every one of 
Zimbabwe’s 120 electoral constituencies; this was the result of impressive grassroots 
organising by the party’s backers and constituent elements (notably the trade unions and 
National Constitutional Assembly) in the year before the 2000 election. The party’s support 
was most concentrated in the urban provinces of Harare and Bulawayo as well as the two 
Matabeleland provinces – though the party also won at least 30% of the vote in four of 
Zimbabwe’s remaining six provinces.633 The decision to forego the electoral alliance with the 
other opposition parties did not harm the MDC but did displace the smaller parties, whose 
collective vote share, together with independents, dropped from about 20% in 1995 to less 
than 5% in 2000. ZANU-Ndonga won just two seats, while all other opposition formations 
failed to secure a single seat. The party system had begun its partisan and ethno-regional 
polarisation, as can be seen in Figure 17 below.  This election result – and the predominance 
of the MDC within the opposition field – would set the tone for politics for the next decade. 
These results stand in stark contrast with the 2001 election result in Zambia where opposition 
fragmentation (the largest party won just 29% of the vote) set in motion successive cycles of 
coalition formation as opposition parties endeavoured to build working coalitions in each 
subsequent election. Following the ascendance of the MDC in 2000, smaller parties largely 
fell by the wayside and fewer independent candidates ran in each election as the party system 
became increasingly polarised into two competing blocs. This would have a lasting impact 
on coalition politics by contributing to an over-confidence on the part of the MDC that they 
could win elections on the back of their trade union support – and without the assistance of 
smaller parties. 
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Figure 17 The 2000 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election Results by Constituency634 
The polarisation that began in 2000 was consolidated by the 2002 presidential elections. 
Although there were five contenders to the presidency – including ZANU-Ndonga – no 
other political party outside of the MDC and ZANU-PF won in a single constituency across 
Zimbabwe. Although five presidential candidates ran in the polls, just two – Mugabe and 
Tsvangirai – shared 98.2% of the vote. The third-placed candidate from ZANU-Ndonga 
received just 1%. It does not appear that any attempts were made to include the smaller 
parties within the MDC fold, and so no alliances were brokered for the 2002 election. The 
election was marred by intimidation, violence, pro-ZANU media dominance and the 
reduction of polling stations in urban areas, which created long queues and suppressed urban 
voter turnout.635 Despite this, President Mugabe garnered just 56% of the vote to Tsvangirai’s 
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42%. The remaining 1.8% of the vote was split between the three other contenders. 
Approximately 85% of the president’s support came from the predominantly rural provinces 
of Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Masvingo, Midlands and 
Manicaland.636 A week after the election and due to intimidation, violence and a deeply flawed 
electoral process, the governments of Nigeria and South Africa first proposed the creation 
of a government of national unity, and Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth 
for a year.637  
 
Figure 18 The 2002 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency 638 
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The 2005 parliamentary elections – as suggested in the previous section – were less coercive 
than those that came before them. This was partly because of the SADC intervention, and 
due to ZANU-PF’s attempts to regain some legitimacy following particularly violent polls in 
2002.639 It was during and after the 2002 elections that patriotic history became a strong 
feature of ZANU-PF’s electoral mobilisation. Although violence diminished significantly in 
2005, ZANU-PF ramped up its rhetoric around the ‘conspiracy’ between the MDC, NGOs 
and foreign ‘imperialists’ – notably the Tony Blair and George W. Bush administrations – to 
effect what the party termed an “illegal regime change agenda.”640 In this vein, the ruling 
party’s 2005 election manifesto stated that: 
As the ZANU PF Government decisively implemented its bold land reform programme, the 
western world led by the Blair Administration began to build and sponsor opposition to the 
Party, Government and the Land Reform Programme. Apart from the MDC itself, the 
imperialist world launched and sponsored phoney non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
which in reality were disguised opposition, to fight ZANU PF… In both the June 2000 general 
election and the 2002 Presidential poll, they organized and campaigned for the MDC, using 
their pseudo-humanitarian face and the abundant resources made available to them through 
organisations like the British Westminster Foundation, to penetrate, inveigle and subvert 
communities into supporting the opposition.641 
As noted in previous sections, elements of civil society such as the constitutional movement, 
the student movement, the unions and certain community-based organisations, were critical 
to the MDC’s formation and mobilisation machinery. In the 2005 elections, they again 
assisted in campaigning for the party. But, besides the party’s civic allies, the MDC received 
support from other sympathetic groups. 
The Donors 
Although ZANU-PF’s accusations against the opposition and foreign governments were 
used to denigrate and delegitimise the opposition in the eyes of voters, it is now apparent 
that the MDC was receiving support from embassies, donor agencies and political 
foundations.642 The nature of this aid was qualitatively and quantitatively different from ‘party 
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strengthening’ programmes run in other African countries. This assistance came in several 
guises – first in ‘kind’ in terms of election advisors, technical expertise and training from US 
government agencies643 and USAID-supported groups (largely the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI)). Second, in terms of strategic advice 
from foreign embassies;644 and finally, in the form of more direct financial assistance.645 The 
IRI and NDI – apparently funded at least in part by USAID646 – began working with the 
MDC from about 2000, providing extensive training, skills development and strategic 
advice.647 The IRI also worked to build Tsvangirai’s personal brand, beginning in the early 
2000s and working until 2011 to help build him as a counterpoint to Mugabe and the ‘face’ 
and focal point of the MDC.648 The WikiLeaks cables are replete with references to trainings 
run by the IRI on communications, strategy, policy formulation and negotiation tactics.649 
The work of the IRI and NDI with the opposition quickly raised the ire of ZANU-PF, and 
they resolved as early as 2000 to conduct most of their activities with the MDC from outside 
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the country.650 Ahead of the 2013 election, the IRI was forced to operate using even more 
‘covert’ tactics from neighbouring South Africa.651  
The actual financial assistance provided to the MDC by donor governments and foreign 
embassies is somewhat more complex.652 There are references in WikiLeaks that suggest that 
the United States government was providing funding to the MDC, either directly or through 
third parties.653 In a 2007 cable which details a meeting between Arthur Mutambara and US 
Ambassador Dell, the ambassador notes: 
[Mutambara] said that resources were tight and inquired about USG support. The Ambassador 
responded that although the USG could not provide direct financing it could assist the 
opposition indirectly through an umbrella coalition such as “Save Zimbabwe.”654   
In the US Embassy’s post-2005 election review cable, the post noted that the key lesson 
learned for the US government following the MDC’s electoral loss, was that “we need to 
provide sufficient and sustained resources to the democratic forces in Zimbabwe to achieve 
meaningful change.”655 One way of doing this was to provide resources to the MDC through 
civic groups. The Institute for a Democratic Alternative for Zimbabwe (IDAZIM) was one 
such organisation, which ultimately became a conduit to funnel donor funds to the 
opposition.656 A former Zimbabwean Senior Governance Advisor to USAID also outlined 
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the way in which he and other Zimbabwean activists and aid/embassy workers ensured that 
funds were channelled to and through civil society, with NGO’s encouraged to siphon off 
funds for activities and equipment and redirect them to the MDC.657 He (and other highly-
placed civil society leaders) suggest that this was done with the implicit or explicit support of 
embassies and agencies. The secrecy around the provision of resources to the party meant 
that it was difficult to account for significant portions of these donor funds, so embassies 
and agencies faced a quandary when trying to trace money that was also siphoned off for 
personal use by civic and party actors.658 This would, in part, lead to significant reductions in 
donor funds and ‘blacklisting’ of particular civic leaders prior to and after the 2013 elections. 
As well as funding the opposition through NGOs, these foreign agencies and governments 
increasingly channelled resources to NGOs and civil society bodies, to assist in the broad 
anti-ZANU-PF fight. This funding, coupled with the economic crisis and shrinking economic 
opportunities for middle class and poor Zimbabweans alike produced distortions in civil 
society, or what Zeilig (2008) refers to as a ‘donor syndrome.’659 As these organisations saw 
a massive influx of funds – largely for programming related to governance, accountability, 
reforms and elections – grassroots activism and civic struggles became commodified, paid 
for by donor funds. Few people would attend meetings, workshops or events without per 
diems or sitting allowances, and the leadership of civics became increasingly concerned with 
maintaining their positions – and thus their lifestyles – than with the risks involved in 
genuinely holding government to account. As donors – and particularly those linked to the 
US government – invested more in the MDC’s success, civic leaders who criticised the 
opposition found their positions and funding at risk, leading to self-censorship and a lack of 
critical engagement. Following the MDC’s loss in the 2005 parliamentary elections, the US 
Embassy in Harare resolved to take a firmer line on NGO’s to ensure that they played a 
supportive role to the major opposition party, noting: 
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Another lesson we should take away from this election is that we need to take a more active 
role in fostering coordination among the democratic forces, using our leverage as the key 
donor.  The middle ground in Zimbabwe remains extremely thin and if elements of the church 
or organized labor again choose to sit on the fence, additional USG support to them should 
be curtailed. Instead, support should flow to enlightened, committed, non-violent, but activist, 
civil society groups, key regional partners, the more progressive elements in organized religion 
and labor.660 
This appears to have been translated into policy at a local level after 2005, as several civil 
society leaders interviewed in Harare and Bulawayo noted that funding became increasingly 
dependent on the grantee’s proximity to the MDC-T.661  
There is some debate as to how much centralised planning there was in the upper echelons 
of the embassies and donor bodies regarding the diversion of funds to the MDC-T 
(particularly after 2005), but it is certain that what was known, was either sanctioned or 
ignored – until 2013.662 During an interview with an Harare-accredited Western diplomat in 
Johannesburg in May 2017, the diplomat offered that it was now “established fact” that 
certain Western embassies had been channelling funding to the MDC or MDC-aligned CSOs 
(with the implicit or explicit aim to redistribute funds to the party).663 A Western diplomat in 
Kampala had referred to these Zimbabwean diplomats as “activist ambassadors” and noted 
that Western embassies had been burned quite badly in the resulting backlash from their 
interventions in the Zimbabwean electoral process. This had gone on to inform Western 
embassies’ more cautious approach to other countries undergoing democratic backsliding – 
such as Uganda. 
The 2005 Election 
No coalitions were mooted for the 2005 election, as the playing field had clearly consolidated 
into just two camps. The polls saw an apparent reduction in support for the MDC; they saw 
their parliamentary seats decline to 41, from 57 in the 2000 polls. There had been some debate 
within the opposition party with regards to participation in the election. The party had 
previously resolved not to participate in another electoral process until the ruling party 
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complied with the SADC guidelines.664 But it came under pressure from external allies, 
regional governments and internal forces to participate, and ultimately did so because of the 
lack of a coherent boycott strategy. This caused some friction with their civic allies – 
particularly the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) – who had resolved that in the 
absence of electoral reforms, the opposition should boycott the polls. Prior to the election, 
the MDC leadership was also fragmented into camps organised around Secretary General 
Welshman Ncube and President Tsvangirai – and there were escalating tensions around 
ethnicity and tensions between the trade unionists (such as Tsvangirai) and the intellectuals 
(such as Ncube).665 These issues led the party to enter the 2005 election season under severe 
strain. However, once the election campaign began, a feeling of hope again emerged.666 The 
official results announced after the 31 March 2005 elections are widely believed to have been 
exaggerated in ZANU-PF’s favour.667  
Succession politics within ZANU-PF was charged by dissatisfaction over the increasing 
influence of the Zezuru faction (headed by Mugabe) within the ruling party;668 which allowed 
the MDC to make some inroads in rural areas – notably in the Karanga homelands of 
Midlands and Masvingo provinces.669 At the same time, the MDC consolidated gains in the 
Matebeleland provinces. But still, the MDC won 16 fewer seats in 2005 than it had in 2000, 
declining from 57 to 41 seats in the 150-seat parliament. The party’s bruising loss set up an 
internal battle that manifested along leadership, ideological, ethnic, strategic and generational 
lines.670 Although five parties ran in the elections, ZANU-PF and the MDC shared 99.1% of 
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the total vote. While 15 independents ran, just one (former ZANU-PF minister, Jonathan 
Moyo) managed to win their seat. 
 
Figure 19 The 2005 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election Results by Constituency 
The MDC’s First Split 
As noted above, in 2006 – shortly after the 2005 election and the internal dissent that it 
helped to foster – the MDC experienced a damaging split. The split occurred between two 
camps; one group consisted of the ‘moderates’ who had rallied behind the Ndebele Secretary 
General Ncube. This faction was largely made up of professionals, academics, the leaders of 
various civic groups and the ‘moderates’ who preferred to take electoral disputes to the courts 
rather than the streets.671 The more radical faction that cohered around Shona party President 
Tsvangirai were largely comprised of former trade unionists who preferred a ‘mass action’ 
approach to resolving disputes and included the key members of his so-called ‘kitchen 
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cabinet.’672 Divisions had been deepening for some time, as evidenced by the intra-MDC 
violence noted above that first occurred in 2004, and the party’s leadership had become 
increasingly divided along ethno-regional and anti-intellectual/intellectual lines.673 A later 
inquiry into the violence found that the party leadership had been fuelling ethnic tensions, 
contributing to the “strong anti-Ndebele sentiment that has been propagated, orchestrated 
and instilled into the innocent party members’ minds by a senior party leader under the guise 
of sheer hatred for the Secretary General at a personal level.”674 Differences in strategy and 
personality between Tsvangirai and Ncube were constructed in both ethnic and anti-
intellectual terms, and exacerbated by the parallel structures that were no longer accountable 
to the party’s institutional centre. The split was widely seen as the product of Shona-Ndebele 
rivalry,675 and the resulting parties were more ethnically exclusive than the united MDC had 
been. 
This division ultimately manifested in a split in early 2006 following a debate within the party 
over whether or not to participate in the elections for the newly-created Senate.676 On 12 
October 2005, the MDC National Executive Council (NEC) voted 33 to 31 to participate in 
the elections. Tsvangirai vetoed the decision, accusing Ncube’s pro-Senate faction of bribery 
and ballot-stuffing.677 Although the pro-Senate faction ultimately conceded, seven MDC 
branches (primarily in Ncube-supporting Matabeleland Provinces) defied Tsvangirai and 
fielded candidates to the Senate elections. The two groups traded insults in the media and 
campaign rallies in Mashonaland East and Bulawayo ended in tussles between the two 
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factions.678 After the results of the damaging 2005 election became public, the pro-Senate 
faction accused Tsvangirai of de-campaigning the party and suspended him. In return, 
Tsvangirai’s faction suspended members of the pro-Senate faction and the split became 
official after the two factions held their own party congresses in February and March 2006.679 
The pro-Senate faction – headed by Ncube and made up predominantly of leaders from the 
Matabeleland regions – opted to choose a Shona leader, former student activist Arthur 
Mutambara, to maximise its national appeal.680 This faction retained the original name of the 
MDC. The Tsvangirai faction, who renamed themselves MDC-T (for Tsvangirai) repeatedly 
attacked the ‘MDC-M’681 in the press – accusing them of being in cahoots with the CIO and 
South African President Thabo Mbeki.682 The split between the two factions of the MDC 
would make the 2008 elections a difficult one – MDC-M was widely seen as a Ndebele party 
– with 20 seats (predominantly from Ndebele-speaking regions), while the MDC-T held 21 
seats. It was under these circumstances that the opposition would face the 2008 election, 
unless the two could broker a reconciliation – or at least a coalition – to prevent electoral 
fragmentation and the continued stay in power of Mugabe’s ZANU-PF.  
In her book chapter on ‘polarisation as craft,’ LeBas describes how both the MDC and 
ZANU-PF invested in political polarisation to build their brands, using the other as a foil 
against which to be projected as ‘hero’; either liberator or democrat.683 In doing so, the MDC 
and ZANU-PF made defection expensive. However, following the 2006 split, the Tsvangirai 
faction did not just aim its polarising rhetoric at the ruling party, but also branded 
Mutambara’s MDC as ‘sell outs’ and ‘traitors.’  In doing so, they sought to project themselves 
as the ‘real MDC’ and the only legitimate opposition, thus making reconciliation and even 
alliance-building a nearly-impossible exercise. This polarisation infused all levels of the party, 
and occasionally manifested in violence perpetrated by grassroots activists who accused the 
Mutambara MDC of being ‘sellouts’ and ‘political prostitutes.’684 The MDC-T’s derision 
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towards the MDC-M mirrored the narrative previously deployed by ZANU-PF against the 
MDC. The breakaway faction was derided as ‘sellouts’ and ‘traitors,’ from the top echelons 
of the party685 to the MDC’s grassroots youth activists.686 This rhetoric – and the violence 
that accompanied it – would make cross-faction reconciliation and alliance building 
particularly difficult ahead of the 2008 and 2013 elections. 
4.2.2 Coalition Negotiations Ahead of the 2008 Election 
Coalition Formation 
Following Mutambara’s ascent to the leadership of the MDC’s pro-Senate faction, his 
conversations with the US embassy in Harare suggested that he was in favour of reuniting 
the divided opposition.687 Soon thereafter, his discussions of reunification turned to promises 
of a coalition to be built ahead of the next elections.688 Negotiations to form a coalition 
between the two MDC formations began in earnest in August 2006689 but ground to a halt in 
late May 2007. While the MDC-T was widely acknowledged to have greater grassroots 
support than the Mutambara faction, the two sides were at near parliamentary parity with 21 
and 20 legislators in their respective camps.690 The MDC-M’s legislators were all from the 
three Matabeleland provinces, while the MDC-T’s parliamentarians had much greater 
national spread. The Mutambara faction decided in the wake of the split that it would 
concentrate on winning support in the Matebeleland regions – all but ceding Mashonaland 
to Tsvangirai – to ensure that neither the MDC-T nor ZANU-PF could win in the Ndebele-
speaking regions without its support.691 However, the personal animosity between Tsvangirai 
and his former deputy, Ncube, would make reaching an agreement extremely difficult.692  
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Unlike in coalition negotiations in Uganda and Zambia, there was little debate over who 
should head the mooted coalition. It was decided in negotiations over Easter 2007 that the 
two factions would create a coalition that would front Tsvangirai as the flagbearer and 
Mutambara would be sworn in as national vice-president in the event of an election victory. 
The two parties agreed to share portfolios and ministerial positions with the MDC-T having 
an advantage of an extra three. On the modalities of cooperation during the election, the 
parties agreed to allow each side to run unopposed by the other faction in the constituencies 
that they held at the time, while there would be equity in the selection of candidates in 
ZANU-PF held constituencies.693 Following this discussion, the MDC-T shifted the 
goalposts by presenting a new agreement, which called for two vice presidents (one from 
each faction) and an electoral college to select candidates. Mutambara’s faction opposed this 
move as they suggested that the electoral college would prove unwieldy and would be 
vulnerable to CIO infiltration. Equally, the electoral college would mean that all parliamentary 
candidates would be subject to a nominating process – including those seats currently held 
by the Mutambara faction – which would mean that there were no ‘safe’ or guaranteed seats 
for either faction.694 This would work in favour of the MDC-T, which had stronger grassroots 
support and more extensive organisational machinery (including the support of organised 
labour and the civic movement). 
Despite the troubles within the negotiations, Mutambara emphasised to embassy officials 
that the opposition would have to achieve unity if they were to defeat ZANU-PF in the 
upcoming elections.695 This was a narrative that was consistently repeated over a period of 
approximately 18 months and 5 rounds of coalition negotiations. Finally, during the fifth 
attempt at building a coalition, the two MDC factions appeared to reach an accommodation 
between 18-20 January 2008. The negotiations were funded by the Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa (IDASA) and chaired by Zimbabwean activist academic, Professor Brian 
                                                 
693 ‘Mdc Talks Break Down’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Zimbabwe Harare, 30 May 2007), 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HARARE474_a.html. 
694 ‘Welshman Ncube on Sadc Negotiations, Mdc Split’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy 
(Zimbabwe Harare, 2 August 2007), https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HARARE685_a.html; 
‘Ambassador’s Meeting with MDC’s Tsvangirai’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Zimbabwe 
Harare, 24 April 2007), https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HARARE344_a.html. 
695 ‘Mdc Faction Leader Arthur Mutambara: Mdc Unity Necessary’, Wikileaks Public Library of US 
Diplomacy (Zimbabwe Harare, 5 February 2007), 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HARARE92_a.html. 




Raftopoulos.696 Each of the MDCs were represented by ten members, headed by their 
respective Secretaries General – Tendai Biti (MDC-T) and Ncube (MDC-M). The parties 
agreed to front joint candidates at presidential, parliamentary and local government level.697 
According to the agreement, Tsvangirai would be the MDC coalition presidential candidate, 
while Mutambara would contest a ‘safe’ parliamentary seat in Harare.698  
Coalition Collapse 
But this neat deal was scuppered by the MDC-T’s intransigence over just two seats in 
Bulawayo. It was agreed that the MDC-T would contest 70% of the seats in seven of the 
country’s ten provinces, while the Mutambara faction would be entitled to 70% of the seats 
in Bulawayo, Matabeleland North and South. The parties also agreed that they would each 
contest the seats that they had held prior to the election – and any other opposition 
candidates for those seats would be required to cede their candidacy. The agreement was 
reached by Biti and Ncube, but the MDC-T’s national council refused to ratify the agreement 
and pushed for a renegotiation over two seats in Bulawayo.699 Following the MDC-M’s 
unwillingness to cede these two seats, the MDC-T pushed for parity in the three Matabeleland 
provinces, effectively killing the coalition.700 The MDC-T’s inflexibility was pushed by the 
party’s Bulawayo faction, who refused to concede their positions in the opposition-
sympathetic province. 
The larger MDC sought “to establish its dominance in both its existing areas of support and 
in those areas claimed as strongholds by the MDC Mutambara”701 – this was particularly the 
case in the western Matabeleland regions where the MDC had previously won with large 
majorities, and from where many of the Mutambara MDC’s most notable leaders came.702 
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This intransigence was driven by key Ndebele leaders within the MDC-T who did not want 
to cede ground to the MDC-M and risk losing their profile in their home region. MDC-M 
Senator, David Coltart, noted that the issue of the two seats was just the ‘proximate cause’ 
of the collapse of negotiations, and that the deeper reason was that both party leaders 
believed that they could do a lot better on their own.703 This was corroborated by Biti who 
contends that both party leaders felt that they were doing each other “a favour,” which 
contributed to both parties digging in and refusing to concede in order to achieve a successful 
coalition.704 Both sides were over-confident, based on misplaced perceptions of party 
strength. Evidence from WikiLeaks suggests that foreign embassies (particularly the US 
embassy) – who by 2007 were providing logistical and other support – were more supportive 
of the MDC-T, and didn’t believe that Mutambara’s party were a major electoral factor (see 
below).705 This external support exacerbated the MDC-T’s intransigence, as they believed 
that, with the support of their external allies and the key civic bodies, they had little need to 
ally themselves with the MDC-M. 
While the MDC was supported and funded by foreign embassies and government bodies – 
either directly or indirectly through third parties – the MDC-M apparently received little 
funding and was held in low esteem by foreign diplomats. This passage in US Ambassador 
Dell’s farewell address in 2007 is emblematic of various embassy administrations’ thinking 
on the leadership of the MDC-M:  
Arthur Mutambara is young and ambitious, attracted to radical, anti-western rhetoric and smart 
as a whip. But, in many respects he’s a light-weight who has spent too much time reading U.S. 
campaign messaging manuals and too little thinking about the real issues. Welshman Ncube 
has proven to be a deeply divisive and destructive player in the opposition ranks and the sooner 
he is pushed off the stage, the better. But he is useful to many, including the regime and South 
Africa, so is probably a cross to be borne for some time yet.706 
                                                 
703 Interview, David Coltart, Former MDC-N Minister of Education under the Inclusive Government, 15 
April 2015. 
704 Interview, Tendai Biti, Former MDC-T Secretary General and Finance Minister. 
705 ‘Flagging Pro-Senate Mdc Faction Writes Off Electoral Loss, Requests Usg Help’, Wikileaks Public Library 
of US Diplomacy (Zimbabwe Harare, 13 June 2006), 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06HARARE698_a.html; ‘Stevenson Attack Trial Commences’, 
Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy (Zimbabwe Harare, 19 July 2006), 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06HARARE918_a.html; ‘Mdc Reconciliation Fails’. 
706 ‘The End Is Nigh’. 




The US Embassy in Harare’s disdain for the MDC-M and belief in the MDC-T is evident in 
the WikiLeaks cables, where the Ambassador advises that the US State Department receive 
Mutambara during a visit to the USA “at a level lower than Tsvangirai.”707 This preferential 
treatment afforded to the MDC-T by donor governments helped to create resentment and 
entrench animosity between the two MDC factions, making it more difficult to reach a 
rapprochement.  
A Third Candidate 
While the MDC was negotiating around the upcoming election, there were wrangles within 
the ruling party and factions moving against President Mugabe. ZANU-PF insiders including 
Jonathan Moyo and Ibbo Mandaza (both former CIO operatives with then-contentious 
relationships with Mugabe)708 were trying to foment a coalition within ZANU-PF to 
challenge Mugabe’s candidacy in the 2008 election. The candidate was to be ZANU-heavy-
weight and politburo member Simbarashe Makoni, a former Minister of Finance and well-
respected politician both at home and abroad.709 Makoni also allegedly had the backing of a 
number of party heavyweights including Solomon and Joice Mujuru (a ZANU-PF power 
couple who had been angling to succeed Mugabe) and Dumiso Dabengwa, (a highly 
respected Ndebele lieutenant of Joshua Nkomo’s ZIPRA who had joined ZANU-PF under 
the 1987 unity accord).710 The ruling party was deeply divided, with cracks emerging around 
the issue of leadership succession and the ever-worsening economic crisis, which included 
unprecedented hyperinflation. Members of the South African government, including 
Intelligence Minister Ronnie Kasrils, also appeared – according to Wikileaks cables – to be 
engaged in destabilising ZANU-PF.711  
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The negotiations amongst political groupings in Harare appeared to escalate as the election 
drew nearer – with extensive dialogue occurring across highly polarised party lines. Intra-
party consensus seemed to be collapsing, and factions were seeking solutions to the crisis 
that breached the country’s deep political divides.712 While the two MDC factions were 
negotiating over the formation of an electoral coalition, Mutambara’s party had also held 
discussions with factions in ZANU-PF regarding a potential pact, and the Tsvangirai 
grouping had been in negotiations with the Mujuru faction of the ruling party.713 There had 
also been a series of secret meetings between the key players in the Makoni camp and the 
Mutambara faction, who were eager to forge an alliance with either Makoni or Tsvangirai due 
to their limited resources and mobilisation capacity.  
A Second Coalition? 
Following the collapse of the MDC negotiations in January 2008 and Simba Makoni’s 
announcement that he would stand as an independent (under the banner of 
Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn) on 5 February, both MDC factions intensified discussions with 
the former ZANU-PF insider.714 The US embassy expressed serious misgivings about what 
would happen if Makoni and Tsvangirai ran separate campaigns, they believed that the two 
would split the urban and Mashonaland vote and ultimately benefit Mugabe.715 Makoni 
needed the support from either the Mutambara or Tsvangirai MDC as it was just two months 
to the election and he had few existing party structures; equally he needed to supplement his 
supposed support bases in the traditional heartlands of ZANU-PF (the Mashonaland 
provinces) with support in other regions. By contrast, both the MDC factions had relatively 
developed structures and much of their support derived from the Matabeleland provinces – 
which largely display an anti-ZANU-PF bias due to historical grievances over the liberation 
war and 1980s Gukurahundi atrocities. While Makoni’s entry into the race is widely reported 
to have created a real air of expectation and excitement – not least prompting speculation 
                                                 
712 ‘Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate?’ 
713 ‘Zanu-Pf Official on Current Political and Economic Situation’, Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy 
(Zimbabwe Harare, 17 August 2007), https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HARARE736_a.html. 
714 ‘The Simba Makoni Factor’. 
715 ‘The Simba Makoni Factor’. 




about much broader levels of dissent within ZANU-PF – it also raised the stakes within 
opposition camps.  
A broad opposition alliance comprising the two MDC factions and the Makoni camp was 
expected to be almost unbeatable, though US embassy officials were concerned that an 
alliance would not be achievable in such a short time frame, and that a divided opposition 
would instead split the vote.716 In a meeting relayed to the American ambassador by a party 
source, the meetings between Tsvangirai and Makoni led to each trying to highlight the 
reasons why they should be the coalition candidate. Makoni argued that registration of voters 
in the Mashonaland provinces had jumped significantly since he had announced his 
candidacy, while Tsvangirai maintained that Makoni was an unproven entity who was too 
risky a bet to front the coalition. Publicly, the MDC-T leader referred to Makoni as “old wine 
in new bottles”, while privately expressing scepticism regarding his support base.717 
According to a later discussion between the American ambassador in Pretoria and MDC 
Treasurer Roy Bennet, Tsvangirai was open to an alliance but expressed that he would not 
subordinate himself to the former ZANU insider and would not even accept an alliance 
without guarantees that Makoni could bring the support of the military to the table.718 This 
is an interesting parallel to the coalition mediation between Besigye and Mbabazi in Uganda 
– where an unproven, recently-defected regime insider is the coalition favourite, but the 
leader of the largest opposition party (with obvious vested interests) refuses to allow them to 
stand as the candidate due to their unproven support base. This was surprisingly not the case 
in Tanzania in 2015 as, following the Ukawa alliance’s commissioning of a special report into 
various election scenarios, their ‘research’ pointed to a favourable outcome if they selected 
recently-defected ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) stalwart, Edward Lowassa, as their 
coalition candidate.719 Lowassa ultimately lost to the ruling party’s candidate, John Magufuli, 
who despite being in the unpopular ruling party, was elected as a ‘change’ and anti-corruption 
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candidate. Magufuli vowed to clean the ruling party of corrupt elements – as Edward Lowassa 
was widely believed to be. 
In Zimbabwe, the need for funds was an important factor in coalition formation for the 
Mutambara faction of the MDC, but it was less crucial to the larger and better funded MDC-
T. Contrary to Arriola’s theory, the coalition collapsed despite the availability of funds that 
were offered if the two parties reconciled. According to Bennett, “the Swedish Olof Palme 
Foundation and the Dutch [Netherlands] Institute for Multiparty Democracy both ‘put 
money on the table’ for the parties if they reunited, creating a strong incentive to make a 
deal.”720 But the MDC-T had received significant funds – allegedly from nationals in exile – 
to the degree where the MDC-T was able to give a $1000 USD campaign contribution to 
every MP candidate with a $5000 USD bonus promised if they were able to win their seats.721 
Similarly, local council candidates were given $100 USD with a further $500 if they won the 
election. This amounts to an initial layout prior to the election of $210 000 USD for 
parliamentary races and $73 900 for local council elections. As 748 councillors won their 
seats,722 and so did 100 MPs, this would have meant an additional outlay of $500 000 USD 
to parliamentarians and $374 000 for local councillors. This is a vast campaign chest, to say 
nothing of the cost of t-shirts, posters, handouts and the facilitation costs of mobilisers. This 
suggests that the MDC-T, at least in Treasurer Bennet’s estimation, likely had somewhere in 
the region of $1.2 million for facilitation fees. It’s likely that the financial incentive offered 
by the European donor foundations was insufficient given that Tsvangirai’s MDC had 
alternative sources of campaign funding.  
Makoni’s campaign was wholeheartedly supported (and likely funded to some extent) by 
prominent exiled Zimbabwean businessman Trevor Ncube, publisher of the South African 
weekly newspaper the Mail & Guardian, as well as the Zimbabwean newspapers, The Sunday 
Standard and The Zimbabwean Independent.723 By contrast, the MDC-T’s campaign was 
supported by South Africa-based Econet founder and CEO Strive Masiyiwa who provided 
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strategic advice, funds and helped to set up an anti-rigging unit.724 Despite the offer of funds 
for the two groups to unite, both parties opted to contest separately. This suggests that 
(contrary to Arriola) the availability of funding is not the primary reason for opposition 
cohesion, but that instead the availability of funding can act as a disincentive for cooperation, 
or when it is provided disproportionately to one side, it can help undermine trust and 
coalition-formation. 
Due to the support that the MDC-T was already receiving in cash and kind from embassies 
and agencies and its privileged position with its civil society allies, the party had few incentives 
to concede to the MDC-M’s demands. The larger party also faced an internal revolt from its 
Ndebele leadership – over their privileged position in the region and future positions in the 
party’s hierarchy – and Tsvangirai wagered that it was better to go it alone than cede control 
or positions in return for further resources from donors. Besides financial support, the MDC-
T’s campaign was supported by the powerful civic organisations that had led to the formation 
of the MDC in 1999 – the unions under the ZCTU, the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA) and the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) amongst others.725 This was 
done under the banner of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, which also included churches, 
women’s groups and community-based organisations.726 It appears that the MDC-T also 
wagered that with the support of the civic movement, they did not need a coalition with the 
MDC-M to bolster their electoral fortunes. The labour movement and civic groups had 
historically formed the backbone of the MDC’s mobilisation machine,727 and the 2006 split 
had done little to undermine this. In fact, because of this support, both MDCs had invested 
relatively little in organisational development, relying on their partners to help drive member 
and voter recruitment.728 This would become a serious concern as their relationship with key 
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civic groups broke down after 2009 and the mass informalisation of the economy decimated 
the mobilising capacity of the unions.  
Ultimately, the MDC-M rallied behind Simba Makoni, lending their support to his 
presidential campaign while running candidates at local and parliamentary levels. The MDC-
T ran candidates in every constituency, with some disgruntled players who had lost in the 
party primaries opting to contest as independents. This meant that in many seats, a single 
ZANU-PF candidate faced two – or sometimes even three – opposition members.729 As a 
result, the two MDCs split the vote in at least eight of the 210 constituencies, allowing the 
ruling party to take those seats with a plurality of the vote. More importantly, the parties split 
the presidential vote – with Makoni (backed by the MDC-M faction) garnering an official 
8.3% of the vote. After the elections, the MDC-T failed to adequately align themselves with 
the other opposition formations in a bid to create a common front against ZANU PF’s 
manipulation of the results declaration process.  
The results of the 2008 elections were surprising (see Figure 20 below). For the first time 
since independence, Robert Mugabe came second in an election. The official presidential 
election tally – announced after a tense five-week delay – gave Tsvangirai 47.9% to  Mugabe’s 
43.2% while Makoni received the remaining 8%.730 Discontent within ZANU-PF regarding 
the dire economic situation and the lack of adequate succession planning had led dozens of 
ZANU-PF MPs to deploy a strategy which became known as bhora musango (‘kick the ball 
into the long grass’) in which they urged their constituents to vote them in at parliamentary-
level, but vote for whomever they pleased at presidential level.731 This strategy was also 
allegedly sanctioned by politburo members from the highest echelons of the party – 
ostensibly Joice and Solomon Mujuru (who had also been supporting Makoni’s campaign). 
Tsvangirai’s support was far more widespread than it ever had been (see Figure 20), and at 
the same time as they won a presidential majority, the opposition also won control of 
parliament. Once the final tally was announced, the combined opposition had garnered 109 
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seats (MDC-T 99 seats; MDC-M ten) against just 97 for ZANU-PF. In the Senate election, 
the 60 seats were evenly distributed between the combined opposition (MDC-T 24 seats; 
MDC-M six) and ZANU-PF. All ten MDC-M seats were won in rural Matebeleland, with 
relative unknowns on MDC-T tickets sweeping seats from well-known MDC-M incumbents 
in urban Bulawayo.732  
Urban voters demonstrated allegiance to parties rather than individuals, demonstrating again 
that party brand trumped local prominence. Although 102 candidates ran as independents, 
just one (Jonathan Moyo) won their seat – highlighting the importance of party brands. The 
elections confirmed – yet again – that there was little space in Zimbabwean politics for 
candidates who stood outside the two main parties. As noted by Africa Confidential at the time: 
Most of all, the elections showed a polarisation between Mugabe and Tsvangirai supporters; 
Makoni and Mutambara and their organisations were marginalised and there appeared to be 
doubts in voters' minds about what they stood for. People voted for the party line, not the 
local candidate. Only one independent won, Jonathan Moyo; this was largely because he had 
Tsvangirai's endorsement.733 
Independent candidates won less than 3% of the total votes cast in the parliamentary ballot.734 
This stands in stark contrast to both Uganda and Zambia, where party brands matter 
significantly less and individuals are able to shift parties or run as independents and still be 
re-elected to their seats through mobilising their personal profiles and networks (see Table 6 
below).  
Table 6 Official Results from the 2008 Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election 
Province ZANU-PF MDC-T      MDC-M Independent           Total 
total 
Bulawayo 0 12 0 0 12 
Harare 1 28 0 0 29 
Manicaland  6 20 0 0 26 
Mashonaland Central 16 2 0 0 18 
Mashonaland East 22 0 0 0 23 
Mashonaland West 16 6 0 0 22 
Masvingo 12 14 0 0 26 
Matabeleland North  4 5 3 1 13 
Matabeleland South 4 2 7 0 13 
Midlands 21 7 0 0 28 
TOTAL 99 100 10 1 210 
                                                 
732 Alexander and Tendi, ‘A Tale of Two Elections: Zimbabwe at the Polls in 2008’, 8. 
733 ‘Tsvangirai’s Transient Victory’, Africa Confidential, 11 April 2008, https://0-www-africa--confidential-
com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/article/id/2534/Tsvangirai’s_transient_victory. 
734 LeBas, From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa, 191. 




Source: Kubatana.net Election Archive735 
While eighteen ZANU-PF heavyweights were defeated, the MDC-T was the big winner. 
Mutambara’s success was limited and the MDC-M lost a lot of ground to the MDC-T in its 
heartlands. Mutambara's MDC lost ten seats, and he failed in his own parliamentary bid for 
the Zengeza East seat in Harare. The MDC-M lost control of Bulawayo, ceding it to the 
larger MDC faction. Mutambara’s deputy, Gibson Sibanda, also lost his seat as did Secretary 
General Ncube, the Treasurer and Elections Director Paul Themba Nyathi, and the Mayor 
of Bulawayo, Japhet Ndabeni-Ncube. Only David Coltart, who won his Senate seat on the 
MDC-Mutambara ticket, saved the party from total humiliation in Bulawayo.736 ZANU-PF 
also lost two seats in Bulawayo where the MDC-T took all the seats. Meanwhile, Makoni 
performed quite badly at Senate- and parliamentary-level; four of his top supporters lost their 
seats and none of his prominent Senate candidates were elected. However, in the presidential 
race, Makoni won several constituencies in rural Matabeleland on the back of support from 
the MDC-M and Dumiso Dabengwa (see Figure 20). The Manyika former ZANU-PF 
politician received most of his support from non-co-ethnic Ndebele voters, while voters in 
Manicaland rallied behind the MDC-T (see the yellow and red maps in Figure 21). 
Unfortunately for the former ZANU-PF heavyweight, the anticipated widespread defections 
from ZANU-PF failed to occur and their supporters retreated into the shadows of the ruling 
party. In Harare, the MDC-T almost cleared the board, while key former party members Job 
Sikhala and Trudy Stevenson, who had defected to the MDC-M, lost their seats. Despite his 
success in the West, Tsvangirai failed to make significant inroads into Mashonaland East, 
Central and West, as well as the Midlands. Though he had substantial success in Masvingo, 
where he matched ZANU-PF, and Manicaland, where his party was granted the majority. 
The split between the two factions of the MDC cost the parties at least eight seats.  
Following the officially inconclusive results of the first round of the presidential election, a 
run off was held. In the months between the March and June rounds, the ruling party 
unleashed unparalleled violence on the MDC-T, its supporters, civic organisations and the 
rural populations that had dared to vote against the ruling party. As a result, the opposition 
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withdrew from the race and SADC stepped in to negotiate a transitional government between 
the two bitter rivals. The two MDC’s and a recalcitrant ZANU-PF were forced into an 
unhappy marriage in a Government of National Unity (GNU) that would stabilise the 
country, but undermine the opposition’s position.737 In standing against Mugabe and winning 
– against all odds –  without the support of the smaller MDC faction, Tsvangirai’s MDC 
believed that victory in the next elections in 2013 would be nothing short of certain. 
However, the five intervening years would be harsh on the MDC-T, who would go into these 










                                                 
737 Nicole Beardsworth, ‘Short Term Gains and Long Term Losses? The Impact of Power-Sharing on 
Opposition Parties in Kenya and Zimbabwe’ (Unpublished MSc Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013); 
Adrienne LeBas, ‘The Perils of Power Sharing’, Journal of Democracy 25, no. 2 (15 April 2014): 52–66. 





Figure 20 The 2008 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency 
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Figure 21 The 2008 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results for MDC (red), ZANU-PF (green), MKD (yellow) 
in order of declining vote share 




4.2.3 The Failed 2013 Coalition 
Following the violence that characterised the presidential run-off738 in June 2008 and the clear 
manipulation of the first round of the vote (evidenced by the five-week delay in announcing 
the results), the opposition pulled out of the second-round election. To address the growing 
political crisis, President Mbeki and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
intervened, mediating an end to the crisis and brokering a power-sharing agreement and 
Government of National Unity (GNU) on 15 September 2008.739 Under this arrangement, 
Mugabe would continue to serve as President, while Tsvangirai would be made Prime 
Minister with Mutambara serving as his deputy. The parties agreed to share cabinet posts, 
but these were ultimately distributed unevenly with ZANU-PF retaining all the key ‘hard’ 
ministries (such as Defence, Justice and Mines), while giving the opposition control over less-
powerful portfolios (such as Health, Education and Public Service). The one exception to 
this was that MDC-T Secretary General Tendai Biti was appointed as Finance Minister to 
allay the fears of international donors and financial institutions of continued fiscal 
irresponsibility under a ZANU-PF finance minister. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) 
– the document which outlined the GNU and stipulated reforms that needed to be met 
before a new election could be called – was insufficiently implemented ahead of the 2013 
election. The goalposts were constantly shifted and donor/SADC expectations were 
progressively revised downwards as the GNU wore on. With ZANU-PF blocking most 
meaningful reforms, the MDC’s inability to make their parliamentary dominance count and 
most of their intended victories being thwarted by hardliners in ZANU, the opposition was 
unable to capitalise on their time in government.740 Despite their often-valiant efforts (and 
some notable successes)741 during the GNU, the opposition emerged significantly weaker 
following the end of the power-sharing arrangement in 2013.  
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Experiences of co-operation and competition during the inclusive government era helped to 
define the likelihood of an opposition coalition ahead of the next election. The two MDCs 
largely proved unable to work together during the GNU, except to elect the speaker (who 
was a member of the MDC-T), after MDC-M MPs rebelled against a direct instruction from 
Mutambara.742 The two parties failed to pursue a meaningful and productive legislative 
agenda, and their inability to capitalise on their parliamentary majority was a significant failure 
which blemished their time in government. In particular, the two MDC’s failed to effect any 
meaningful reform of repressive state institutions, and were even unable to repeal or replace 
repressive legislation such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to 
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA).743 Despite the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) having spent £450 000 over six months in 2009 alone in 
support for the Office of the Prime Minister (Tsvangirai),744 this office performed few of its 
intended functions and was particularly poor at monitoring, communication and policy 
formulation.745 The personal rivalries and animosity between Welshman Ncube and 
Tsvangirai also limited what was achieved between the two parties.  
In early 2011, the MDC-M resolved to remove Mutambara from the party’s presidency – on 
charges of having sold out to ZANU-PF – replacing him with Ncube.746 In a catastrophic 
strategic failure, Tsvangirai sided with both Mugabe and Mutambara in marginalising Ncube 
and preventing him from taking up the Deputy Prime Minister position (as per the GPA) 
following his ascent to the now “MDC-N” presidency. The political bickering over the issue 
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encouraged the resurgence of regional and ethnic politics within the two MDC’s, 
undermining support for the MDC-T and re-igniting a debate over Ndebele marginalisation 
and the unacceptability of a potential Ndebele president in a majority-Shona country.747 That 
ostensible enemies, Mugabe and Tsvangirai, would close ranks to support Shona-speaking 
Mutambara over Ndebele-speaking Ncube appeared to many to be yet more evidence of 
ethnic favouritism.748 Qubani Moyo, the MDC-N Organising Secretary suggested that “the 
people of Matabeleland have seen Welshman as a victim of a tribal agenda to try to deny the 
people of Matabeleland space in determining important national issues,” ostensibly helping 
to erode the MDC-T’s support in the Matabeleland provinces.749 Ultimately though, while 
the MDC-T would perform particularly badly in the Matabeleland provinces (outside of 
urban Bulawayo), the MDC-N would disappear entirely in 2013 – failing to secure even a 
single seat.  
Coalition Negotiation and Collapse 
Despite the lack of cooperation between the former allies during the inclusive government 
period, there was some recognition ahead of the 2013 election – partly because Makoni had 
split the opposition vote in 2008 – that a coalition between the major players was necessary. 
A team of independent consultants – convened by Secretary General Tendai Biti – comprised 
of academics, lawyers and civic leaders advocated for the formation of a coalition.750 
According to Ncube, there was also a concerted effort by British High Commissioner 
Deborah Bronnert (undertaken through shuttle diplomacy) to encourage the two MDC’s to 
unite.751 But despite this pressure, negotiations were left to the last minute, only beginning in 
earnest in late June and early July 2013, ahead of the election to be held on 31 July.752 In late 
June, Simba Makoni held a press conference to announce that he would withdraw from the 
presidential race in favour of a coalition with other opposition forces. Popular Ndebele 
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politician, Dumiso Dabengwa, of ZAPU-Dabengwa, also made announcements that 
negotiations were ongoing to form a broad front of opposition parties. However, it appears 
that the negotiations were not particularly detailed, though they seem to have involved 
promises that Welshman would be granted the Vice Presidency, and that Makoni and 
Dabengwa would be given cabinet positions.753 However, such an arrangement would 
necessarily disrupt the existing hierarchy within the MDC-T if the coalition were to succeed, 
so members of the party with vested interests sought to undermine the coalition efforts. 
Phillan Zamchiya (2013) contends that it was the faction within the MDC-T that had the 
most to lose from such a coalition that managed to scupper it. As in 2008, it was the leaders 
from the party’s Ndebele heartlands – Vice President Thokozani Khupe, Lovemore Moyo 
and Abednico Bhebhe – who advocated against a coalition with the MDC-N.754 These leaders 
argued that a coalition with Ncube would merely prop up his waning political brand, that 
they had enough support to win the election in the Matabeleland region and that a coalition 
with the MDC-N would be read as a lack of confidence in their leadership.755  
Gallagher (2015) suggests that the failure of the two MDC’s to form a coalition in 2013 left 
some voters disillusioned,756 such as one respondent in Bulawayo who reported that: 
“Morgan [Tsvangirai] and Welshman [Ncube] were supposed to reconcile and fight for the 
people of Zimbabwe but they went back to fight each other.”757 Chan and Gallagher (2017) 
reported that many grassroots activists and party members became disillusioned with both 
MDCs and their inability to surmount their differences; many questioned, “how could they 
be expected to run a country when they couldn’t even pull together to oppose ZANU PF?”758  
The MDC-T did, however, manage to ally itself with Makoni – but by 2013, all the previous 
goodwill invested in his 2008 campaign had been spent. In return for supporting Tsvangirai 
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for the presidency in 2013, the MDC-T withdrew its candidate in Makoni Central, sparking 
an internal revolt against the party’s imposition of centrally-approved candidates over locally-
popular individuals.759 Ultimately, the MDC-T chapter in Makoni Central revolted against the 
central leadership and ran an unsanctioned parliamentary candidate – which allowed the 
ZANU-PF candidate, Patrick Chinamasa, to take 50.14% of the vote, while Makoni, the 
MDC-N and unsanctioned former MDC-T candidate shared the rest of the vote. The MDC-
T’s poor handling of the 2013 nominations process entrenched internal divisions and 
generated dissent and suspicion, which led to 28 of the party’s failed parliamentary candidates 
contesting the elections as independents. 
Meanwhile, the economy had recovered somewhat from the nadir of hyperinflation that 
peaked in 2008 – creating just enough breathing space for ZANU-PF. Diamonds had been 
discovered in 2006, and the diamond fields were violently secured by the military in 2008.760 
The funds were used to pay for ZANU-PF’s 2013 re-election campaign, and to create the 
necessary breathing space for them to run an effective campaign. ZANU-PF cohered ahead 
of the polls, and drew on its reconfigured and expanded ‘social base’ – those who owed their 
livelihoods to the party through its control of land redistribution, informal mining, petty 
trading and the provision of farming inputs.761 The shadow economy and all who worked in 
it found themselves beholden to the state, while the opposition-supporting labour movement 
was decimated by the collapse of the formal economy. By 2013, the formal sector 
unemployment rate was estimated at over 80%.762 Mass informalisation had left the once-
powerful trade unions with little mobilising power. This had always been central to the 
MDC’s electoral mobilisation machine, and the loss of capacity represented a threat to the 
party’s electoral fortunes. The opposition went into the election highly fragmented, with 
bitter internal rivalries souring relations within and between parties. The party’s time in 
government had undermined their previously clean reputation with corruption scandals and 
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personal indiscretions.763 The mobilising capacity of the MDC-T’s civic allies had also eroded 
– as many competent leaders had been brought into government,764 and the relationship with 
others had become strained during the inclusive government period.765 In sum, the 
opposition entered the 2013 election in a severely weakened state,766 though the MDC-T was 
full of bravado and believed that victory in the election was all but certain.767  
In the 2013 polls, ZANU-PF achieved a landslide victory – attracting 61% of the vote and 
more than two-thirds of the parliamentary seats. Tsvangirai’s vote was reduced to 35%, while 
the smaller MDC received just 2.7% of all ballots cast. ZANU-PF won 197 parliamentary 
seats while the MDC-T took 91,768 leaving the party with a third of the seats and severely 
handicapped in terms of advancing a legislative agenda. Although there were widespread 
accounts of electoral fraud and a highly uneven playing field (amongst other distortions of 
the electoral process),769 the scale of ZANU-PF’s victory is interesting. While it is frequently 
expected that ruling parties rig their way to victory in close elections, it is difficult (as ZANU-
PF found in 2008) to change a losing election result into a victory. Despite the MDC-T’s 
protestations that the election had been stolen from them in 2013, many Zimbabwe analysts 
believe that the election was manipulated, but that the manipulation served only to increase 
the margin of the ruling party’s victory.770 Rumours in Harare in the aftermath of the election 
appeared to corroborate this – they suggested that high-ranking members of ZANU-PF had 
also been surprised by the scale of their victory. Debates over the veracity of the results are 
ongoing with scholars such as Chan and Gallagher (2017) arguing that there was a genuine 
collapse in the MDC-T vote with many voters defecting to ZANU-PF, with others such as 
Bratton et al (2016) and Harare-based Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) (2014) unpicking 
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ZANU-PF’s highly unlikely extra 1 million votes garnered771 between 2008 and the 2013 
election – when the total votes cast reached just 3.4 million.772 By contrast, the MDC-T’s 
reported tally from 2008 stayed relatively constant, decreasing by only 23 000 votes. RAU’s 
report is persuasive, and makes it clear that there was extensive manipulation of the voting 
process, but also that the MDC-T had failed to persuade more voters to support them over 
the course of the GNU. Despite their dramatic loss, the MDC-T still attracted 80% of all 
ballots cast for the opposition.773 Although 71 independent candidates ran for parliamentary 
seats, just one succeeded – emphasising yet again that party identities remain key signifiers in 
Zimbabwe. In the wake of the election, the MDC-T found itself largely confined to the two 
most urbanised provinces (see Table 7) – Bulawayo and Harare – while its 2008 rural vote 
base had all but collapsed. The MDC-N’s vote completely collapsed, and they failed to secure 
a single parliamentary seat – even in their Matabeleland and Bulawayo heartlands. 
Table 7 Official Results from the 2013Zimbabwean Parliamentary Election (Directly Elected Seats) 
Province ZANU-PF MDC-T MDC-N Independent Total 
Bulawayo 0 12 0 0 12 
Harare 6 23 0 0 29 
Manicaland  22 4 0 0 26 
Mashonaland Central 18 0 0 0 18 
Mashonaland East 22 0 0 1 23 
Mashonaland West 21 1 0 0 22 
Masvingo 26 0 0 0 26 
Matabeleland North  7 6 0 0 13 
Matabeleland South 13 0 0 0 13 
Midlands 25 3 0 0 28 
Total 160 49 0 1 210 
Source: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission774 
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The failure to create a coalition between the two MDCs in 2013 severely undermined their 
electoral prospects. At the presidential level, Tsvangirai won in just three of the country’s ten 
provinces – Harare, Bulawayo and Matabeleland North. Figure 22 shows how the MDC-T’s 
presidential vote was eroded, though the red map in Figure 23 highlights that the MDC-T 
did still have significant support across parts of the country, but that it was unable to muster 
a majority of the vote in many of its old stronghold constituencies. Support for the MDC-N 
had waned significantly, and it got no votes in many constituencies and found itself entirely 
confined to the western Matabeleland regions (see the yellow map in Figure 23). At the 
parliamentary level, the parties lost key seats to ZANU-PF as they split the vote between 
themselves. In Matabeleland South, 8 of the 13 seats were lost because of the split vote, while 
in Matabeleland North the united MDC’s would have won 11 of the 13 seats – but instead 
ZANU-PF took 7 of 13. Four more seats were lost to a split vote in Kwekwe, Zvishavane, 
Masvingo and Kadoma.775 Had the opposition been united in 2013 – and won the 17 seats 
where they spit the vote – they would have had control of four of the country’s ten provinces 
rather than just two.776 But of course, simple electoral calculations such as these are 
inadequately able to capture the likely effect of coalitions, as not all votes would necessarily 
be transferrable, and perhaps not all voters would have turned out or repression may have 
increased – or perhaps more would have transferred their votes or turned out to vote. It is 
also possible that the combined MDCs would have won more seats and a greater share of 
the presidential vote as coalitions often have a ‘demonstration’ effect, increasing the 
electorate’s confidence in an otherwise frequently-distrusted group. 
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Figure 22 The 2013 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results by Constituency 
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Figure 23 The 2013 Zimbabwean Presidential Election Results for ZANU-PF (green), MDC-T (red), 
MDC-N (yellow) in order of declining vote share 




4.2.4 Looking Ahead to 2018 
Already in 2014, there were moves afoot to correct the fractiousness of the Zimbabwean 
opposition that had caused so much trouble in 2013. Considering its diminishing electoral 
returns, the MDC-T leadership was bullish, blaming ZANU-PF for its spectacular failures in 
the 2013 election and chalking their loss up to rigging. However, many activists and those 
outside of Tsvangirai’s inner circle were aware that the party’s fractured internal unity and 
the fragmentation of the playing field had led – in part – to the poor showing in the polls.777 
As noted in a previous section, the party’s poor showing in 2013 and a growing rift between 
the Secretary General, Tendai Biti, and President Tsvangirai degenerated into fractiousness 
that would result in yet another split. As noted by Zamchiya, the Tsvangirai faction of the 
party had gone into the elections expecting a resounding victory – they refused to listen to 
the ‘intellectuals’ in the party (or Biti’s consultants) who were concerned that the party’s 
support base and mobilisation capacity had been eroded, making victory unlikely.778 The anti-
intellectualism deployed against Ncube in 2005 was wielded against Biti in 2013, who was 
accused of trying to undermine the president in order to usurp his position at the head of the 
party. When Biti’s concerns proved well-founded and the MDC-T found itself facing a new 
5-year term in which ZANU-PF had won itself regional and (a semblance of) domestic 
legitimacy through an election victory, calls grew within the party for Tsvangirai to step down. 
This came to a head in early 2014 when a letter written by Elton Mangoma requesting 
leadership change within the party saw him expelled from MDC-T headquarters (Harvest 
House) and assaulted by party youths outside.779 In the wake of this incident, Tendai Biti, 
Elton Mangoma and a host of other party heavy-weights split (or were expelled)780 to form a 
new party, the MDC-Renewal. The split led to 22 MDC-T MPs breaking away from the main 
formation, and Tsvangirai conspiring with the ruling party to expel them from parliament, 
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leading to by-elections in 14 constituencies which were boycotted by the MDC-T.781 The 
MDC-Renewal later split again, into the Renewal Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ) under 
Elton Mangoma, and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) under Tendai Biti. The MDC-N 
under Ncube has similarly faced a series of desertions, weakening the party even further. 
After announcing in 2016 that he was battling colon cancer, Tsvangirai passed away in 
Johannesburg on 14 February 2018.782 He failed to name a successor before his death, and in 
the wake of his passing, a hard-fought battle played out between the MDC-T’s three vice 
presidents.783 Nelson Chamisa – who had turned 40 just days before784 – ultimately won the 
contentious (and at times, violent)785 struggle.786 Chamisa then purged the party of Vice 
President Khupe and 19 of her allies from the Bulawayo Provincial Executive. Having excised 
the group who had been so resistant to previous coalitions, this left the leadership 
unchallenged in pushing forward with its 2018 electoral coalition. 
While the MDCs faced internal battles, ZANU-PF housed fresh crises of its own. In 2011, 
General Solomon Mujuru was found dead in his home following a suspicious house fire.787 
In December 2014, President Mugabe expelled Solomon’s widow Joice Mujuru788 and her 
supporters from the ruling party – including eight allies in Cabinet.789 Over the months that 
followed, those who supported her in the provinces were also purged as the opposing faction 
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of the ruling party sought to consolidate power. Mujuru went on to form her own party – 
Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) – which also later fractured and led her to form a new party 
in 2017, the National People’s Party (NPP).790 Mugabe, Grace Mugabe and the ruling party 
faction that surrounded them then moved to expel Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa in 
November 2017, while apparently lining Grace Mugabe up to succeed her husband.791 A little 
more than a week later, in a shock move, the Zimbabwean military appeared on the state 
broadcaster to announce that they had surrounded the president’s residence and taken 
control of the capital in what appeared to be a military coup.792 A week-long, tense standoff 
ensued, and on 21 November as parliament was beginning a special sitting to impeach him, 
Mugabe resigned.793 Emerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s long-serving right hand man, was 
installed as the country’s president a week later. As the country moved ever closer to the 2018 
election, it was clear that these polls would not look like any of those held in the last two 
decades. 
Coalition Negotiations 
From the moment that Mujuru was expelled from ZANU-PF, speculation began regarding 
her intention to join the opposition. Pundits in Harare hoped that if she joined the existing 
opposition, it might lead to widespread defections from within ZANU, and it might finally 
break down the polarisation that has characterised Zimbabwe’s politics since 2000. The 
parties have been engaged in a dance around the issue of a coalition since 2015, but with little 
more than an MoU on potential collaboration.794 Meanwhile, Mujuru launched her own small 
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‘People’s Rainbow Coalition’ in October 2017 with two small parties and a breakaway faction 
of Biti’s PDP.795 The ‘MDC Alliance,’ as the coalition became known, entered into 
discussions with Mujuru’s coalition about a broader opposition front, but nothing ultimately 
came of it. Party polarisation makes collaboration across partisan lines particularly difficult, 
as much energy has been invested in reifying party boundaries and defining the opposition 
as the antithesis of the ruling party. A coalition with former ruling party members threatens 
to derail the MDC’s message and alienate its ‘hardcore activist’ base. The MDC-T’s youth 
leader in 2015 described the coalition talks between Mujuru and Tsvangirai as a “great 
betrayal of those who died for the democratic struggle if we are to be seen to work together 
with people who presided over the abuse and killings of our people in Mashonaland 
Central.”796 As Mujuru prevaricated, the various former MDC formations came together in 
August 2017 to form the ‘MDC Alliance,’ which comprised of seven groupings – MDC-T, 
PDP, MDC-N, Transform Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe People First (ZPF), the Multi-Racial 
Christian Democrats (MCD) and ZANU-Ndonga.797 At the coalition launch on 5 August 
2017, all the party leaders took to the stage to preach unity and forgiveness and a willingness 
to put aside their differences in order to confront the ruling party in the 2018 election.798 
The MDC-T had again faced an uphill battle to negotiate the alliance, as the party’s Bulawayo 
leadership rebelled against the alliance once again.799 In August 2017 Tsvangirai’s deputy, 
Thokozani Khupe, along with Abednico Bhebhe and Lovemore Moyo, wrote a letter to the 
president asking him to delay the coalition, expressing their concerns with the alliance and 
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the distribution of seats in Bulawayo and the Matabeleland provinces. Khupe and others 
argued that the MDC-T has no need for an alliance in the Ndebele regions as the party had 
performed well there in the past, but they conceded that an alliance in the Mashonaland 
regions would be beneficial.800 As in 2008 and 2013, this appeared to be an attempt by the 
MDC-T’s regional leadership to protect their positions within the party and the Matabeleland 
regional hierarchy. In response to the dissent from Khupe, party youths disrupted a meeting 
that she and others held in Bulawayo, where Khupe was assaulted.801 The reticence of the 
Bulawayo faction contributed to a widening rift between Tsvangirai and Khupe. At the same 
time, Tsvangirai’s worsening health became a concern for both the coalition and MDC-T 
leaders who wanted to position themselves to take over the party. As Tsvangirai became 
increasingly ill, jostling began within the MDC-T to replace him, and to select a new leader 
for the nascent alliance. In defiance of Nelson Chamisa who had been appointed as acting 
party president, Khupe and MDC-T Secretary General Mwonzora attended an externally 
brokered meeting in Cape Town on 13 February 2018 with Joice Mujuru and other 
opposition members. They negotiated Mujuru’s accession to a new, broader alliance of 84 
political formations.802 However, Tsvangirai’s death the following day and Chamisa’s rapid 
takeover of the party scuppered their plans. In the wake of her expulsion, Khupe vowed to 
contest for the MDC-T party name and symbol,803 and take her faction into Joice Mujuru’s 
People’s Rainbow Coalition.804 
While in 2008 and 2013, Khupe’s faction won out against coalitions with the largely 
Matabeleland-centric MDC-N, in 2018 there was an attempt to suppress their dissent and 
force unity on the recalcitrant faction. There are two explanations for this. The first is that 
Tsvangirai’s faction in the MDC had finally recognised that the failure to form a coalition in 
previous elections was a hindrance to achieving a transfer of power from ZANU-PF. The 
second, and likely the most important factor, is the MDC-T’s declining mobilisation capacity. 
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As noted previously in this chapter, the MDC and later MDC-T have always relied heavily 
on the mobilisation capacity of its civic allies – the trade unions, NGO’s, community-based 
organisations and churches. The previously-formidable Zimbabwe Congress of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU) – which was the backbone of opposition mobilisation – has atrophied under 
the weight of splits, funding declines, deindustrialisation and disastrous informalisation of 
the economy. Zimbabwe’s current unemployment rate is estimated by the ZCTU to stand at 
over 90%.805 With rapid deindustrialisation, business closures and shrinking opportunities for 
formal sector employment, the clear majority of Zimbabweans are engaged in informal sector 
subsistence activities,806 which has drastically reduced the ability of political parties to mobilise 
citizens through unions or along class lines and in favour of workers struggles. NGOs and 
civil society bodies are facing massive financial shortfalls, with Zimbabwe having slipped off 
the international agenda.807 Equally, the relationship between the MDC-T and many civic 
groups has soured, and donors now actively seek out apolitical NGO’s and NGO leaders for 
financial support. This has reduced the number and efficacy of the MDC-T’s allies, and by 
extension the party’s ability to mobilise at election-time. Finally, having been abandoned by 
their donor allies – who are instead re-engaging with ZANU-PF and seeking to mend 
fences808 – opposition parties are facing serious financial shortfalls.809 In July 2017, furniture 
in the MDC-T’s Harvest House headquarters was attached by debt collectors because the 
party had failed to pay its debts.810 Even Strive Masiyiwa has reportedly abandoned the 
party.811 Each of these factors has served to increase the likelihood of a coalition as opposition 
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parties seek to pool their meagre financial and human resources to pose a credible threat to 
ZANU-PF’s rural and urban resurgence.812  
Many Zimbabweans interviewed in the Round 7 Afrobarometer survey (in February 2017) 
support the idea of a ‘grand coalition’ of the opposition. In response to the statement that 
“in order to win the 2018 presidential election, opposition political parties should work 
together under a grand coalition,” 45% of all respondents agreed.813 Amongst those who 
reported supporting the MDC and other ‘traditional’ opposition actors, support for a 
coalition increased to 63%. By 2018, support for an opposition coalition had risen to 56% of 
all respondents.814 But it remains to be seen whether the MDC-T can avoid alienating their 
alliance partners, and whether the MDC-T’s fallout with its Matabeleland leadership will 
undermine the alliance’s efficacy in the opposition’s heartlands ahead of the rapidly-
approaching 2018 election.815 Ahead of 2018, the opposition is likely to face a difficult uphill 
battle. Of the 210 seats in the national assembly, 68% are in rural areas in which the 
opposition have few structures and little control over voter mobilisation. ZANU-PF’s new 
command agriculture programme has likely helped to shore up their rural base, despite almost 
universal un- and under-employment and urban dissatisfaction with the ruling party. In rural 
areas, ZANU-PF retains control of traditional leadership and land redistribution, which have 
proven to be effective vote mobilisers in the past. In urban areas, the once-mighty workers’ 
movement is little more than a shadow of its former self, as most Zimbabweans have been 
forced into petty trading to make ends meet. The rise of Emmerson Mnangagwa in 2017, his 
re-engagement with the international community and broad promises of sweeping change 
have also taken the wind out of the MDC Alliance’s ‘change’ narrative.816 Considering these 
challenges and the broader erosion of opposition support, a coalition of opposition forces 
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will be a necessary but certainly not sufficient condition for electoral turnover in Zimbabwe 
in 2018. 
4.3 From Polarisation to Cooperation 
Why Coalesce? 
This chapter has outlined the coalition negotiation processes undertaken in Zimbabwe 
around the 2008 and 2013 elections, and ahead of the upcoming 2018 polls. Unlike in Uganda 
and Zambia, there was little debate over who would be the face of these coalitions, with 
Tsvangirai the undisputed leader of the country’s increasingly fractious opposition. Coalitions 
were negotiated with factions of the MDC that had broken away from the main formation; 
this was done in recognition that the splits may undermine the party’s electoral success in the 
2008 and 2013 elections.  
Why Collapse? 
Instead, dissent welled from within the MDC-T’s Ndebele leadership, who sought to ring-
fence and protect their positions from Ncube’s MDC-N – which was itself formed from a 
regional breakaway from the main opposition party. Competition over the spoils of 
opposition politics in one region served to repeatedly undermine opposition unity, and led 
the two parties to split the presidential vote in 2008 and a significant number of parliamentary 
races in both 2008 and 2013. The same issue, and the same group of leaders, threatened to 
derail the opposition coalition again ahead of the 2018 elections. This problematises existing 
research which predicts that the existence of ethnic parties817 is a barrier to the formation of 
coalitions.818 In fact, as the preceding chapter has highlighted, when parties are competing 
for the same voters within the context of a multi-ethnic party, it may make coalition 
formation more difficult as party members from lower echelons refuse to concede their pre-
eminent position within a particular region, or as the party’s highest-ranking representative 
of their particular identity group. As a result, these party members seek to scupper coalition 
negotiations and rally others to their cause, making it much more difficult for parties to reach 
an agreement.  
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The Zimbabwean case also highlights the importance of taking parties seriously as 
organisations that draw together different interests. The literature on coalitions largely 
ignores lower level party members, and treats parties as little more than vehicles for the 
personal interests of the party leader. Instead, and as the Zimbabwean case demonstrates, 
parties knit together factions with different interests, and some of those interests are not best 
served by joining a multi-party coalition. While coalitions may offer benefits for party leaders 
if the coalition is successful, the same agreement may carry costs for actors and factions in 
lower echelons. These costs may be quantified in terms of prestige and profile, their position 
in the party hierarchy or parliamentary seats in their home region. Whose interests win out 
in each circumstance depends on the balance of power at the point of reaching the agreement, 
the spoiler capacity of lower party members and whether or not the party can afford – 
financially and politically – to run their own campaign or alienate lower-level functionaries. 
Finances are an important part of this equation, as the preceding discussion shows. 
However, as the discussion of party funding, donor support and financial incentives for 
coalition-building suggests, pecuniary coalition-building is not necessarily as straightforward 
as Arriola (2013) suggests. As outlined in previous chapters, funding frequently comes from 
other external sources, and parties are rarely just reliant on domestic businessmen to fund 
their coalitions. When funding is offered for cooperation – as in Zimbabwe in 2008 – it still 
does not guarantee cooperation. Even smaller, more regionally-contained parties with little 
funding are, at times, able to turn down financial incentives for coalitions when they believe 
that going into a coalition might compromise their vote base. In addition, large, well-funded 
parties – such as the MDC-T – feel little need to partner with smaller parties when they are 
well-funded, confident of victory and forced to concede more than they are willing to. This 
is particularly the case in Zimbabwe’s polarised party system, where party brands are 
important social markers that appear to trump the personal profile of parliamentary and local 
government candidates. 
The importance of party labels has also restricted the number of newly-elected party 
presidents deciding to contest alone. Most newly-elected and untested opposition leaders 
recognise that there is little to be gained by running against the two behemoths – ZANU-PF 
and MDC-T – except for Simba Makoni’s candidacy in 2008 (see Table 8). Makoni was the 
only untested opposition leader who scuppered a coalition with the MDC-T in order to run 




his own campaign, but he was ultimately supported by the MDC-N. Coalition efforts were 
frequently scuppered by the largest party to the coalition – the MDC-T – rather than by the 
smaller partners who overestimated their national following.  No opposition leader has gone 
into a coalition with the ruling party, further highlighting how different Zimbabwe’s polarised 
politics is from that of Uganda and Zambia. 
Table 8 New Party Leaders and Electoral Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 2000-2018 
Candidate Party Election 
  2000 2002 2005 2008 2013 2018 








Ndonga 0.80% - - -  - - 
Wilson Kumbula 
ZANU-
Ndonga - 1% 0.25% - Coalition Coalition 
Simba Makoni MKD* - - - 8.10% Coalition - 
Arthur 
Mutambara MDC-M/N - - - Coalition* - -  
Welshman 
Ncube MDC-M/N - - - - 2.72% Coalition 
Dumiso 
Dabengwa ZAPU - - - - 0.75% Coalition 
Tendai Biti PDP** - - - - - Coalition 
Agrippah 
Mutambara ZPF - - - - - Coalition 
*Simba Makoni was in a coalition with Arthur Mutambara's MDC-M     
**The PDP was formed during the MDC-T's 2014 split      
 
Finally, the Zimbabwean case highlights how personality, ethnicity and funding might interact 
to derail coalition-building. While Gandhi and Reuter (2013) suggest that in highly 
fractionalised party systems, parties struggle to reach agreements as they do not have a stable 
past of interactions, this is rarely the case. In Zimbabwe, most opposition actors have – at 
some point in the past – been members of the same organisation and have worked together 
closely. However, in many cases, the antagonisms entrenched during their years together 
became a barrier to future coalitions. Some of the themes that emerged from this chapter 
highlight the distrust and factionalism between coalition principals as well as high levels of 
paranoia about state interference and attrition. Looking ahead to 2018, it appears that – as in 
Uganda in 2016 – party weakness and a lack of funding may lend itself to the greater 




likelihood of coalition cohesion, where opposition parties wager that it is better to pool 






















5.1 Comparing Opposition Coalitions 
This research began with the puzzle which asked why a coalition failed to materialise between 
two Zambian opposition party leaders – Hakainde Hichilema and Nevers Mumba – in 
December 2014. In a context where the ruling party’s collapse appeared imminent and 
foreign businessmen had put money on the table to encourage cooperation, the mooted 
coalition was stillborn. The coalitions literature predicts that in such cases, the opposition 
will coalesce because of the increased likelihood of the opposition winning the election,819 
the availability of funds which allows the larger party to buy the allegiance of the smaller 
grouping,820 and the single-round electoral system which provides incentives for opposition 
parties to cooperate before the polls.821 Instead, Nevers Mumba – who had not yet competed 
in an election as MMD president – opted to run alone. Ultimately Mumba came fourth in the 
polls, with less than 1% of the total vote. 
It has been argued that existing theories of opposition pre-electoral coalition formation are 
insufficiently nuanced to explain the dynamics around the (un)successful negotiation of such 
arrangements because they adhere to the ‘unitary actor assumption,’ assume that ethnicity is 
a hindrance to cooperation, argue that the provision of funding leads to successful coalition 
negotiations and fail to account for the diverse interests and strategies pursued by party 
leaders. In 2014, Nevers Mumba decided to contest the polls on his own party ticket as he 
had not yet competed in an election as the president of the former ruling MMD, and he 
overestimated the levels of popular support that remained for the party – and for him as its 
president. Mumba was also accountable to the political and financial interests that helped to 
elevate him to his position, and so he decided, in the face of stiff resistance from within his 
party and foregoing funding, to contest alone. When he performed particularly poorly – 
placing fourth and taking less than 1% of the vote – it was clear that he was not a nationally 
viable candidate. By the next election, held just 18 months later, Mumba decided to go into 
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the coalition with Hichilema and the UPND, as he had spent all his political and financial 
capital in 2015. Across the three cases outlined in this research, the majority of newly-elected 
party leaders opted to forego coalitions and to contest on their own in their maiden polls.  
This chapter will bring together some of the key lessons from the three case studies to reflect 
on the arguments developed in Chapter 1. It will put the cases in conversation with each 
other and point to the similarities and differences between instances of coalitions across the 
three countries.  
Why Cooperate? 
The reasons why opposition parties coalesce in the three cases under study appear to be fairly 
straightforward – in cases where parties are weak and poorly funded, they collaborate to 
maximise scarce resources and minimise competition. Cooperation also helps parties with 
limited constituencies to broaden out their voter base. This suggests that parties are more 
likely to coalesce when they are ‘weak’ – when their funding, organisational capacity and 
spread are limited. This is certainly true of the opposition in Uganda and Zambia (until 2011), 
where parties with limited resources and confined constituencies sought to cooperate to 
achieve better electoral outcomes. In Zambia in 2015 and 2016, the UPND sought to build 
a broad, inclusive coalition to expand their reach beyond their traditional (ethno-regional) 
base, and to ‘rebrand’ in the face of accusations of ‘tribalism’ and ethnic exclusion. However, 
even strong opposition parties – such as the MDC(T) from 2000 to 2013 – still seek out 
coalitions with other parties, but they are less likely to make the concessions necessary to 
sustain them when negotiating from a position of strength. When the funding and 
organisational capacity of the MDC-T declined, the party was more concerned with inter-
party unity and cooperating with members of splinter parties. As argued by van de Walle 
(2006), it is easier to build and sustain a coalition when the ruling party’s chances of retaining 
power appear slim, and this was certainly the case in Zambia in 2015 and 2016 when the 
growing likelihood of an incumbent party defeat made opposition cooperation more 
attractive. In such cases, it is common to see opposition actors and former regime insiders 
defect to the coalition, as they seek out a better deal in a more likely opposition-led 
administration. But even then, the UPND’s experience in 2015 highlights that gaining full 
cooperation of all relevant opposition actors still is not straightforward. This suggests that 
opposition parties form coalitions both when they are weak and when they are ‘strong.’  




There is significant debate in the literature over how electoral rules impact on opposition 
coalition formation. The previous three chapters highlighted that the effect of electoral 
institutions across the three cases is difficult to predict. When the Zambian electoral system 
was changed in 2016 from a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system to a two-round voting system 
with a 50%+1 threshold, opposition elites saw this as giving even more impetus to coalition 
formation. However, Zambian parties had regularly attempted to negotiate coalitions around 
each electoral cycle under the FPTP system. The two-round system prevailing in Zimbabwe 
did not preclude coalition negotiations but such cooperation remained elusive until 2018 
when under the same electoral rules, the opposition has cohered. Uganda has had a two-
round electoral system since the mid-1990s – a system that some suggest discourages first 
round coalition formation822 – but this has not proven to be the case. Opposition parties in 
Uganda have sought to form multi-party coalitions in every election, and with more success 
than the parties in the other two cases. Electoral rules do not preclude the coalition 
negotiations, and may partly explain why the evidence is mixed with regards to how electoral 
systems impact on the likelihood of coalition behaviour.823 This research suggests that two-
round electoral systems do not preclude pre-electoral coalition negotiations, but they do 
lower the incentives for cooperating in the first round as parties can make the case to run 
separately before cooperating in the second round. First round coalitions – as outlined above 
– require higher levels of trust, coordination, cooperation and sacrifice and they carry higher 
costs in terms of party profile and internal unity. Second-round coalitions offer higher 
rewards at a significantly reduced cost, once the ‘ranking’ of opposition parties has been 
firmly established by the results of the first-round election. However, most opposition players 
would prefer to win decisively in the first round. This is to encourage a demonstration effect 
which may increase turnout and to avoid the risks of a second-round election in which the 
ruling party might be more willing to deploy violence and manipulation to swing the results 
in their favour. When there is low trust in the electoral commission and a belief that the 
incumbent is unlikely to play fair, opposition parties in two-round systems will still endeavour 
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to form an oversized coalition in the first round to mitigate the risks of incumbent 
malpractice.  
Pre-electoral coalitions are formed for various reasons. Van de Walle (2006) argues that 
coalitions are like tipping games – that they are more likely to occur and coalesce when the 
fall of the incumbent appears imminent.824 This prompts defection from the ruling regime, 
which bolsters the ranks of the opposition and further increases the likelihood of electoral 
success. The 2015 and 2016 coalitions in Zambia appear to confirm this theory – the PF was 
in disarray and their prospects for retaining power after the loss of Michael Sata looked slim. 
This led to the coalescing of various interested parties (and individuals) who sought to join a 
coalition to maximise their chances of gaining a powerful position in the wake of the polls. 
However, the Zimbabwean and Ugandan cases illustrate that cooperative behaviour can 
equally be a response to party weakness, a lack of funds and inadequate geographic reach. In 
Uganda, the weakness of parties, their meagre financial resources and the barriers to 
competition imposed by the dominant party-state forces parties to seek cooperation 
repeatedly across electoral cycles. In Zimbabwe, a fairly strong and well-resourced MDC (and 
then MDC-T) frequently defected from negotiations, but after its mobilisation machine and 
resource base declined post-2013, the party sought out and committed to the 2018 electoral 
coalition to try to revive its ailing fortunes. Although it seems logical that opposition parties 
should cooperate, this thesis highlights that cooperation is difficult to achieve and even 
harder to sustain. This is due to the many competing interests at various levels of each party 
and the limited information available regarding which course of action best suits the interests 
of the party and party leader. 
5.1.1 Bringing Parties Back In 
Political science literature on parties in Africa is sparse and dominated by pessimistic accounts 
of patrimonialism, ethnic determinism and the predominance of party leaders. The literature 
on coalitions in Africa builds on these assumptions, treating parties as little more than 
‘ephemeral vehicles for the personal ambitions’ of the leader.825 This leaves little space for a 
discussion of African parties as complex organisations constituted by factions who compete 
for ascendance. Previous research on coalitions in Africa makes use of the ‘unitary actor 
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assumption’ with regards to opposition parties, but this research highlights that African 
opposition parties are rarely cohesive and this internal discord impacts on coalition 
negotiations. Parties are frequently divided into factions who are competing to advance their 
own interests. This is even more prevalent when negotiating coalitions, as party factions jostle 
to define the party’s strategy and candidatures ahead of the polls in the hope of achieving 
their own aims. These factions complicate internal party processes, potentially undermining 
the position of the party leader and compromising his position within negotiations. Rather 
than the assumption that parties (and party leaders in particular) can negotiate as 
unconstrained unitary actors who seek to maximise votes, policies or seats, parties are 
constrained by their internal balance of forces.826 Coalitions can be damaging for parties’ 
internal unity, as rifts can emerge over a multitude of issues such as the choice of coalition 
partners, the nature of the coalition, the timing of the agreement and the choices of joint 
candidates. Party activists and structures at the local level often resist the choice of joint 
parliamentary candidates from coalition partners, and the disruption caused by this can have 
grave consequences for local party structures. Party presidents are often simultaneously 
combating threats to their positions whilst bargaining with other party leaders. This can be 
further complicated by cooperation between dissenting party factions and potential coalition 
partners, as in Uganda in 2011 and 2016. As suggested by Maor (1998), the credibility of party 
leaders’ threats and proposals during coalitions may be compromised by defections and 
dissent, which are seen as an inability to exert control over their own organisations.827  
When considering opposition behaviour during coalitions, it is important to distinguish, as 
Kelly (2018) does, between parties that were formed to contest elections – with fairly 
sophisticated organisational structures, systems and mobilisation strategies – and those that 
function primarily as vehicles for attracting patronage and raising the profile of the party 
leader.828 Across the three cases outlined in this research, it is clear that that while some 
smaller parties which are little more than ephemeral vehicles for the interests of the party 
leader do in fact conform to the unitary actor assumption, this is not the case for larger and 
more established parties. Larger opposition parties find themselves riven by greater levels of 
factionalism, with multiple groups competing for ascendancy and often trying to undermine 
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coalition negotiations which they see as being inimical to their interests. Equally, Arriola’s 
theory suggests that opposition parties always seek to sell their support to the highest bidder, 
but not all parties are so easily bought in or co-opted. Larger parties – particularly the largest 
opposition party – are far less likely to sell their endorsements to others. 
Uganda presents a valuable case study of the ways in which factionalism and inter-opposition 
competition can undermine coalition bargaining. As noted in Chapter 2, between 2011 and 
2016, an insurrection from within the DP’s Buganda ranks served to destabilise the party and 
shift the strategic calculations of the party’s leader, Norbert Mao. The latter was 
simultaneously negotiating within a multi-party coalition to try to protect his own position, 
and undermine the opposing DP faction. When the rival FDC cooperated with the dissenting 
group, this cemented existing DP-FDC antagonism and undermined future coalition-
building efforts. Due to factional infighting and close cross-party collaboration, several DP 
members and activists crossed over to the FDC during coalitions. The Ugandan case 
demonstrates that coalitions can be high-cost endeavours for parties, as they often lead to 
the loss of members and activists and undermine party unity. Strategic differences between 
the party’s structures can easily prompt party splits, and thus party leaders find their actions 
constrained by what they wager is the option most likely to enable them to retain their 
positions. In the case of the 2016 election, the DP’s Mao and several other small fractious 
parties voted for newcomer and NRM stalwart, Amama Mbabazi, over the FDC’s Besigye to 
protect their positions and ring-fence their constituencies from FDC encroachment. 
Fractious parties undermine the bargaining position of leaders, so party leaders will attempt 
to strengthen their hand in coalitions by leveraging what bargaining tools they do have. 
Party leaders are also constrained by the actions of their subordinates, and coalitions can 
easily be scuttled by leaders below the party president. Zambia’s most promising pre-electoral 
coalition was dashed in 2011 by the revelation of internal party documents to the press by 
the PF Secretary General, Wynter Kabimba, who feared losing his position in the PF (and 
potential government) hierarchy to another party’s leader. Similarly, the promising coalitions 
between the MDC factions in Zimbabwe in 2008 and 2013 were undermined and undone by 
the MDC-T’s prominent Ndebele leadership, who feared that cooperation with the Ndebele-
led MDC-N would undermine their positions within their ethnic stronghold. In 2018, another 
attempt to do so by the same regional leaders was thwarted by the party leader when the 




regional leadership was violently ‘disciplined’ and ultimately expelled from the MDC-T. 
These instances highlight the inadequacy of the ‘unitary actor assumption’ which is 
prominent in most coalition studies, and implicit in Arriola’s theory. In extreme cases, party 
structures take decisions that fly in the face of the party president. In Zambia in 2015, the 
majority of the MMD’s parliamentary caucus voted to go into a coalition with the UPND, 
though the party’s leader had not formally agreed to cooperate. Ultimately, the party leader 
decided to contest the election on an MMD ticket, while the majority of the party’s MPs 
supported another candidate in the presidential by-election. This is indicative of the ways in 
which parties’ behaviour in coalitions is determined by the shifting balance of power and the 
competing interests of factions within parties.  
Most coalitions seek to run both a joint presidential candidate and joint parliamentary 
flagbearers. The struggles over the allocations of constituencies can be a highly fraught and 
contentious process, with disruptive consequences for both coalition unity and local party 
structures. The division of the constituencies in the Western Province of Zambia during the 
PF-UPND Pact (Chapter 3) highlights these difficulties, and points to how divisive it can be 
for parties to try to select joint candidates. As both parties saw Western Province as ripe for 
their expansion, both sought to claim the majority of seats there ahead of the 2011 polls. In 
so doing, parties allegedly resorted to underhanded tactics to try to wrest constituencies from 
their ostensible ally. This resulted in local party structures protesting and requesting that the 
party’s headquarters withdraw from the coalition. It also sowed distrust between the coalition 
partners when it became apparent that the UPND had ‘rigged’ a fact-finding mission to gauge 
party support, and the UPND’s candidate placed poorly in the polls. Intra-party competition 
for the same seats increases incentives to manipulate perceptions of competitiveness, and 
decreases trust between allies. In Zimbabwe in 2013, the MDC-T’s imposition of Simba 
Makoni as the coalition candidate for Makoni Central prompted disunity and dissent amongst 
the party’s structures (Chapter 4). The MDC’s candidate who had been forced to step down 
ran as an unsanctioned independent, allowing a ZANU-PF minister to take the seat with a 
slim majority. Ahead of the 2018 polls, there are rumblings of similar fallouts at the local level 
over the perceived imposition of parliamentary candidates by the MDC Alliance.829 These 
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scuffles over local representation can cast a long shadow over the unity of local party 
structures, which has long-lasting consequences for the party’s mobilisation capacity.  
This research argues that, in seeking to understand opposition pre-electoral coalitions, it is 
crucial to look at the internal balance of power within parties, and the degree to which the 
party leader is subject to constraints and various demands from below when negotiating. 
Such constraints and demands are crucial to understanding why so many of the coalitions 
outlined above collapsed prior to the polls. Much of the pressure that is exerted to push for 
coalition collapse comes from lower levels of parties, whose interests are not necessarily 
served by collaboration. While coalition agreements divvy up positions between party 
presidents, lower level members see their potential for ascending to the top of the party or 
potential government as being thwarted by the entry of other opposition leaders. Coalitions 
also hold substantial costs for parties at the local level, where they may prompt disunity and 
disorder in the wake of choosing joint candidates and requesting that others withdraw from 
the races. In order to understand multi-party coalitions, it is crucial to understand the 
dynamics within parties from which they are constituted. 
5.1.2 Coalitions and the Political Salience of Ethnicity 
This research challenges conventional wisdom regarding the ethnic voting hypothesis, and 
the role that ethnicity is believed to play in undermining coalition-formation. Arriola’s 
pecuniary coalition-building theory rests on a set of assumptions that incorporate Horowitz’s 
‘ethnic census’ model of African electoral behaviour. The first assumption is that parties in 
multi-ethnic African countries mobilise ethnic voters predominantly through appeals to 
ethnic solidarity, and citizens make voting choices predominantly along these affective lines. 
The second assumption is that in most African states, the presidency is the key locus of 
patronage and the president’s co-ethnics are the primary beneficiaries – through systems of 
patronage – of the benefits of state power. Following from this, because the benefits of an 
electoral victory in a presidential system cannot be equally shared, ethnic opposition parties 
resist cooperation and engage instead in ethnic outbidding. More specifically, ethnicity is seen 
as a barrier to pre-electoral coalition formation that can only be overcome through providing 
financial incentives to coalesce. However, the theory only holds, when opposition leaders are 
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able to pay upfront for the support of other ethnic parties – who are then able to deliver their 
co-ethnic’s votes – and provide the necessary stackable ethnic voting blocs to constitute a 
winning majority. This thesis challenges these assumptions, arguing instead that voters’ 
choices are less determined by ethnicity than is commonly believed, that the parties studied 
do not engage in ethnic outbidding, and that parties’ abilities to deliver the votes of their co-
ethnics is far from assured. Instead, this thesis suggests that because parties compete for the 
same seats, and voters do not reliably vote for co-ethnic leaders, this creates greater 
uncertainty in negotiations and coalitions are less likely to cohere as party leaders seek to ring-
fence their strongholds from their coalition allies. This implies that coalitions formed 
between ethnic parties who do not compete at the local level and can more reliably deliver 
the votes of their co-ethnics – as in Kenya – may be more likely to cohere. 
Pre-electoral coalitions are often negotiated to address an opposition party’s inability to win 
national elections due to some combination of their narrow constituencies (ethnic or 
religious), a lack of resources, state harassment or a lack of voter trust. Existing research 
presumes a static relationship between ethnicity and coalition formation, that greater ethnic 
fragmentation and the existence of ‘ethnic parties’ hinders cooperation because of inter-
ethnic competition over limited political resources. However, the research presented in this 
thesis questions these assumptions, showing that the importance of ethnicity in politics varies 
across the three cases, and that voters rarely vote for their co-ethnic party leader solely on 
the basis of his or her ethnicity, especially if they are unlikely to be nationally competitive. 
While some opposition parties in each country are limited to drawing on one or two ethno-
regional or ethno-linguistic groups (such as the DP and UPC in Uganda, the MDC-N in 
Zimbabwe and the ADD in Zambia), the largest opposition parties are multi-ethnic (such as 
the MDC-T in Zimbabwe and the FDC in Uganda) or pursue strategies to expand their vote 
base beyond their traditional ethno-regional strongholds (as with the UPND in Zambia). 
Both the MDC-T and the FDC have consistently fronted presidential candidates who are 
from the ethnic group that held the presidency at the time. Despite this, they have 
consistently consolidated the anti-incumbent vote in non-co-ethnic regions, to the 
disadvantage of smaller co-ethnic opposition parties. This finding supports and extends the 
findings of Ishiyama (2012) who found that groups who are both geographically-
concentrated and perceive themselves to be discriminated against are more likely to bloc-




vote for the opposition.830 In Zambia, despite higher reported levels of ethnic voting than the 
other two cases, the opposition UPND leader successfully consolidated the anti-incumbent 
vote in non-co-ethnic regions in 2015 and 2016, in spite of the existence of co-ethnic 
candidates on the ballot831 – again highlighting the limitations of the ethnic voting model. 
This provides substantial evidence that anti-incumbent voters (particularly in marginalised 
regions) coordinate their voting choices to support who they perceive to be the most viable 
opposition challenger, whatever their ethnicity. Indeed, the most viable challenger is often 
not a co-ethnic and may originate from the incumbent’s ethnic group (or region) – as with 
Besigye in Uganda and Tsvangirai in Zimbabwe.832  
If the ethnic voter hypothesis does not hold, what are the implications for coalition research? 
It suggests that party leaders face greater uncertainty with regards to their claimed 
constituencies than was previously recognised. While some party leaders may claim to bring 
their co-ethnics along with them, larger parties with greater national reach will question the 
reliability of smaller parties’ constituencies and may wager that they are better able to compete 
in those regions. Contrary to Arriola’s thesis on ethnic leaders being able to bargain reliably 
on the basis of delivering the votes of their co-ethnics, the coalitions outlined in this thesis 
are subject to much higher levels of uncertainty. If larger opposition parties feel that they can 
draw support from non-co-ethnics in the ethno-regional strongholds of their coalition 
partners, they are less likely to commit to coalitions, and more likely to defect when the deal 
on offer is not favourable to them. In Uganda, despite a history of party support that co-
aligns with ethnic and regional interests, parties can no longer rely on ethnic bloc-voting for 
co-ethnic party leaders. Instead, anti-incumbent regions such as the north and east have 
repeatedly rejected parties led by co-ethnic leaders in favour of politicians who are more 
competitive at the national level. This increases uncertainty in coalition bargaining, as parties 
cannot reliably leverage their co-ethnic support base to make an argument for a predictable 
voting bloc that they can deliver at election-time.  
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This means that parties then often find themselves in direct competition with each other over 
the same voters, making it more difficult to run joint coalition candidates at parliamentary 
level. Doing so runs the risk of the party compromising their local party structures, their party 
profile and image, with potentially lasting consequences for the unity of local party structures. 
Competition for the same voters and constituencies can cripple a nascent alliance as ethnic 
entrepreneurs battle for ascendancy within their regions, and try to outmanoeuvre their co-
ethnic opposition ‘allies.’ In Zimbabwe, the key cleavage for voters was not an ethnic but an 
anti-incumbent one. Although ethno-regional identities are strong, and a sense of collective 
grievance motivates bloc-voting, the beneficiaries are not regional parties but the largest 
opposition party which is headed by a non-co-ethnic. While negotiating the 2008 coalition 
between the smaller Matabeleland-based MDC-N and the larger MDC-T, the MDC-T was 
aware that it was competitive within the Matabeleland region and believed that it had few 
reasons to concede seats to the smaller faction. Ethnic competition scuttled the nascent 
coalition, but not for the reasons that Arriola and others predict. Instead, it was prompted 
by intra-party factionalism as the MDC-T’s Ndebele vice president opposed the deal. This 
was due to concerns that she and other Ndebele leaders within the MDC-T would be forced 
to cede their primary positions within the party and coalition hierarchy as the region’s pre-
eminent representatives and power-brokers. The same group helped to undermine the 2013 
coalition for the same reasons of intra-regional competition for the Ndebele vote. As an 
example of the importance of both ethnic competition and intra-party factionalism in 
determining coalition outcomes, the Zimbabwean case is instructive. 
When opposition parties compete for the same groups of voters whilst simultaneously 
negotiating a coalition, it is reasonable to expect that – as happened in Uganda (2016), Zambia 
(2011) and Zimbabwe (2008, 2013) – parties will use these negotiations to try to 
outmanoeuvre their competitors. In cases where they are likely to be pushed to accept 
another party’s presidential candidate, larger opposition parties frequently wager that it is 
better to compete alone.  Contrary to Arriola’s theory, it is likely that coalitions are easier to 
negotiate and less likely to fragment in circumstances where ethnic parties can reliably deliver 
the votes of their co-ethnics, and where parties do not compete for seats at the local level. 
Recent research by Dettmann (2017) suggests that similar dynamics operate in Malaysia.833 
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This is the case because the costs of cooperation for party unity are lower, and party leaders 
are less concerned with protecting their own positions from rivals within the party’s and 
coalitions’ ranks.  
5.1.3 On Funding and Coalitions 
A lack of finance has long been credited as a key reason for the lack of competitiveness of 
African opposition parties. The massive disparities in spending potential undermines the 
opposition’s ability to wage a competitive campaign against a well-funded ruling party. A lack 
of resources is also often pointed to as the reason that parties might sell their endorsements 
to the incumbent, joining their coalition in return for financial rewards. Arriola’s major 
contribution to the field of coalition studies is his emphasis on funding as a determinant of 
coalition cohesion. His pecuniary coalition building theory holds that coalitions are more 
likely to stay together when the party that seeks to form the coalition is able to provide 
financial incentives for ostensible opposition rivals to support his bid for the presidency. This 
funding is crucial for underfunded parties, who were previously unable to access funding due 
to political constraints on the domestic business community. However, as this thesis has 
demonstrated, while funding plays a critical role, opposition parties’ sources of funding are 
more diverse than Arriola allows. As outlined in this thesis, party funding came variously 
from foreign governments (Zimbabwe), foreign party organisations (Uganda), and foreign 
businessmen (Zambia). And despite this provision of resources to parties, negotiations failed 
and coalitions frequently collapsed. This suggests that while funding is an important element 
of cooperation, there is more at play than Arriola allows for, and that he overdetermines 
funding as a driver of successful coalition-building.  
A potential caveat that comes from Arriola’s theory, but which he does not explore, is that 
party leaders are less likely to cooperate when they are sufficiently well-funded to be able to 
run their own campaigns. Evidence of this comes from several negotiations processes 
outlined in this research – namely Zambia (2001, 2006) and Zimbabwe (2008). Even though 
funding was provided for parties to cooperate, these parties still ran individual campaigns and 
competed against each other, ultimately allowing the ruling party to win with a plurality of 
the vote. Although funders had provided the opposition with funding in the 2011 and 2016 
elections in Uganda, this was still not sufficient to encourage parties to coalesce (Chapter 2). 
In Zimbabwe in 2008, several international organisations had offered the two MDC factions 




a financial incentive to reach a compromise and strike a coalition deal (Chapter 4). The larger 
MDC-T was sufficiently well-funded by sympathetic governments and business elites that it 
could easily have offered the smaller MDC faction (or Simba Makoni) a financial incentive 
to support them. Instead, the selective support of one MDC faction by external actors drove 
an even deeper wedge between the two parties, and encouraged the larger faction to act 
unilaterally. This indicates that pecuniary coalition building is not always sufficient to forge 
unity from disparate opposition parties, and that the availability of funding can instead be a 
hindrance to successful cooperation by undermining trust and the relationships between 
parties.  
Arriola (2013) suggests that opposition parties are incentivised to sell their support to the 
highest bidder, which in many cases is the ruling party.834 However, as noted by Kelly (2018), 
parties – and party presidents – are not uniform in the extent to which they are willing to sell 
their support to the incumbent. While smaller parties in Zambia’s fluid party system enter 
coalitions with the incumbent fairly frequently, this is less common in Uganda and almost 
unheard of in Zimbabwe’s polarised political space. In particular, large electorally-significant 
opposition parties with a fairly stable electoral base – such as the UPND in Zambia, the FDC 
in Uganda and the MDC in Zimbabwe – are the least likely to enter into coalitions with the 
ruling party. Given the degree of coordinated anti-incumbent voting described in this 
research, these parties would likely undermine their electoral base by entering into a coalition 
with the incumbent. This all suggests that parties have other preferences than just to sell their 
support to the highest bidder, and that while funding is an important consideration, it is just 
one of a range of considerations for party elites during negotiations. 
5.1.4 The Ambiguous Role of Party Presidents 
Finally, as a corollary of the section on theorising parties as multi-level actors, this research 
has addressed the ambiguous role of party presidents. In the existing literature, the interests 
of parties are seen as indivisible from that of party presidents, and they are treated as one and 
the same. This research has shown that this assumption is largely misplaced, and that the 
interests of various party leaders should be disaggregated in order to understand coalitional 
behaviour. Across the three cases explored in this research, just seven newly-elected party 
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leaders agreed to go into coalitions with their ostensible allies. By contrast, 17 new opposition 
presidents pulled out of negotiations and opted instead to contest the election alone. This 
occurs frequently, but has not previously been recognised by coalition scholars due to 
inattention to coalition negotiations across multiple election cycles. The reasons why new 
leaders defect from coalitions appear to be their over-confidence in their ability to win the 
election – due in part to a lack of trusted and reliable polling data on the political support of 
candidates – and their accountability to the political and financial interests that helped them 
achieve their position. In addition, several of these ‘new party leaders’ or potential coalition 
partners were recent defectors from the regime – as with Amama Mbabazi (Uganda) and 
Simba Makoni and Joice Mujuru (Zimbabwe). These politicians, who had gambled their 
political fortunes by defecting from the ruling party and who project a view of the opposition 
as tired and incapable of winning, would insist on being chosen as the coalition’s candidate 
in any broad opposition alliance. In such cases, the largest opposition party – or that which 
came second to the incumbent in the previous polls – is more likely to withdraw from the 
coalition. In most instances where a new party president competed, they performed poorly 
at the polls in their maiden attempt and, having expended their political and financial capital, 
they enter into coalitions with other parties in subsequent electoral rounds.  
However, this still does not guarantee a broad, inclusive coalition that coheres until election 
day. Party presidents will still seek to use coalition negotiations to their own advantage, 
importing grievances from previous rounds of negotiations into new coalitions. In Uganda 
in 2016, DP President Mao was facing an insurrection within his party from the Buganda 
faction, which had aligned itself with the FDC presidential candidate. This exacerbated 
existing grievances which had been cemented in previous elections where the DP (and other 
smaller parties) had complained that the FDC had dominated the coalitions, run competing 
candidates in their strongholds and undermined their party’s unity. In response, and to try to 
retain control over his fractious party, Mao chose to elect Mbabazi as the TDA coalition 
candidate in 2015. Mao had calculated that Mbabazi was less likely to pose a threat to Mao’s 
position (or that of his party) than the FDC’s Besigye, as Mbabazi had no party or organised 
structures. Party leaders are constantly operating within a complex game where they are 
negotiating on multiple fronts, and trying to compare the expected utility from competing in 
a coalition with that of competing alone. 




Although rarely seen as such by scholars, each coalition negotiation is seen by the players as 
one set in an iterative game, where the previous behaviour of coalition partners has a bearing 
on future behaviour of party leaders.835 Some party leaders, having previously participated in 
coalitions, will refuse all later offers by the same partners. In Zambia, FDD President Edith 
Nawakwi – despite having lost with less than 1% of the vote in 2015 – refused to go into a 
coalition with the UPND in 2016, arguing instead that the larger party should support her 
electoral bid as she had supported theirs in 2006. Nawakwi has a small and unreliable base 
and limited party structures, but insisted that the UPND (which had nearly won the previous 
election) should support her bid for the presidency. This behaviour does not conform to any 
traditional theory of coalition behaviour, or rational actor framework, and although it may be 
an outlier, it complicates neat theories of coalition formation. 
Finally, in the wake of several failed coalition attempts, party leaders may make strategic 
choices to shift from a coalitional strategy to one of individualised elite inclusion, as in 
Zambia after 2011. Following the collapse of inter-party negotiations between 2001 and 2011, 
the PF sought to co-opt individuals into its ranks, bolstering its ability to compete nationally. 
This strategy was adopted by the UPND after 2011, who sought to broaden out their narrow 
electoral base by approaching disgruntled members of other parties and bringing them in as 
individuals, thereby short-circuiting complex inter-party negotiations.  
5.2 The Politics of Coalitions 
Coalition negotiations are highly complex and extremely fraught processes, which are plagued 
by information asymmetries and strategy dilemmas. Rather than being a straightforward 
question of whether to cooperate or not, parties find themselves trying to compare the 
expected utility of cooperation with the expected utility of running independently while 
choosing amongst potential coalition partners in often complex parallel negotiation 
processes. In contexts where ruling parties frequently try to subvert the opposition, party 
leaders must also contend with the possibility that some of their potential allies have instead 
been sent by the state to destabilise their electoral prospects – as in Ugandan in 2016. These 
parties face high levels of uncertainty over actual levels of political support, and the political 
support of new entrants to the coalition – including recent defectors from the regime. 
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Decision-making is hindered by a lack of precise polling, which is used in other contexts to 
determine the likely outcome of various sets of potential coalitions. In France and elsewhere, 
parties who were considering pre-electoral coalitions would frequently undertake opinion 
polling and voter sampling to test assumptions regarding the effect of the mooted coalition.836 
This creates a greater sense of certainty regarding the potential benefits (and costs) of 
coalitions. Golder (2006) describes how Korean politicians decided which opposition leader 
would step down in favour of their opponent based upon opinion polling of a few thousand 
voters.837 Such polls are rarely conducted in African countries, and those that are conducted 
are seldom believed.838 This uncertainty helps prompt new opposition party presidents to 
overestimate their electoral support, and insist on running an independent campaign. The 
widespread perception of electoral malpractice by the incumbent also renders many 
opposition parties and their allies to be more optimistic of their electoral fortunes than is 
warranted. 
The complexity of decision-making during negotiation processes is rarely highlighted. Much 
of the traditional theory assumes that it is a fairly simple calculation between two actors over 
who has greater electoral support, and thus who should step down in favour of the other. 
However, in many of the cases outlined in the empirical chapters, these coalitions are highly 
complex – with many simultaneous negotiations occurring between more than just two 
parties. In Zimbabwe in 2008, the two MDC parties were both in negotiations with each 
other to form a coalition, but at the same time both groups were in simultaneous negotiations 
with factions within the ruling party. Without an accurate measure of the popularity of some 
candidates relative to others, these can be difficult decisions to make. At the same time, these 
parties are trying to weigh up the potential electoral costs and benefits to allying themselves 
with a former (or current) member of the ruling party. And these decisions need to be made 
within an uncertain environment where the opposition believe that their ranks have been 
infiltrated by agents from the government’s security sector – which automatically undermines 
trust. 
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Coalition negotiations collapse for several reasons, and this research has explored some of 
them. The first relates to how the interests of party factions can work to undermine 
cooperation. The second relates to difficulties in securing cooperation when parties are 
competing for the same groups of voters, rather than having complementary constituencies 
which lead to lower levels of inter-party competition. Third, the availability of funding can 
help to scupper a coalition if it is widely available and parties are not in need of the finances 
that come with coalescing, but also if it is provided just to one party as this can undermine 
inter-party relationships. The provision of funding for cooperation is not a guarantee of 
coalition coherence, and instead this is dependent on the interests of the party leaders. Finally, 
party leaders have an ambiguous role to play in driving coalition coherence. Newly-elected 
party leaders and those who came second in previous elections are less willing to enter into 
or remain in coalitions in which they are not the presidential candidate than more seasoned, 
but less successful, candidates, and some will continuously renege on coalitions despite their 
lack of national reach. The complexity and contingent nature of the factors outlined above – 
and the history of the cases expanded upon in this thesis – helps to explain why so little 
academic consensus exists with regards to the drivers of successful coalition-building in 
Africa. 
5.3 Beyond Opposition Coalitions 
While this research is valuable for hypothesis-testing, as has been done above, it has broader 
relevance beyond this. It has also highlighted the importance of factors such as the role of 
party leaders and party members in scuttling negotiations. This suggests new variables that 
might be usefully included in future comparative studies of coalitions. This research 
advocates for more in-depth research into political parties in Africa, and the various 
mobilisation strategies that they deploy. Coalition negotiations are but one of a range of 
options available to parties at election time, and parties may change their electoral strategies 
in response to failed coalitions. This research has outlined how, in the wake of the collapse 
of several coalition processes, Zambian opposition parties sought to expand their narrow 
social bases through individualised elite inclusion, circumventing complex inter-party 
negotiations.  




More broadly, this dissertation has contributed to the sparse literature on opposition parties 
in Africa, highlighting the varied histories and mobilisation methods of the parties in each of 
the three countries. In Zambia, it traced the changing mobilisation methods of the UPND 
and outlined how a previously nationally uncompetitive party can branch out beyond their 
traditional constituencies and grow its electoral base, especially amongst non-co-ethnics. 
With regards to Zimbabwe, this research has begun to outline the effects of foreign 
intervention on the opposition and civic actors during the country’s long 21st century decline. 
This is also the first piece of research that has sought to outline the complex relationships 
between the opposition parties in Uganda’s hegemonic party-state. 
Beyond this, these three cases have highlighted the limitations of the ethnic voting hypothesis 
which remains the touchstone of much of the political science literature on Africa. It has 
shown that anti-incumbent voters frequently abandon co-ethnic party leaders and parties 
who are not perceived to be nationally viable, in favour of non-co-ethnics who stand a greater 
chance of defeating the incumbent. Finally, this dissertation has also provided an important 
reminder of the rich insights that can be gained from both small-N case studies and 
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